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Summary of the Dissertation: Long-Run Growth 
Dynamics of British Cities and their Role in the 
Economy 
This thesis examines the economic development and evolution of British cities since the 
1970s. Outside of the introduction and conclusion, it is comprised of six papers, most 
published jointly as journal articles through work on two ESRC-funded projects, How Regions 
React to Recession: Resilience, Hysteresis and Long Run Impacts (Grant ES/1035811/1) 
and Structural Transformation, Adaptability and City Economic Evolutions (Grant 
ES/N006135/1). 
What binds the papers together, aside from their focus on different aspects of the 
development of British cities, is a database constructed to undertake the empirical analysis. 
The cities covered by the research are defined as a set of (high-population) Travel-To-Work-
Areas, which are functional labour market areas defined on commuting boundaries and 
thresholds. What makes the database unique is both its extensive time dimension, and the 
range of economic indicators that have been developed to underpin the different dimensions 
of the research, each of which is addressed in the following chapters. 
Growing Apart - Structural Transformation and the Uneven Development of British Cities 
summarises how cities have evolved since the 1970s, and the role that sectoral change has 
had in their growth and decline. Reviving the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and Spatially 
Rebalancing the British Economy discusses the role of cities in the ‘north-south divide’ and 
the emerging policies to address the perceived under-performance of northern cities. The 
City Dimension of the Productivity Growth Puzzle looks at the national productivity slowdown 
through a city lens, in particular the role played by structural change. In Search of the Skilled 
City investigates the role of human capital in cities and how high-skilled labour is linked to 
different types and geographies of urban development. Finally, The Resilience of Cities to 
Economic Shocks examines how cities have responded in times of recession, and how this 
affects their long-run performance, before looking forward to the potential impact of Brexit as 
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‘As is commonly the case with the geography of a complex economic unit, the 
present makes no sense until it is related to the evolutionary process which has 
produced it’ (Peter Hall, 1962). 
 ‘Macroeconomics - large scale economics - is a shambles. Nations are not the 
basic, salient entities of economic life, nor are they particularly useful for probing 
the mysteries of economic structure, the reason for the rise and decline of 
wealth. Cities, not nations, are the true engines of economic progress’ (Jane 
Jacobs, 1984). 
‘The economy as a whole is simply too big, too remote from ordinary experience, 
to grasp. Is there any piece of the economy that can truly help us understand 
the whole? I suggest a somewhat unusual answer, but one that is growing in 
popularity amongst economists: that a particularly good way to understand the 
economy is by studying cities’ (Paul Krugman, 1996). 
1.1 Motivation and Context 
Academic perspective 
It is difficult to underestimate the degree to which interest in city-level economic development 
and political devolution has increased over the past decade. Cities and urban areas are seen 
as the primary sources of wealth creation and the centres from which competitive advantage 
and productivity gains can accrue through agglomeration economies. 
In academia, within the overlapping subfields of urban economics, regional science and the 
‘new economic geography’, a vast body of literature now exists that explores the importance 
of the external economies and increasing returns effects that arise from the concentration of 
economic activity (firms, workers and consumers) in cities, and the positive impact of that 
concentration on productivity, innovation and wages. A substantial part of this work is 
theoretical and involves formal mathematical models; but it has also stimulated an expanding 
body of empirical enquiry, although this remains somewhat limited in many countries partly 
due to data limitations and definitional ambiguities. 
Over the past few years, cities and city-regions have assumed growing prominence in 
discussions over economic growth, performance, and prosperity. Both geographers and 
economists point to the increasing concentration of economic activity and wealth creation in 
cities, and their crucial importance as the loci of national prosperity (Florida, 2008; Scott, 
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2001; Glaeser, 2009, 2012; Storper, 2013; Storper et al, 2015).  National governments and 
international bodies have likewise recognized the key economic role that cities play, and have 
correspondingly directed attention to cities as the foci of policy intervention and governance 
reform (for example, OECD, 2015; European Commission, 2016; World Bank, 2008; Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2006). Cities have come to dominate how we think about 
economies.  
But, as some studies demonstrate, not all cities have enjoyed economic success in recent 
years, (Dijkstra et al 2013; Parkinson, 2013), and some evidence points to an increasing 
divergence in economic growth between cities, especially in the United States  (Hobor, 2013; 
Moretti, 2013; Kemeny and Storper, 2014). In fact, certain cities have actually experienced a 
dramatic decline in economic fortune, such as Detroit in (Binelli, 2013), or Liverpool in the UK 
(Couch and Cocks, 2012), and have been struggling to recover.  More generally, there is 
growing concern about what has become known as the ‘shrinking city’ phenomenon, as 
certain cities across the US, Europe and elsewhere appear to be declining in population and 
in economic growth (see for example, Pallgast, 2010).  Other cities appear to be able to 
‘reinvent’ themselves and undergo economic resurgences, such as Boston in the US 
(Glaeser, 2005) and London in the UK (Martin, 2016).  As the famous North American 
urbanist Jane Jacobs argued many years ago, cities rise and fall, in relative if not in absolute 
terms, depending on the competitiveness of their export activities. The decline of many cities 
particularly in the north of Britain in the post-war period has had dramatic consequences for 
the well-being and quality of life of their residents. The loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector 
led to many people living in cities becoming long-term unemployed or destined to take 
relatively low paid service sector jobs, or move to urban centres of growth and employment 
elsewhere. The structural transition from manufacturing to service economies has thus been 
one of the fundamental drivers of urban inequality. 
The UK context 
While much of the recent academic research referred to above has focussed on US cities 
(e.g. much of the work of Glaeser, Storper and Florida, op cit), and ‘world cities’ (e.g. ARUP’s 
100 Resilient Cities1), this thesis focusses on the economic performance of UK cities. There 
is a question on the extent to which findings from the academic research, and subsequent 
policy initiatives that emerge from this, are based on findings from US studies that may not 
be directly applicable in the UK. 
 
1 See https://www.arup.com/projects/100-resilient-cities. 
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The UK is an interesting case because it is heavily urbanised and also operates on a largely 
mono-centric system due to the dominance of London (see Figures 1.1  - 1.2 below). London 
has benefited from two fundamental advantages not enjoyed by other UK cities. 
First, it has long been the nation’s financial capital, and was to some extent already a leading 
international financial centre when deindustrialisation set in, so that it was well placed to 
benefit from the deregulation and globalisation of finance and banking that the national 
Government began from the mid-1980s onwards (so-called ‘Big Bang’) – indeed, as Figure 
1.1 shows, this is the period when London’s productivity pulled away from the rest of the 
country, and other large cities in particular.  












Source: Data constructed as part of PhD Thesis (see Chapter 2). 
Much of London’s economic turnaround since then can be attributed to the success of its 
financial nexus, and its leading role as a global financial centre. Second, and again of long-
standing significance, London is the seat of not just financial power in the UK economy but 
also of political power, containing as it does all the major seats of what is one of the most 
centralised political and policy systems among OECD nations. This has put London in a 
 
2 The Core Cities are a group of 11 large UK cities outside of London. They include Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, 
Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield. 
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unique position to influence national policy-making, from fiscal and monetary policy to control 
over public finances and public spending across the regions and cities of the UK. It has also 
enjoyed a level of political and fiscal autonomy simply not available to other major cities 
across the nation. In short, the UK’s political economy is highly spatially biased in favour of 
the capital, a bias that has long been an institutionalised feature of the UK. This raises 
important questions concerning the need to devolve and decentralise the national economy, 
so as to permit the UK’s other cities to develop and compete on a ’level playing field’. 
The growing interest of policy and academia in cities as economic hubs also reflects a basic 
economic and demographic phenomenon of the increasing proportion of populations that are 
living in urban areas. The UN report, World Urbanisation Prospects (2015 revision), reports 
that urbanisation of global population has increased from 43% in 1950, to 54% in 2014, and 
is expected to rise to 66% by 2050. In the UK the equivalent figures are 78, 82 and 89.  Figure 
1.2 shows these trends in more detail, and while the UK proportion did not change much up 
to 2000, there has clearly been a marked shift towards an upwards trend since then. 
Figure 1.2: Urban Population Shares 
  
Source: UN World Urbanisation Prospects (2015 revision)3 
 
3 Much of this type of analysis depends on how you define what is meant by the term ‘urban’. For the UN, it is noted that no 
common (global) definition exists and so they rely on ensuring consistency of definition within countries across time, rather 
than across countries. 
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Having established that the UK spatial context is an interesting one to research, two further 
questions can be asked. Firstly, to what extent the UK’s concentration of activity in London 
is unique, particularly among large European countries with which it has had closest links in 
recent times through EU membership. Secondly, whether the period of time being analysed 
(1970s -> 2015) is unique in terms of the spatial imbalance being experienced in the UK or 
whether it is more normal than might be realised. 
Figure 1.3 provides the country-level comparison (at NUTS2 regional level, as equivalent city 
definitions were not readily available) by looking at the ratio of the top and bottom region’s 
productivity. 
Figure 1.3: Country comparison of regional (NUTS2) productivity spreads 
 
Source: Eurostat ARDECO database4. 
It can be seen how Germany shifts upwards suddenly in the early 1990s due to 
reunification, when east German regions are added to the mix, but since that initial rise the 
trend has been generally one of convergence. Also Italy, a country which conjures up 
stereotypical north-south divides with the Mezzogiorno, has generally seen a decline in the 
spread of its regional productivity, although this is partly due to slow growth in general. 
Meanwhile France, a country which is also has a largely monocentric governance structure 
similar to the UK, has a much lower productivity spread, and aside from a divergence 
around the time of the financial crisis and subsequent great recession, has been fairly 
 
4 See https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/territorial/ardeco-database_en.  
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stable. Finally the UK, where the sharp rise in the mid-1980s is caused by a mix of rising 
productivity in inner London, the top productivity region for the whole period  (due to the 
combined effects of continuing de-industrialisation and financial liberalisation but also the 
declining productivity of Southern Scotland (the lowest ranking region around that time). 
The reversal of this divergence occurs as low-performing regions start to catch up in the 
boom period of the mid-1990s, but this is a short-lived phenomenon. From the late-1990s 
onwards the trend has mostly been one of further separation of London’s productivity from 
the rest of the country. 
The historical perspective on UK imbalance and is outlined as part of Chapter 4, in 
particular Section 4.2 which uses data from Geary and Stark (2015, 2016) and Stark (2005) 
to show how London was, even in the late 1800s and certainly into the early 1900s, the 
dominant region in the UK in terms of GDP and GDP per capita shares, and was also 
growing in importance (in both manufacturing and finance). Possibly a more telling 
visualisation can be found in Figure 1 of the Industrial Strategy Council’s review of UK 
productivity disparities5, which shows how relative regional (NUTS1) productivity levels 
have moved since 1900 to recent times. While it is true that London is the only NUTS1 
region that is close to representing a city, the wax and wane of its fortunes can be clearly 
seen over the longer run of data, with a gradual decline during the first half of the 20th 
century reversing around the early-1970s (at the start of this study’s data period) and 
increasing thereafter. However, having said this, although the early period can be seen as 
part of a ‘long wave’ of development, the current levels of London’s relative performance do 
seem historically high even by these longer-term standards. 
UK policy perspective 
From a policy perspective, the contributions that cities make to the national economy and 
how some cities are part of a global network that transcends national systems are of 
increasing interest. The world is also becoming increasingly urbanised and so it makes sense 
to look below the regional level and investigate how cities and regions interact with one 
another and how this affects the ability of different spatial areas to resist and recover 
economic shocks such as recessions.  
In recent years, the UK Government has acknowledged that the national growth model has 
become too centralised6 and too dependent on just a narrow range of economic activity – 
especially finance and associated sectors – in just one corner of the country (London and the 
 
5 See https://industrialstrategycouncil.org/uk-regional-productivity-differences-evidence-review. 




surrounding South East), and has recognised the need to ‘rebalance’ the economy spatially, 
to ‘power up’ the nation’s other major cities (see Martin and Gardiner, 2018).   
Increasing calls for a loosening of tax-raising powers from Whitehall have, in turn, given rise 
to more localised policy initiatives, including devolution of power to cities and local areas. In 
2011 the Government published Unlocking Growth in Cities7, which set the scene for giving 
greater financial powers to cities through a number of initiatives, in parallel to operation of the 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which were designed to provide business-driven 
decisions at local level. More recently, cities have been at the heart of the so-called 
“powerhouses” of the North, Midlands, and elsewhere, and are thus now at the very heart of 
boosting economic growth. 
In this context, recent national-level policy developments would appear to be useful steps in 
the right direction. These include: the declaration of a commitment to boost the major cities 
making up what George Osborne, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, called the ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’  (Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle); similar commitments to 
other pan-city initiatives e.g. Midlands Engine; the decision to construct a new High Speed 
Two rail link (HS2) from London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds; the granting of 
certain devolved fiscal and other powers to a limited number of major cities and combined 
authorities, with their own new ‘metro-mayors’; a number of City Deals intended to support 
economic growth and job creation; a National Infrastructure Commission to advise central 
Government to undertake a nation-wide infrastructure assessment; and the introduction of a 
new, ‘place-based’ National Industrial Strategy. These are all welcome and could potentially 
provide some of the building blocks for a much-needed policy programme to stimulate growth 
in the cities outside of London and ultimately help to spatially rebalance the national 
economy. 
However, these various initiatives are not well coordinated, operationally or spatially, nor 
based on any coherent strategy specifically focused on how the cities operate as a system.  
The Government’s commitment to promoting a ‘Northern Powerhouse’ to “rival that of 
London” seems to have lost momentum, and arguably has fallen victim to the demand of 
securing a satisfactory Brexit outcome. The HS2 project is also under review. Further, while 
devolution is certainly necessary for ‘powering up’ city economies and other areas outside 
London, of itself it is not likely to be sufficient. Much will depend on the scale of financial 
resources and powers actually devolved (an issue that had been raised by Lord Heseltine in 
 
7 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-growth-in-cities--5. 
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his report No Stone Unturned, 2012), and how far devolution goes beyond what appears to 
be the existing priority of ‘contract over real governance’ (Sandford, 2016).  
Finally, despite its claim to be ‘place-based’, the Industrial Strategy which now underpins the 
subsequently-devolved Local Industrial Strategies merely regards place as one (and the last) 
of 10 key pillars of a national policy.  As the leading North American urbanist, Jane Jacobs 
(1984), famously argued, it is impossible to understand the ‘national’ economy without explicit 
reference to the performance and developmental needs of the cities and city regions of which 
it is composed.  It is in cities that the bulk of a nation’s wealth is created, its exports are 
produced, its jobs are located, and its incomes are spent. ‘Place’ is not some separate ‘pillar’ 
of industrial policy, a simple ‘add-on’ dimension, but should be the central foundation on 
which to base and spatially configure key national policies on innovation, technology, skills, 
infrastructure, and so on. 
That said, recent initiatives are of help and make the UK an interesting geography from which 
to analyse and learn from city evolutions, but there is still much to do. 
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
My research is underpinned by several aims and themes, that are best articulated in the 
questions below: 
How have structural transformations observed at national level been distributed 
across British cities? 
This analysis focuses primarily on the changing employment, output, and productivity of 
individual sectors, so as to identify declining industries, new and growing industries and those 
that have experienced successful upgrading or ‘turnaround’.  
The analysis then investigates how these individual industry patterns have played out across 
the national urban system and how the position in cities compares with that in their 
hinterlands.   A priori, one would not expect national patterns of industry change to occur 
uniformly across cities and their regions, not only because the latter will differ in their industrial 
(structural) ensembles, but also because the growth performance of a given industry may 
itself vary from area to area, reflecting, for example, local conditions and national and 
international factors (Storper, 2013; Cheshire et al. 2014).   
To establish the first objective, I have constructed and applied a new database for describing 
the economic evolutions of cities in Great Britain. This is significant because the availability 
and awareness of a new database allows for improved analysis of city-level economic 
evolutions across space and time in a manner which, up until now, was not possible.  
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How have the economic structures of British cities changed over time? 
A second aim has been to reveal and analyse how the economic structures (industrial 
ensembles) of individual cities have evolved over time. Thus, while the first aim is to 
determine the urban geographies of national industry-by-industry growth patterns, the aim 
here is to analyse the evolutionary dynamics of each city’s complete industrial ensemble 
(including public sector activities).   Several inter-related questions have been investigated 
here: 
• How should city economic structures (industrial ensembles) be measured and compared?  
• How should specialization, diversity and other structural concepts such as diversified 
specialization (Farhauer and Kroll, 2012) and related variety, (Frenken et al, 2007) be 
measured? 
• Which measures provide better insight into a city’s economic structure and its 
transformation over time? 
• How far, and in what ways, have cities varied in the pace and direction of structural 
change?  
• Have cities become less specialized and more diversified, and thereby increasingly similar 
in their economic structures over time? 
• Do city economic structures change incrementally, or more discontinuously, for example in 
response to major shocks? The ideas of urban regional economic resilience are of direct 
relevance here (e.g. Martin, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015). 
How and why have cities varied in economic adaptability and to what degree has this 
been shaped by their industrial structure? 
The issue of structural change relates directly to the question of adaptability, or the speed 
with which city economies either shift from declining sectors into newer growth sectors, or 
are able to revivify slow-growing activities, for example by innovation and/or productivity-
raising strategies. The notion of adaptability is central to an evolutionary perspective on 
economic growth (Metcalfe, 2003; Metcalfe et al, 2006), and to the new evolutionary 
economic geography (Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010).  This is where the concepts of path 
dependence and new path creation come to the fore, both of which play a key role in how 
local economies evolve (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010).  Key inter-related questions 
to be investigated here thus include: 
• How far and in what ways do pre-existing city economic structures condition (positively or 
negatively) the emergence of new activities and industries?  
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• Do relationships between industries within an urban ensemble play a significant role in 
shaping urban economic adaptability?  
• Are structurally diverse cities more likely to develop or attract new sectors of activities than 
more specialised cities? 
• How path dependent are city economic structures? What is the evidence of lock-in? Are 
economically specialized cities more prone to lock-in? 
• How does a city’s inherited skills profile (its human capital base) shape the pace and 
direction of structural change?  
• What has been the role of economic structure and structural transformation in explaining 
city growth paths? 
What sort of economic structure - diversified or specialized - is most conducive to 
regional and city growth? 
The question of diversity versions specialisation has been a recurring topic of debate in 
economic geography, regional science and urban studies/economics.  Despite the fact that 
some observers argue that specialization is the motor of city growth (Storper, 2013, Chapter 
2; Storper et al, 2013, Chapter 2; Kemeny and Storper, 2014), the jury is still out on how 
structure influences growth.  Some studies find that employment growth rates are higher in 
cities with diversified economic structures (eg. Glaeser et al, 1992; Combes, 2000; Frenken 
et al, 2007), whereas others find that productivity growth rates are higher in specialised cities 
(Henderson, 2004; Mukkala, 2004). In fact, the evidence is equivocal (see Beaudry and 
Schiffauerova, 2009), and much of it, furthermore, pertains to short time periods. A medium 
to long-run perspective of the sort adopted in my research helps illuminate the question of 
which types of structure and ensemble are more or less conducive to growth.  
How have urban and related policies impacted on the structures and growth paths of 
British cities? 
There is increasing interest in the ways in which institutions and governance structures shape 
local, urban and regional economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), in as much they may 
determine the operation of land and housing markets, physical infrastructures, and the supply 
of business finance and human capital. It is thus important to establish how far and in what 
ways both city-specific and national urban and industrial policies and governance 
arrangements have had any significant consequences for the process of industrial change 
and economic growth in cities. This issue is of particular relevance given current political 
concern to boost the economic growth of Britain’s northern cities (Osborne, 2014; RSA City 
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Growth Commission, 20148). Some have argued that any urban and industrial policy 
intervention should be ‘horizontal’, and that policies that support all entrepreneurial start-ups, 
encourage knowledge exchange and raise human capital levels across the board are most 
conducive to growth (Nathan and Overman, 2013). An alternative view is that more tailored 
local policies targeted at specific sectors or clusters are a more effective use of resources 
(Bailey et al, 2014), and policy and institutional interventions should therefore be directed at 
the supply of specific research institutions, technologies or skills that are related to the 
emergence of ‘new economy’ industries and clusters. This is the idea behind so-called ‘smart 
specialization’ in which policies are focused building on the potential of the existing industrial 
base and pursuing those key directions recognized by local entrepreneurs (McCann et al 
2017). 
1.3 Overview of the Research 
The thesis consists of six discrete pieces of research, all focussed around the topic of cities 
and their evolution over time, space and the type of activity. Although the research topics are 
different, the flow chart in Figure 1.4 below and overview text shows how they are, 
nonetheless, part of an inter-related system of ideas that fit together as a whole. 







Underlying narratives of the research 
• Places versus people 
An underlying narrative that binds all the papers together is that place matters. In the UK and 
elsewhere there has been, and largely there still is, an ongoing policy debate which is stylised 
as people vs place. The people side of the debate argues that policies should be place neutral 
and only focus on actions which focus on benefits to the individual (e.g. education, mobility) 
rather than those which try to improve the inherent features of a place (unless this is a result 
of people want to live and work there). Studies such as Gibbons et al (2011) typify this view 
and claim that, once the individual (people) effects are removed, spatial disparities disappear 
and place is no longer important. To quote: 
“our general finding is that most of the observed regional inequality in average wage 
in Britain is explained by ‘sorting’ or ‘people’ rather than ‘places’. Our preferred 
estimates, which include the individual fixed effects, suggest that the contribution of 
individual characteristics to variation in wages is between 100 to 850 times larger than 
the contribution of area effects (Gibbons et al. op cit; 760). 
• Equity versus efficiency 
Linked to this debate is that of equity versus efficiency, on which one side argues that 
imbalance is a natural outcome of the agglomeration forces which accrue due to increasing 
returns to scale an increasing densification in already prosperous areas (such as London and 
the Greater South East). Thus, these forces should be left to run their course, or even 
encouraged if the objective is stronger national growth. This is a view which in the past was 
largely be adopted by the British Government, in particular HM Treasury: 
“Theory and evidence suggests that allowing regional concentration of economic 
activity will increase national growth. As long as economies of scale, knowledge 
spillovers and a local pool of skilled labour result in productivity gains that outweigh 
congestion costs, the economy will benefit from agglomeration… policies that aim to 
spread growth amongst regions are running counter to the natural growth process and 
are difficult to justify on efficiency grounds, unless significant congestion costs exist 
(HM Treasury 2007: 20).” 
On the other side of this debate is the view that regional imbalances do matter. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, but the arguments are that a more unequal regional 
distribution of prosperity and performance is bad for the country as it makes macroeconomic 
policy less efficient as regions become less representative of the UK average which fiscal 
and monetary policy are aimed at. In addition, there are negative aspects of ever further 
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concentration such as pollution, congestion, social unrest, and other health-related issues 
which are often under-played. The OECD, in a recent study, (Royuela et al, 2018) find a 
negative association between regional income inequality and national growth, i.e. more 
unequal countries have growth more slowly since the start of the economic crisis.  
The debate has not been concluded, and probably will never be due to the complex dynamic 
inter-linkages between place and people that are difficult to disentangle within an economic 
model. This view harks back to the work of Lösch (1939), which points to the close 
interrelationships between people, production and place that give rise to intractable 
identification issues. 
• No single theoretical underpinning model 
Throughout the chapters it will be evident that there is no underlying theoretical model from 
which dependent and independent variables are derived, or from which particular hypotheses 
are tested. This reflects partly the exploratory and explanatory nature of the work, based as 
it is on a newly-created database, and also the wide-ranging nature of the research brief 
which covers a variety of dimensions of city performance and which it would be difficult to 
originate at a single theoretical starting point. This stands somewhat at odds with more 
focussed first-principals empirical work on, for example, agglomeration economies (see for 
example Chapter 6 in Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk (2020)). In contrast, the work 
in the chapters is more eclectic. For example, the existing modelling structure of Simon and 
Nardinelli (2002) is adopted (and adapted) for analysing different hypotheses relating to 
skilled labour and city development in Chapter Six. Also, in Chapter Seven on city resilience 
a basic correlation and production function type approach is adopted, whereas an alternative 
might have been to consider firm-level resilience from first principles and then build up an 
aggregate model which was consistent with micro-economic foundations. These are 
potentially topics for future research and would certainly help to bring the work closer to the 
field of mainstream urban economics, and in the case of resilience also reflects the still early 
nature of the research on explaining the concept through empirical work. 
Chronology of research 
The chronology of the research is also relevant for understanding how the narrative of the 
work evolved, and the chapters of the thesis generally follow the timing of work. The database 
was the first of research that was developed, as it was needed for all the other empirical 
analysis to take place. However, initially the work focussed on four main variables: sector 
output, employment and labour productivity, and population. Then came the need to establish 
a basic understanding of the trends in the data, in particular the extent to which city trends 
replication national-sector trends. Also, there was a desire to establish typologies of 
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behaviour, initially from underlying characteristics, but ultimately this evolved into looking at 
growth clubs because sets of common factors were hard to identify. Around the time the 
sectoral trends paper was being completed, an offer came along to do a book chapter on the 
north-south divide and this was seen as another interesting way of exploring the dataset, and 
so the role of cities in this policy debate was examined. This also fitted well with external 
projects, as I had helped to complete and publish the Northern Powerhouse Independent 
Economic Review (IER)9 for Transport for the North a few months previously. Also, around 
this time, I was working as a Co-Investigator for the Productivity Insights Network10, which is 
looking to improve understanding of the UK productivity puzzle by using cross-thematic 
approaches to shed new light on the problem. Using the newly-constructed database to 
analyse city productivity trends and, in particular, analyse the importance of sector mix and 
the role of de-industrialisation and rise of services (especially Knowledge Intensive Business 
Services, KIBS), was a useful addition to this strand of work. The project team then felt 
something should be done on human capital, which is often cited as one of the most important 
drivers behind economic performance at all spatial levels. An additional data set, based on 
research being done for Working Futures11 by my company, Cambridge Econometrics, was 
established in the form of sector-occupation matrices to be developed at TTWA level. This 
additional dimension (occupation by sector by city over time) enabled us to test certain 
hypotheses concerning human capital and skilled labour, which otherwise would not have 
been possible. Finally, a long-running theme of interest in the project team was the concept 
of resilience – indeed the previous ESRC project had been devoted to the topic of regional 
resilience, and so looking at city-level resilience seemed to be a natural extension. It also 
brought together understanding gained from all the previous work (the role of sectoral mix, 
human capital, north-south divide typology, and the evolution of productive performance) in 
seeking to explain the concept of resilience from a new spatial perspective (as the regional 
resilience research space has become rather crowded). It was thus a fitting way to end the 
project. 
The following sub-sections describe the different chapters in more detail. 
Database 
From the start, the construction of a database has been a central, and an underpinning, factor 
to all the subsequent empirical work, for the simple reason that such a database (of sufficient 




10 See https://productivityinsightsnetwork.co.uk/. 
11 See https://www.camecon.com/what/our-work/working-futures-2017-2027-long-run-labour-market-and-skills-projections/. 
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In addition, and despite the increasing interest in city-level economic development and its 
place at the centre of sub-national policy agenda, there is no single definition of what 
geography a city should represent. City level databases usually fall within two groups – those 
based on administrative boundaries which are generally easier to collect and maintain, and 
functional boundaries which rely on more detailed (often census-based) calculations. The 
work on the data has culminated in a new city-level database centred around the travel-to-
work-area, which is a concept based around self-contained commuting areas. This is a 
functional definition, although the database is constructed from local authority level data. The 
resulting dataset covers the period 1971-2015, has detail up to 82 sectors, and includes 
indicators for population, employment and output. The analysis begins by firstly comparing it 
with data available from other urban representations (functional areas, metropolitan regions, 
and primary urban areas). The analysis then moves to provide two applications of the data 
that demonstrate its usefulness to city-level research. 
The work described in the data construction thus provides the foundations of the chapters 
that follow. 
Structural change 
Following the establishment of the database, the next most obvious path to take was to 
describe and typologise what was observed in terms of city growth paths. Structural change 
is central to this – the period of analysis has seen periods of deindustrialisation, the rise of 
the services sector, and in particular the rise of knowledge-intensive business services 
(KIBS) as globalisation has radically changed trading patterns and specialisation behaviour. 
As noted earlier, eg Storper (2013), Frenken et al, (2007), debates continue about how 
structural change is important in driving performance at all spatial scales (national, regional, 
and city-level). Regardless of the position in the debate (specialisation, diversification, related 
variety) structural change is widely considered to be an important aspect of national economic 
growth. Yet the issue is not only of relevance at the macro-economic level; it also has a direct 
bearing on the growth of regions and cities. In this chapter the relationship between structural 
transformation and economic (output) growth across British cities over the last half century is 
examined. The work shows how the structural transformations in the national economy have 
played out quite differently across British cities, shaping to a considerable extent their 
divergent growth trajectories over the past five decades. At a broad level, it is possible to 
distinguish between a number of distinct growth types of cities, and these also display 
significant differences in the extent and direction of structural change and reorientation. 
However, while differences in structural change have certainly been important in influencing 
city growth paths, other, ‘city-specific’, factors appear also to have exerted an influence, and 
thus require investigation. 
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Spatial rebalancing and the Northern Powerhouse 
The concept of Northern Powerhouse was born on a trade mission trip to China by the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, in 2013, where it was felt that the cities and 
regions of the north required an entity or voice to represent them, following the abolition of 
the Regional Development Agencies a few years previously. In a talk in Manchester the 
following year12,  George Osborne’s Northern Powerhouse agenda was launched, based on 
the idea that Northern cities are “individually strong but collectively not strong enough. The 
whole is less than the sum of its parts.” Few would probably disagree with the basic intent 
and aspiration behind this declaration, or that the UK economy has become too dominated 
by London, but this chapter argues that both the dominant diagnosis of the problem, and the 
main policies being advanced to solve it, are more debatable. In addition, this ‘discovery’ of 
spatial imbalance in the UK was nothing new and had already been documented in research 
such as Martin (1988) and Fothergill and Gudgin (1982), among many others. This work 
tended to be regional in nature, however, while the city-based dimension of the Northern 
Powerhouse concept developed more recently following the rise of London contrasted 
against the deindustrialising northern cities (rather than just the stereotype North-South 
divide), and increasing relevance of cities to the policy landscape through rising urbanisation. 
It is in fact questionable whether Northern cities are as economically strong ‘individually’ as 
Osborne’s claim suggests. There is more to a city’s economic success than just size and 
density, and the argument that greater connectivity to London promised by the High Speed 
2 rail project will benefit Northern cities is highly contestable. Moreover, devolution could even 
intensify economic and social disparities both among Northern cities themselves and in 
relation to the more advantageous position of London with regard to fiscal devolution. The 
lagging performance of northern cities (and regions) and the challenge confronting their 
catch-up with London need to be understood in terms of the historical development of the 
national political economy, and how that development has favoured a certain disposition 
towards and role in the evolving process of globalisation. 
Cities and the productivity puzzle 
Across OECD countries productivity growth has slowed, not just in recent years but over the 
past four decades: the so-called productivity puzzle. The research in this chapter examines 
the differing productivity growth paths of 85 British cities since the beginning of the 1970s, 
and explores how far these paths reflect differences across cities in the pace and nature of 
structural change. We find that while northern cities led productivity growth over 1971–91 
southern cities then led after 1991. However, at the same time, the rate of productivity growth 
 
12 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-we-need-a-northern-powerhouse. 
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slowed across almost all cities between these two periods. We find evidence of considerable 
structural convergence across cities and a general tendency for the degree of specialisation 
to fall. This then leads to a decomposition analysis which identifies the relative contribution 
of between-sector (structural change) and within-sector effects to city productivity growth. 
The analysis reveals that structural change – and especially the shift from manufacturing to 
services – has had a negative impact on productivity growth across all cities, but that within-
sector productivity developments while positive and outweighing structural change effects, 
have also declined over the past 45 years, as well as varying across cities. These findings 
point to the need for further research on the causes of this slowdown in ‘within-sector 
‘productivity growth and why those causes appear to differ from city to city. They also point 
to the need for a ‘place-based’ dimension to policies aimed at improving national productivity 
performance. 
Cities and skills 
Recent research has argued that human capital has become the key driver of city growth and 
that there is a widening divergence between high and low-skill cities, e.g. Glaser (2003), 
Moretti (2013), and Parkinson (2016). This skilled city view includes several stylised 
propositions. The first is that more skills and human capital generate stronger economic 
growth; the second is that already skilled cities are becoming ever more skilled; and, the third 
is that larger cities tend to have stronger concentrations of, and faster growth in, high-skilled, 
cognitive occupations. Additional data work was undertaken to extend the city database, 
whereby occupational change between 1981 and 2015 was linked to and calculated from the 
existing sectoral employment data, this research evaluates whether these propositions apply 
to British urban evolution, and how they relate to the ‘hollowing-out’ of medium-skilled jobs. 
The results confirm the close interactive relationship between growth and high-skilled 
occupations. However, some of the skilled city propositions, such as ‘smart cities becoming 
smarter’, and a positive relationship between agglomeration and high skilled employment 
growth, do not apply in Britain where other factors have been more important. The pattern of 
high-skill growth has shown a strong regional dimension, and the ‘emergence’ of newer 
smaller cities, particularly in southern England has been more evident than the ‘resurgence’ 
of large core and industrial cities. 
City-level resilience 
Research on resilience in the social sciences has grown rapidly over the past decade, linked 
mainly to the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession which saw many 
countries in Europe plunged prolonged downturns. Much of this work that relates to 
economics and geography (and which itself has originated from analysis of shocks in other 
areas such as psychology and environmental science) has focussed on national and regional 
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resilience, generally defined in terms of macro-regions. While the research undertaken thus 
far has addressed the issue of resilience from a variety of different perspectives (e.g. 
ecological, social, cultural, and economic), much less work has been undertaken into the 
roles that cities play in regional resilience, and how they contribute to the longer-term 
consequences for economic growth and prosperity. This is an important omission, because 
from a policy perspective the contributions that cities make to the national economy and how 
some cities are part of a global network that transcends national systems are of increasing 
interest. The world is also becoming increasingly urbanised and so it makes sense to look 
below the regional level and investigate how cities and regions interact with one another and 
how this affects the ability of different spatial areas to resist and recover economic shocks 
such as recessions. The paper thus helps to fill a gap in the literature by examining the 
resilience of British cities to major economic shocks. Using the newly-created city database, 
it analyses their resistance to and recovery from the last four major recessions, over the 
period 1971 to 2015.  It reveals a distinct shift in the relation between resistance and recovery 
between these shocks, as well as major differences between northern and southern cities. 
Some possible factors shaping these patterns are explored, and tentative estimates of the 
likely impact of the Brexit shock (Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union) are also 
provided.  A key implication is that differences in resilience to major shocks can contribute to 
the long-run growth paths of cities. 
My role and contribution to the research papers 
My contribution to each of these areas of research can be summarised as follows: 
• Database: My role here was to be responsible for the construction of the entire 
database, with some guidance being given by the wider project team on the criteria for 
establishing a threshold for the definition of TTWAs that were acting as a proxy for a 
functional city area. The database was first constructed, and then subsequently updated 
with a further year of data when these became available. It was then tested with some 
basic economic applications prior to wider use for research papers. 
• Structural change: Here, I was working to develop the growth typologies adopted by the 
paper by reviewing the growth paths of output, employment, and labour productivity. I 
was also responsible for the development and application of the dynamic shift-share 
approach, originally developed by Barff and Knight (1988) to analyse the evolution of 
structural versus local effects across the different city types – this involved comparing 
and contrasting different shift-share approaches (static vs dynamic, as well as 
consideration of the Multi-Factor Partitioning technique proposed by Ray et al (2012), 
amongst others). Finally, I assisted in the sectoral descriptions and analysis of each of 
the city club types. 
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• Spatial rebalancing: I was responsible for the analysis of cumulative growth paths of the 
various cities included in the research, as well as contributing to the northern 
powerhouse background description. Subsequently I led on the calculation and 
description of the export base analysis, also assisting in the concluding sections. 
• Productivity puzzle: I was responsible for analysing and reporting the historic growth 
paths of British cities over the period of study, including the north-south typological 
distinction. I was also responsible for calculating and reporting on the structural changes 
across northern and southern cities, including the statistical analysis of measures such 
as the Krugman Specialisation Index, and subsequently the Kruger decomposition 
analysis which separates structural change into within and between-sector components. 
Finally, I undertook correlation analysis in helping to describe factors that were 
associated with changes in productivity growth being analysed. 
• City skills: Firstly, I was responsible for constructing an additional (occupations-based) 
database consistent with the sectoral employment previous calculated, which allowed 
the empirical analysis of skills (for which occupations were a proxy) to take place. This 
also led to the section on describing and defining occupational categories. I also 
undertook an initial review of the (mostly US-based) occupations-related literature (in 
particular the work of Simon and Nardinelli (1996 and 2002)), summarising the areas 
which we could analyse with our own database and starting to develop the propositions 
on which the paper would eventually be based around. I was responsible for most of the 
empirical analysis in the paper, including the Krugman Specialisation Index and equation 
estimation. Finally, I also devised an additional dimension to the shift-share analysis 
(occupation by sector by city) which was used initially to decompose changes in 
employment over time, but which ultimately did not make it into the final version of the 
paper. 
• City resilience: In the final set of analysis, I conducted the majority of the empirical work. 
This included recessionary analysis, calculation of resistance and recovery indices 
across the periods of recession and recovery, and the typological analysis looking at the 
shape of recovery paths across cities against the theoretical possibilities. I assisted in 
the regression analysis, formulating the data, regression and interpretation of results. 
Finally, I was mostly responsible for undertaking the Brexit-related analysis, applying 
previous empirical results across the selection TTWAs to provide an estimated city-level 
impact of alternative Brexit scenarios. 
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1.4 Remaining Chapters13 
The remaining sections of this thesis contain publications produced during the course of my 
research on the aforementioned projects. These are as follows: 
Chapter Two: Constructing a New City Database on Long Run Economic change in Great 
Britain, B. Gardiner. 
Chapter Three: Growing apart? Structural transformation and the uneven development of 
British cities, Tyler, P., Evenhuis, E., Martin, R., Sunley, P., and B. Gardiner, Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Volume 10, Issue 3, 14 October 2017, Pages 
425–454, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsx017  
Chapter Four: Reviving the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and Spatially Rebalancing the British 
Economy: The Scale of the Challenge, Martin, R. and B. Gardiner, Chapter 2 in Developing 
England’s North (2018) Craig Berry and Arianna Giovannini (eds), SPERI. 
Chapter Five: The city dimension of the productivity growth puzzle: the relative role of 
structural change and within-sector slowdown, Martin, R., Sunley, P., Gardiner, B., Evenhuis, 
E., and P. Tyler, Journal of Economic Geography, Volume 18, Issue 3, 1 May 2018, Pages 
539–570, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lby008.  
Chapter Six: In Search of the Skilled City Sunley, P., Martin, R., Gardiner, B., and A. Pike, 
Urban Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098019834249.  
Chapter Seven: The Resilience of Cities to Economic Shocks: A Tale of Four Recessions 
(and the Challenge of Brexit), Martin, R. and B. Gardiner, Papers in Regional Science, 
February 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12430.  
Chapter Eight presents my conclusions from the work. Firstly, it draws out the main findings 
of the papers. Secondly, it identifies further lines for research, and any remaining unanswered 
questions. Finally, it reports on the implications for policy.  
Chapter Nine is the bibliography, followed by Technical Appendices relating to different 
chapters.  
 
13 It should be noted that I do not consider that any part of my research (method or data) has ethical or health and safety issues 
connected with it, and so do not intend to make any further comment on these topics. 
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2 A City-Level Database of Long Run Economic 
Change in Great Britain 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the growing interest in seeing cities as a basic building block from which to conduct 
analysis within economic geography, there has been little agreement on how to define what 
is meant by the term ‘city’. Partly this is because the term can serve different purposes, with 
some studies focussing on the tight built-up area of a city, while others need to take a broader 
view that includes commuter boundaries. The definition used is also affected by available 
data, as the typically the more functional boundaries have limited time series in comparison 
to the less accurate administrative constructs. This paper seeks to address these limitations 
of analysis by constructing a new database, based on functional definitions but which can 
also be used for long time series and sectoral analysis. In this way, a more detailed and 
longer-term perspective can be obtained on how the British urban landscape has evolved 
over time, and the extent to which changing economic structure has contributed to this can 
be better understood. 
For some countries even the issue of definition is not straightforward, there being no 
agreement of what is meant by a ‘city’ in terms of geographical boundaries. Different authors 
and institutions, in different studies, use different definitions. In the UK there is no single 
consistent or official definition that is used as the basis for the collection of economic data 
series on cities, nor as the basis for public policy interventions.  This makes analysis based 
on the basis of robust and reliable data, especially over time, far from straightforward. It also 
stands in contrast with the situation in the United States, where an official system of 384 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), defined by the US Office of Management and 
Budget14, can be used to study urban trends and developments. The MSAs are well-
established (since the 1950s) and are typically defined by a commuter area surrounding and 
urban core which contains at least 50,000 inhabitants. The latest data definitions are 
available for 2010-2017. 
2.2 Alternative Methods for Defining a City 
Two main types of city area definition can be identified – either on administrative or functional 
lines. 
 
14 See http://www.census.gov/population/metro/ and https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2000-12-27/pdf/00-32997.pdf. 
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Administrative methods use officially available units of data such as the NUTS (Nomenclature 
des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) regions in Europe to define urban boundaries. The main 
advantages of this approach is that the data are readily available as they are collected 
regularly by the relevant statistical authorities, while also connecting needs with the scale of 
administrative delivery, while the main disadvantage is that the boundaries imposed by these 
data may not best reflect the actual functioning area of a city or urban area, i.e. they may 
over or under-bound the functioning city area15. Cities need more than their immediate built-
up area to function properly – they need housing, transport infrastructure for commuters to 
travel to and from work, and recreational space for people to relax. All this points towards the 
space used to define a city being larger than the business district or even the immediate 
neighbourhoods. Indeed, this works on an administrative level as well, because if the primary 
city area and surrounding support areas are governed by different agencies with different 
strategies and goals, this may be to the detriment of an areas economic potential. Definitions 
of city boundaries are discussed by Parr (2007), who identifies four alternatives: the Built City 
(the immediate urban area with clear physical presence), the Consumption City (where most 
goods and services are supplied from), the Employment City (the wider employment 
catchment area16), and finally the Dependent City (the broader territory required to support 
employment and other city-based needs). All these perspectives on city space have their own 
role to play but can lead to quite different findings and conclusions when it comes to economic 
scale and performance. Parr (opt cit) summaries well by stating “Clearly, there is no “all-
purpose city”, and the type of city adopted will depend on the nature of the research question 
under consideration.”. 
Functional methods, on the other hand, rely on an understanding of the economic behaviour 
of an area, usually17 using census-level information on employment, residence and resulting 
commuting flows to establish a more robust measure of the economic sphere of a city or 
region18. Compared to administrative definitions, the main advantage and disadvantage are 
reversed, i.e. functional areas are harder to obtain but correspond better with economic 
 
15 The term under- or over-bounding refers to a situation where the spatial definition or an area is not consistent with its 
functioning boundary. So an area is under-bounded if economic activity greatly exceeds its spatial definition, and over-
bounded in the reverse situation. 
16 The Workforce City is most closely aligned to the one used in this paper. 
17 Alternative functional definitions are discussed in Burchfield et al (2006) which uses satellite images to measure ‘urban 
sprawl’ and to investigate the causes behind the spread of urban development in the US, while Henderson et al (2018) use 
night-time light intensity to measure the spatial distribution of economic activity and relate this to the evolution of development 
in different countries across the world. Interesting as they are, however, neither of these approaches would be conducive to 
studying the evolution of economic development over time and space in the way that more standard economic data could do. 
18 Clearly different activities and indeed indicators have different spatial scales that are appropriate for them and their 
analysis. For functional areas built on commuting boundaries, this is most directly linked to the labour market and then to the 
output produced by the jobs within an area. 
29 
 
reality in what they seek to measure. The forerunner of functional area definition in Europe 
was the Functional Urban Region (FUR), originating with Hall and Hay (1980) and taken 
further by Cheshire and Magrini in various publications (e.g. Cheshire and Magrini, 2006) 
extolling the advantages of using FURs over NUTS regions for measuring economic 
development. For the majority of EU countries, the FUR core-city area was defined on the 
basis of the smallest local units available for each country (wards in the UK) that gave a 
population density of 1,235 per km2, with a hinterland defined on the basis of net commuting 
flows19.  
In an effort to re-establish internationally consistent city-level definitions along functional 
lines, similar to the MSAs in the United States, the European Commission20 and OECD 
(2012) have worked together to define and create a database of functional urban areas 
(FUAs), which has a clear definition of what is meant by an “urban” area, using a 4-step 
process: 
(i) Identify “urban high-density areas” that have a population density criterion of at least 1,500 
inhabitants per km2 defined across 1 km2 grids. 
(ii) Group contiguous areas together in high-density clusters, with urban centres defined as 
those with a population greater than 50,000. 
(iii) FUAs are then comprised of urban areas (contiguous or otherwise) which have commuting 
patterns that link residential populations based on a defined minimum threshold of 15%.  
(iv) A further distinction is then made between FUAs of different population sizes: 
(a) Small Urban Areas: 200,000 < population > 50,000 
(b) Medium-sized Urban Areas: 500,000 < population > 200,000 
(c) Metropolitan Areas: population > 500,000. 
(d) Large Metropolitan Areas: population > 1.5m. 
Such an approach is welcome and long overdue. For cross- or within-country research this 
initiative represents a way of looking at cities on a comparable basis that has not been 
possible before, and empirical research on these data are already yielding interesting results, 
e.g. Schmidheiny and Suedekum, (2015). However, for long historical analysis the database 
 
19 Commuting flows were originally calculated for, and limited to, 1971 values but were subsequently updated to 1991 through 
the GEMACA II project (see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/urban2/urban/audit/parallel/comparitivecontent.htm), 





is of no use, because there are no consistent time series available with a mix of years across 
countries. For example, on the basis of 2001 Census data the UK is listed21 as containing a 
total of 101 FUAs with the following distribution: 
− 3 Large Metropolitan Areas (London, Birmingham and Manchester), 
− 12 Metropolitan Areas, 
− 44 Medium-sized Urban Areas, 
− 42 Small Urban Areas 
 
On the surface this seems promising, yet closer inspection reveals only two data points for 
population (2000 and 2014), and little else available from either OECD or Eurostat database 
sources. What remains therefore is a well-worked functional definition which can identify the 
demographic boundaries of urban areas, but which is currently devoid of any useful economic 
data on which to undertake research or policy analysis. Indeed, in their most recent State of 
the Cities report (European Commission, 2016) in order to look at urban economic 
development over time the additional concept of Metropolitan Regions is used. Metropolitan 
Regions are a broader definition of the Metropolitan Areas mentioned above, namely they 
are urban agglomerations with more than 250,000 inhabitants and are constructed from 
NUTS3 regions22.  As they are built from administrative building blocks, more economic data 
are available covering output (GVA), employment, population and other indicators23. 
Within the UK, one of the most popular methods to define cities is the Primary Urban Area 
(PUA)24, which has been used in a number of studies which look at city performance (e.g. 
Martin, Gardiner and Tyler (2014), Swinney and Thomas (2013)), Future of Cities Foresight 
project (HM Gov, 2015). Following a data construction process for the Future of Cities 
Foresight project, data on the 6325 British PUAs are available from 1981 at 45 sector 
disaggregation. Essentially the PUA is a hybrid definition (i.e. combining both functional and 
administrative features) for while the definition of the PUA is grounded in Census data which 
establishes the geography of the Built-Up Area26 (see ONS) as the starting point, they are 
limited to the use of whole Local Authority Districts (LADs) as their building blocks, which can 
 
21 See https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/functional-urban-areas-all-united-kingdom.pdf.  
22 Adjacent regions are added to the agglomeration if more than 50% of the population are included within its area. 
23 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/metropolitan-regions for more detail. 
24 See http://www.centreforcities.org/puas/.  
25 The PUA definition was revised in Coombes and Wymer (2015). 
26 BUAs are defined as defined as land with a minimum area of 20 hectares (200,000 square metres), while settlements within 
200 metres of each other are linked. 
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lead to questions as to whether the defined area is economically dense enough to really be 
defined as a functioning city27. 
The UK government also has its own method for calculating functional areas, called the 
Travel-to-Work Area (TTWA). The TTWA concept dates back to the 1950s, although it was 
not until the 1980s that a more formal definition was adopted, following the work of Coombes 
et al (1986), which in turn built on the work of Smart (1974). The work has subsequently 
developed and been modified to allow different TTWAs for different sub-groups of the labour 
market (who may have different commuting patterns and thus create different boundary 
conditions) as well as for different industries (e.g. agriculture may have a larger number of 
TTWAs compared to manufacturing and service sectors). See Green (1997) and Casado-
Diaz (2000) for more discussion. 
Subject to a minimum size of 3,500 people, TTWAs are also defined on census commuting 
patterns, and represent labour market areas where the majority28 of the resident population 
also work in the same area. As with other functionally-defined areas, the TTWA can be 
claimed to better define areas in economic terms and relevance, although the principal 
disadvantage is limited data availability (the ONS typically release only one year of population 
data consistent with the areas, although they do revise the TTWAs after each census year, 
as far back as 1971). TTWAs were used by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG, 2006) to support the State of the Cities report, which focussed on the 
56 largest towns and cities in England.  
The TTWA concept is not unique to the UK, indeed as Coombes (2002) notes, ‘…the fact 
that TTWAs meet a clear need in Britain is not surprising when it is realised that this need is 
also recognised in almost all similar countries.’ When Cattan (2002, in particular Table 1) 
undertook a survey of OECD countries it was found that of the 22 countries responding, only 
five did not define regional labour market areas. Among those that did, there were differences 
in the precise conditions, e.g. commuting boundaries and thresholds, on how labour market 
areas were defined, and so direct comparison may be limited even though the core principal 
exists. More recently, Coombes et al (2012) examined the potential for a common functional 
labour market classification for the entire EU, highlighting the different methods used to 
define areas across Member States.  
 
27 It should be noted that the Centre for Cities undertook a review of its PUA definitions in light of changing geographies and 
city growth. This is reported in Centre for Cities (2015). 





The TTWA concept is not without its criticisms, although some of these, e.g. Webster and 
Turok (1997) mostly focus on their usefulness for representing unemployment statistics. Feng 
(2009) highlights three main areas of debate: firstly the fact that economically functional areas 
naturally inter-connect and thus overlap, while the TTWA are mutually exclusive; secondly 
that although the TTWAs are named around the principal urban area in their catchment, there 
is no guarantee that there is not more than one sub-commuting area within them and so they 
may not be as cohesively strong as the definition suggests; finally, the TTWA definition 
changes over time (every 10 years) as commuting boundaries vary according to the wax and 
wane of urban centres, alongside the changing nature of society and people’s willingness to 
commute over longer distances. It is true that the TTWAs will still interact and the commuting 
thresholds imply that there will still be some cross-commuting occurring, but it would be 
extremely difficult to arrive at an economically defined area that was completely self-
contained. It is also true that some TTWAs, e.g. Cambridge (which now extends down 
towards London)29, are much larger than the natural city boundaries would suggest and thus 
they are likely to be diluted in some cases. The majority of TTWAs, however, are centred 
around a large urban area that acts as the commuting hub. The final criticism of changing 
TTWA boundaries (every 10 years) is valid, and evidence tends to show a gradual reduction 
in the number of areas each year30, from 334 in 1981 to 228 in the latest 2011 set of 
definitions. However, if both the economic activity and spatial definition of areas was 
changing over time then it would be impossible to make comparisons of the type which are 
the objective of the dataset. This is why the boundaries used were fixed at the 2011 
definitions. Table 2.1 summarises the functional area definitions currently available for the 
UK. 
Table 2.1: Functional Area Definitions for the UK 
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Travel to Work 
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Government 
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where 75% of resident workforce 
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There is then, a trade-off to be had between defining an economically meaningful area and 
having sufficient data available in order to undertake long-term analysis of how these areas 
develop over time.  
The remaining parts of this chapter describe the method of and results from trying to improve 
on this trade-off by constructing a Travel-to-Work Area database for Great Britain over the 
period 1971-2015 and across 82 sectors. In summary, the method by which this can happen 
is to use LADs as the building blocks (as with the PUAs) but to use proportions of LADs rather 
than just whole areas which helps counter the over-under bounding issue. Constructing these 
data provides the most detailed sectoral database for British cities over this period, a span 
during which considerable structural change and three major recessionary shocks and 
recoveries have occurred. 
2.3 Constructing a Travel-To-Work-Area Dataset for Great Britain 
Main objective 
The main aim of the work has been to construct a dataset comprising population, employment 
and output (constant price GVA) for a set of Travel-to-Work Areas with sufficient time 
dimension to allow for analysis of long-term economic development. This is an important 
development because the ability to analyse city and regional development over long periods 
of time is greatly hampered by the lack of availability of a consistent and detailed dataset, 
and while more recent data are available they do not allow the evolution of economic-
geography patterns to be observed. In addition, a fine level of sectoral disaggregation was 
desired in order to investigate the role played by economic structure of the TTWAs in shaping 
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their development – 45 sectors31 was the starting point, although this was extended to 82 
sectors for some variables.  
The overall aim of the work is based within a clear hierarchy of data. All data manipulation 
was carried out at district level – only when these data were fully checked was the final step 
taken, whereby each variable was aggregated from districts to TTWAs. The following stages 
describe the process which arrives at the most disaggregated data possible, while retaining 
quality and robustness suitable for the subsequent analysis. 
Stage 1: Construction of UK sectoral data (86 sectors, 1981 -) 
The production of the employment data starts with the construction of UK series at an 86-
sector level of disaggregation. Data are estimated for male and female, full-time and part-
time and for self-employment; i.e. six types of employment. Raw data are taken from the ONS 
but at this level of disaggregation some numbers are Cambridge Econometrics (CE)’s own 
estimates. 
Stage 2: Regionalisation (NUTS1, 45 sectors, 1971 -) 
Following the completion of the UK sectoral data, regional (NUTS1) data are constructed. 
Data are constructed at a 45-sector level of disaggregation (see Table 2) by the six 
employment types discussed above, scaled and made consistent with the UK sectoral data. 
The NUTS1 data are then pushed back to 1971 as to provide an intermediate level for 
checking the local area data against. 
The combination of different datasets is not straightforward, as the data are of different 
aggregations and time periods. The following points are elaborated to make the process 
clearer: 
• CE’s regional (NUTS1) data (back to 1992 for employees and 1996 for self-employed) are 
based on the quarterly workforce jobs data from the ONS as the main dataset which 
provides the 19-industry data by region, type (full-time, part-time and self-employed) and 
gender. 
• To move from the 19 industries to 46 sectors, data from the Business Registry and 
Employment Survey (BRES) and Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) gives 46 industry data 
(based on SIC07) that can be used to generate 19 to 46 industry shares for each region 
and type. 
• To extrapolate the dataset back to 1971, the growth rates of CE’s existing historical dataset 
are used, which are themselves based on older ONS data from the Census of Employment 
 
31 A detailed table with sector definitions is provided in the Appendix. 
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and ABI. These older datasets were converted to the latest standard industrial classification 
(SIC07) to maintain consistency with the more recent data. Historical boundary changes for 
regions and local authorities are adjusted for, as part of this process to ensure consistency. 
It should also be noted that the UK and regional data are based on second quarter figures, 
e.g. employment for 2011 is based on data published for 2011Q2 (equivalent to a mid-year 
estimate). 
Stage 3: Localisation (LAD level, 45 sectors, 1971-) 
At local area level, employment data are the most readily available from the ONS (through 
NOMIS32), and these data were first collected and processed. The latest available data 
(BRES data based on SIC 2007) were obtained, with older vintages of data (from BRES33, 
ABI, etc.) being used to construct consistent historical growth rates which were then applied 
to the latest levels to give a consistent back series for each sector and local authority district. 
The GVA data were then constructed by applying NUTS2-level productivity data (as provided 
by the ONS) to the employment data34. This required the mapping of NUTS2 regions to 
districts and the mapping of the detailed sectors to the fewer sectors for which sub-national 
productivity data is available from the ONS35. 
Finally, LAD-level population data were collected from the ONS mid-year population 
estimates and presented alongside the employment and GVA data. 
Stage 4: Further disaggregation (LAD level, 82 sectors, 1971-) 
As with the 45-sector data, detailed local area employment data are the most readily available 
from the ONS (through NOMIS36), and these data were collected and processed accordingly. 
The latest available data (BRES data based on SIC 2007) were obtained, with older vintages 
of data (from BRES37, ABI and the Census of Employment38) being used to construct 
consistent historical growth rates which were then applied to the latest levels to give a 
 
32 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/  
33 BRES is an ONS business survey which (from 2010 onwards) replaced the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). 
34 We are aware of the recent availability of local area GVA data (see 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossvalueaddedgva/datasets/regionalgvaibylocalauthorityintheuk) but unfortunately this 
came too late for the current version of the database. In later editions we would fully expect to make use of these data. 
35 The regional data are deflated using national-sector price deflators, because sub-national price deflators are not available 
from the ONS. 
36 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/  
37 BRES is an ONS business survey which (from 2010 onwards) replaced the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). 
38 Also obtained from NOMIS. 
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consistent back series for each sector and local authority district. Table 2.2 below provides a 
summary of sources. 
Table 2.2: Datasets used for detailed sector disaggregation 
Dataset Period Sectors 
BRES 2009-2015 86 (effectively 82*)39 
BRES 2008-2009 86 (effectively 82*) 
ABI - Employee Analysis 1998-2008 60 (split to 82) 
ABI -Survey Employee Analysis 1991-1998 60 (split to 82) 
ABI – Employee Analysis 1975-1981 183 (aggregated to 82) 
Census of Employment – Employee Analysis 1971-1974 183 (aggregated to 82) 
 
Stage 5: Matching to TTWAs 
With the LAD database complete, the final process was to match the local areas to the TTWA 
definitions. The process of moving from LAD-level data to TTWA definitions is not 
straightforward, as the two area types of are not designed to be consistent, one being an 
administrative definition, the other being functional, their geographies are non-overlapping 
and yet all allocations from LAD to TTWA must add up. 
The process involved matching the TTWA boundaries as closely as possible, using map 
imagery and the large urban agglomerations within each TTWA in order to judge the 
proportions of LADs that should go in each TTWA. Some were straightfoward, others less 
so. An error margin of +/-5% was used to judge whether the combined proportions of LAD 
populations were sufficiently close to the TTWA population and density in 2011 (the census 
and base year for the TTWA definition being used). As the focus of the work was on larger 
urban areas, the matching process was concentrated mostly on those areas that would 
subsequently be used for more detailed analysis – the logic behind this selection is described 
below. 
Choosing which TTWAs to analyse (i.e. proxy for city areas) 
The full set of 228 TTWAs was considered too many for city-based analysis, particularly as 
many of them are quite small and/or do not contain urban centres of any significance. 
Analysis took place to determine a suitable cut-off point based on population size of the 
 
39 The 86 sectors mentioned in the table did not map well to the 45 sectors. As a result, the number of sectors were 
aggregated to map 82 sectors to the 45. 
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TTWAs in 201440, and on the basis of a 200,000 threshold the top 85 TTWAs41 were 
selected42. Combined, the selected TTWAs used in the paper account for 82% of GB 
population, 83% of employment and 86% of output in 2014. Table 2.3 provides a list of the 
selected TTWAs in alphabetical order along with population size and density for 2015, while 
a map showing the geography of the selected TTWAs from among the full set is shown in the 
Appendix. 
Table 2.3: TTWAs and key characteristics for 2015 
TTWA Population 
(000s) 
Area (sq km) Population Density 
(per sq km) 
Aberdeen 416 4706 88 
Barnsley 261 350 747 
Basingstoke 258 828 312 
Bedford 218 612 357 
Birkenhead 354 351 1011 
Birmingham 1738 1058 1643 
Blackburn 337 757 446 
Blackpool 272 390 696 
Blyth & Ashington 236 3809 62 
Bournemouth 368 609 605 
Bradford 531 366 1450 
Brighton 351 243 1444 
Bristol 805 924 871 
Cambridge 691 2578 268 
Cardiff 812 1052 772 
Chelmsford 496 1791 277 
Chester 315 918 343 
Chesterfield 273 818 333 
Chichester 277 1146 242 
Colchester 215 427 503 
Coventry 575 531 1083 
Crawley 645 1345 479 
Crewe 292 888 329 
Derby 433 786 551 
Doncaster 305 569 536 
Dudley 540 158 3422 
Dundee 248 1936 128 
Dunfermline and Kirkcaldy 306 1140 268 
Durham & Bishop Auckland 260 1116 233 
Eastbourne 247 694 355 
 
40 2014 was chosen because the data construction started at an early stage in the project when 2015 data were not available. 
41 TTWAs in Northern Ireland were not considered because the CE LAD database does not cover this region, and so the 
process of data extension and matching was not possible. 





Area (sq km) Population Density 
(per sq km) 
Edinburgh 689 1329 519 
Exeter 438 2335 187 
Falkirk and Stirling 303 2734 111 
Glasgow 1286 1545 833 
Gloucester 278 742 374 
Guilford 652 1170 557 
Halifax 208 364 573 
High Wycombe & Aylesbury 421 1243 339 
Huddersfield 369 347 1063 
Hull 508 1928 264 
Ipswich 384 1938 198 
Kettering & Wellingborough 229 702 326 
Leamington Spa 261 1261 207 
Leeds 818 593 1380 
Leicester 998 2101 475 
Lincoln 346 2521 137 
Liverpool 1012 806 1256 
London 8529 2345 3638 
Luton 736 686 1072 
Manchester 2644 1906 1387 
Mansfield 303 461 657 
Medway 623 1123 555 
Merthyr Tidfil 218 630 346 
Middlesbrough 470 518 906 
Milton Keynes 398 747 533 
Motherwell & Airdrie 423 1590 266 
Newcastle 1001 1081 926 
Newport 307 709 433 
Northampton 356 1127 316 
Norwich 444 1960 227 
Nottingham 824 1109 743 
Oxford 542 2021 268 
Peterborough 329 1356 243 
Plymouth 356 1603 222 
Portsmouth 570 399 1428 
Preston 436 800 545 
Reading 529 744 712 
Sheffield 880 792 1111 
Shrewsbury 213 2184 97 
Slough & Heathrow 1614 866 1864 
Southampton 677 1606 422 
Southend 584 561 1042 
Stevenage 388 601 645 
Stoke-on-trent 523 1036 505 
Sunderland 381 586 650 
Swansea 383 873 439 





Area (sq km) Population Density 
(per sq km) 
Telford 210 614 342 
Trowbridge 267 1790 149 
Tunbridge Wells 312 1021 305 
Wakefield 334 339 986 
Warrington & Wigan 834 597 1396 
Wolverhampton 773 753 1027 
Worcester & Kidderminster 313 1005 311 
York 360 1373 262 
 
The dataset can therefore offer a picture of economic development across the main urban 
areas of Great Britain, covering population, employment, and output, (the latter two indicators 
with detailed sector disaggregation) over the period 1971-2015. This period is of great 
interest because it includes five recessionary periods (the two 1970s crises in 1973 and 1975, 
the early 80s and 90s recessions, and the Great Recession of 2008-2009) as well as covering 
a period of deindustrialisation and the financial liberalisation from the mid-1980s as well as 
more latterly the period of increasing globalisation. Related to these latter developments, the 
dataset can also track the growing dominance of London for the national economy and the 
growing imbalance between the northern and southern regions of the country. 
2.4 Comparisons with Other (city) Datasets 
Having established the TTWA-city dataset, it is instructive to compare characteristics with 
some of the other main city-area definitions described in Table 2.1, to get an idea of the scale 
of differences both in terms of levels and growth rates. 
TTWAs versus Functional Urban Areas (FUAs) and Metropolitan Regions 
Both FUAs and Metropolitan Regions are constructs of the European Commission-OECD, 
so it makes sense to group them together. As mentioned above, data on FUAs are 
somewhat limited. At best what can be compared is population size for those cities which 




Figure 2.1: TTWA vs FUA Population for 2014 
 
Clearly there is a wide range of differences among the 63 areas which coincide43, with (in all 
but 18 cases) a tendency for the TTWA to contain a larger population than the FUA. This is 
not too surprising, as the TTWA will typically encompass a wider area due to its commuting 
definition. The more tightly bounded a TTWA is around an urban centre (or centres), through 
its inability to attract commuters from further distances (this could be due to lack of economic 
weight, lack of transport infrastructure, and/or limitations due to geographical location) the 
more likely it is to resemble the functional urban area. 
Metropolitan Regions are a broader definition of the Metropolitan Areas mentioned 
previously, namely they are urban agglomerations with more than 250,000 inhabitants and 
are constructed from NUTS3 regions44.  As they are built from administrative building blocks, 
more economic data are available covering output (GVA), employment, population and other 
indicators45. Using this definition, there are 37 metropolitan regions for the UK, 35 of which 
correspond to the selected TTWA areas46.  Figures 2.2 - 2.4 show some comparison across 
a range of different indicators. 
 
43 For the purpose of comparison, the Warrington and Wigan FUAs have been added together to better match the 
corresponding TTWA. 
44 Adjacent regions are added to the agglomeration if more than 50% of the population are included within its area. 
45 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/metropolitan-regions for more detail. 
46 The TTWAs of Blackburn, Blackpool and Preston are combined to equate to the equivalent metro region. In addition, the 
West Midlands metro region is equated to the Birmingham TTWA. Depending on the indicator of comparison, not all the 
metropolitan regions are available from Eurostat. 
41 
 
Figure 2.2: TTWA vs Metro Region Population for 201147 
 
Similar boundary issues are likely to be present for metro regions, although given the less-
well defined spatial building block of NUTS3 regions it would be expected that this is less 
marked than for the FUAs. This seems to be broadly the case, and there are a greater 
proportion of areas where the TTWA has a lower population than the metro region. 
Figure 2.3: TTWA vs Metro Region Population Density for 2011 
 
47 2011 is chosen as the period of comparison for cross-sections because this is the base year of the TTWA construction and 




Figure 2.4: TTWA vs Metro Region Employment Growth 2000-15 
 
When a similar comparison is made for population density around half of the areas are within 
+/-30%, as shown in Figure 2.3. However, there are some notable outliers, particularly 
Newcastle and Doncaster. A marked deviation would be a sign that, in the case of Newcastle, 
a more rural hinterland is included in the definition of the metro region – which would seem 
to be the case as the total population ratio is not that large. For employment growth, there is 
a reasonable correspondence (a correlation of 0.43) although there are some outliers, as 
shown in Figure 2.4. 
TTWAs versus Primary Urban Areas (PUAs) 
Another useful comparison can be made between the TTWA city data and those for PUAs, 
particularly as the latter are often seen as the de-facto definition of cities in the UK and 
popularised by the Centre for Cities in their series of Cities Outlook reports48. As mentioned 
 
48 See, for example, https://www.centreforcities.org/publication/cities-outlook-2019/. 
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previously, the PUA definition starts from the basis of the built-up area of a city, which is then 
approximated by the closest fit of LAD boundaries. There are 63 PUAs, representing the UK’s 
largest cities and towns. Of the 63 PUAs, 57 correspond to TTWA area names, allowing a 
reasonable sample for comparative purposes49. 
Figure 2.5 shows the extent of difference between the two spatial definitions by ranking the 
ratios for population and population density50. Clearly there are a few areas (Slough and 
Heathrow being the extreme case) where the TTWA population vastly exceeds that of the 
PUA. In general, TTWA population is greater than that of the corresponding PUA – in only 
four cases (London, Huddersfield, Bournemouth and Birmingham) is the ratio below unity. In 
contrast, the population density of a TTWA is in general lower than that for the same PUA – 
in only three cases is it higher (Warrington and Wigan, Southend, and Barnsley). The findings 
confirm what would be expected – the TTWA is a broader area allowing for commuter zones, 
whereas the PUA focuses on approximating the urban zone as much as possible. 
Figure 2.5: TTWA vs PUA Population Total and Density 
 
In addition to looking at population, productivity differences between the TTWAs and PUA 
were also examined. These were based on my own calculations (i.e. using GVA and 
employment data and appropriate LAD combinations) because the data in the Cities Outlook 
 
49 The Wigan and Warrington PUAs are combined together to allow comparison to the Wigan and Warrington TTWA. 
50 The rankings do not necessarily represent the same area.  
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website is only in current prices, whereas the TTWA data are calculated in constant prices. 
As the TTWA areas are typically larger and less dense, one might expect productivity levels 
to be lower in TTWAs when compared to PUAs. This is generally found to be the case, with 
approximately two thirds of PUAs having a productivity level higher than the equivalent 
TTWA. However, these productivity differences are not particularly large, with the range of 
the ratio from 1.06 to 0.81. In addition, there is a negative correspondence (correlation -0.48) 
between the ratios for productivity and for population, i.e. those TTWAs which are larger than 
the equivalent PUA also tend to have a lower productivity level (although the difference is not 
that great). 
2.5 Applications of the TTWA Dataset 
The new dataset is a key methodological advance as it allows us to address some key 
questions about longer-run urban economic change in Britain. Two examples are explored51: 
firstly, looking at how growth and structure of the economy have changed over the past 40 
years, and secondly at the relationship between long-term productivity and employment 
growth across British cities, 
Long-term structural change 
Figure 2.6 shows the sectoral contribution to long-term employment change over the entire 
sample period of the database52. The TTWAs are ranked according to the percentage change 
in total employment growth over the period, i.e. ranging from Milton Keynes being fastest 
growing area (at 2.9% pa), while Liverpool was the slowest (actually falling by 0.6% pa). 
What can be clearly seen is that those areas which have enjoyed the fastest growth in 
employment were also those which were the strongest performers in the KIBS (Knowledge-
Intensive Business Services53) – only Blackpool had a negative KIBS contribution over this 
period - and also, to a lesser extent, other private sector services such as wholesale and 
retail. Conversely, those areas that have suffered most from slow or falling employment are 
where the manufacturing sector (and to a lesser extent mining and quarrying) has contributed 
most to the lost jobs – Aberdeen stands out as an outlier in the mining and quarrying sector, 
with jobs growth benefiting from the historical strength of the oil industry.  
 
51 Further examples of work and empirical findings from using the dataset can be found in Tyler et al (2017) and Martin et al 
(2018). 
52 The contribution from each sector represents its proportion of the gross change in absolute employment over the entire 
period.  









Part of the loss of manufacturing (and extractive industry) employment losses over the past 
few decades can be attributed to improvements in productivity through labour-saving 
technological progress. At the same time, growth in service-sector employment, which has 
replaced manufacturing jobs, is often in lower-productivity activities (the majority of service-
sector jobs are not in KIBS). 
Figure 2.7: TTWA productivity vs employment growth (1971-2015) 
 
Figure 2.7 shows how, for all TTWAs, employment and productivity growth are associated 
through measuring their cumulative deviation54 from the national (GB) average – the size of 
 
54 Cumulative deviation was highlighted by Blanchard and Katz (1992) to analyse the evolutions of long-term regional 
divergence. The annual growth rate of the indicator in question has the national growth rate subtracted and is then cumulated 
over time. The result is the cumulative deviation of a city’s growth from that of the national economy, up to that year, from a 
selected start year (here 1971). It thus shows a city’s ‘growth gap’, in percentage points, as the difference between its actual 
growth and where it would have been had it grown at the national rate.  A positive cumulative growth differential indicates that 
a city has grown faster than the national economy, and a negative cumulative differential that it has lagged the national 
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the bubble for each TTWA is proportional to its average share of total employment for the 
1971-2015 period. Furthermore, the cities are allocated to Northern and Southern typologies, 
along the same lines that were used in Martin et al (2015). 
Of the four quadrants created by the axes, top-left and bottom-right represent what might be 
expected, i.e. northern (more heavily industrialised) areas have shed (manufacturing) jobs at 
the expense of increasing productivity, while southern areas (which had less industrial 
heritage) are more typified by high-employment low-productivity performance. The top-right 
quadrant, where employment and productivity growth are both above the national average, 
is the preferred outcome, while the opposite situation occurs in the bottom-left quadrant. 
Southern areas dominate the bottom-right (high-employment, low-productivity) quadrant, and 
aside from two sizeable exceptions (London, and Slough and Heathrow) they are mostly on 
the smaller side. Meanwhile, the northern cities predominate the upper-left quadrant (as 
expected) with more examples of larger cities evident also in the bottom-left quadrant – a 
performance which has given rise to the widening of the north-south divide in recent decades. 
2.6 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
This paper has presented a new database for analysing the evolution of spatial development 
in Great Britain over the past four and a half decades, focussing on Travel to Work Areas as 
a proxy for cities and urban areas. The TTWA is a functional area, designed to capture a 
largely self-contained commuting area around a urban centre of cluster of centres. A central 
problem with many functional definitions is having enough data available to undertake 
detailed analysis, particulary over time but also across a range of economic indicators. A 
construction process based upon local area data as building blocks is similar to that of the 
Primary Urban Area, but by using proportions of (rather than whole) LADs to allocate and 
refine boundaries it is hoped that a more accurate representation can be established and 
issues of over or under-bounding can mostly be avoided.  
The result is a database which covers the period 1971-2015, over which several business 
cycles took place including the Great Recession of 2007-12, and also during which large 
structural shifts were occurring (deindustrialisation and the rise of services and in particular 
KIBS). It is sufficiently disaggregated (45 and 82 sector splits) to allow for structural shifts to 
be focussed on particular sectors of interest, and allows for a relatively large number of areas 
(85) to be identified, which is useful for typological analysis and potentially panel data analysis 
 
economy. The procedure helps to smooth out the noise from individual growth periods and shows how growth cumulates over 
time to create divergence from national performance. 
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(particularly dynamic spatial models of the type explored in Elhorst (2014). It also includes a 
sufficient mix of indicators (primarily output, employment and population) to undertake 
decomposition analysis and also explore contemporary issues such as the productivity 
slowdown. As the TTWAs are defined as largely self-contained labour market areas, and it 
has been shown how these areas are typically larger (in terms of population size) than more 
built-up / urban definitions such as PUAs and FUAs. It remains a question as to whether this 
eliminates the need for spatial spillovers if this unit of area were used in regression analysis 
– in all likelihood there would still be a need, both potentially within (the urban core and 
surrounding hinterlands) and between due to inter-linked business supply and demand 
chains which go beyond pure labour market connections. However, as not all the TTWAs are 
included in the coverage, it would be difficult to include a spatial modelling component in the 
analysis, as the full set of contiguous spatial areas is not being covered in the dataset. 
When compared to other databases (functional urban areas, metropolitan regions, and 
PUAs) which cover similar areas of interest, some interesting findings emerge. Firstly, the 
TTWAs are typically larger (in terms of population size) than other urban areas, but not in 
every case. Similarly, the TTWAs are typically less densely populated than their counterparts, 
but again there are exceptions to this rule. Finally, when scale is removed, indicators such 
as productivity show similar results to those for PUAs (their closest spatial relation). These 
differences in results will depend mostly upon how tight the commuting area is around the 
urban centre they service. This in turn will depend upon factors such as economic weight, 
availability of transport infrastructure, and geographical location and any limitations this may 
convey. 
Is the TTWA definition the ‘correct one’ or is it ‘better’ than what currently exists? As noted 
by Parr (op cit), there is no singular correct definition of a city boundary – the appropriate 
definition depends on the issue being examined. Thus, for general labour market-related 
investigations and those involving research on the skills base that supports city activities, the 
TTWA would seem to be the most relevant as its boundary is defined with these concepts in 
mind. On the other hand, for studies focussing on agglomeration benefits, which typically 
accrue in the densified area of a city, a tighter definition based on the built-up boundary of a 
city, based on population size and density, would be best. Combes and Gobillon (2015) also 
address this issue within the context of measuring agglomeration economies. Again, they 
conclude (even within the narrower confines of their own analysis) that ‘Knowledge spillovers, 
human capital externalities, and matching effects should be the most prevalent 
agglomeration forces at short distances - say, within cities or even neighborhoods...’ while 
‘…the effects of market access for both final and intermediate goods emphasized by 
economic geography models should be the main agglomeration forces driving differences in 
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local outcomes at a larger scale, such as the region.’. So clearly then, spatial scale should, 
wherever possible, closely match the economic theory or factor being analysed. And for built-
up area and close focus interactions, firm-level analysis based on post-code location would 
seem most appropriate. 
The usefulness of the database has also been demonstrated through two applied examples 
– revealing the structural changes which have underpinned employment performance, and 
also the spatial nature of the productivity-employment trade-off which is apparent across 
British cities, and which is another reflection of the North-South divide. Further applications 
of, and extensions to, the database will be reported in due course, but for now we hope that 
this paper will generate sufficient interest among academics and policy makers who will 
ultimately have access to the data to undertake their own investigations. 
Functional area databases already exist elsewhere, such as with the Metropolitan Areas in 
the US and Functional Urban Area concept developed by the OECD-EC. Closer matches to 
TTWAs also exist in many countries around the OECD and EC, and there is currently a 
European taskforce55 attempting to establish a harmonised system of labour market areas, 
as also described in Coombes et al (2012). The Eurostat taskforce is likely to face difficult 
challenges in trying to establish a consistent set of labour market areas across the whole of 
the EU, and it is unlikely that these data will have much historical context, instead presenting 
more of a snapshot of activity much like their Functional Urban Area counterparts. In order 
for the methods described in this paper to be applied in other countries it is clear that an 
equivalent (lower level of spatial aggregation) dataset would need to be available so that geo-
spatial matching could take place to match the different area definitions. An alternative 
approach would be to use firm-level databases which have geo-coded entries, such as those 
maintained for business registration purposes. However, the scale of the task involve would 
be large, and so the availability of an intermediate, lower-level, dataset remains a short-cut 




55 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/content/2018-task-force-european-set-lmas_en.  
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3 Structural Transformation and the Uneven 
Development of British Cities  
3.1 Introduction 
The period since the Oil Crisis of the early 1970s has been one of great structural change in 
the British economy. Britain has lost much of its industrial base and experienced rapid growth 
in the service sector. Whilst structural change has affected virtually every aspect of the British 
economy, perhaps one of the most significant impacts has been on the economic growth of its 
cities, particularly its large conurbations that owed much of their rapid expansion throughout 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to Britain’s industrialisation. Many of Britain’s largest 
cities have struggled to adjust to a post-industrial economy. As cities have lost manufacturing 
jobs they have experienced periods of high, often long-term unemployment, and in more recent 
years whilst there have been more job opportunities these have often been relatively poorly 
paid, and thus contributed to increased levels of income inequality across British society 
(Fenton, et al 2008). 
Despite the importance of structural change on the growth trajectories of cities, it is perhaps 
somewhat surprising that there is relatively little in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. In the 
British case, the most comprehensive analysis to-date appears to have been undertaken some 
thirty years ago (see Hausner, 1987). At that time, an extensive (ESRC funded) research 
project considered how British cities, and their hinterlands, had adapted to economic change 
over the period 1951-1981. More recently, a UK Government Office for Science’s Foresight 
Project on The Future of Cities showed that the growth paths of British cities in recent years 
has been quite diverse (Martin, Tyler and Gardiner, 2015), a finding reinforced by other recent 
work (Martin et al., 2016a). 
How cities deal with structural transformation over time, and the concomitant changes in 
conditions and opportunities for their economic growth, are clearly major issues for society and 
the formulation of policy. Indeed, as the British Government devolves economic powers from 
central to local government it is important that those tasked with managing city economies 
understand the basic mechanisms that lie behind change, and what may be the scope for 
intervention to assist the process in a way that enhances local economic growth. Policy makers 
need to know the sectors that are declining, those that may be experiencing successful 
upgrading or ‘turning around’, and those that are new and growing. They need to know how to 
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assist city economies to adapt and adjust their structures in response to both the challenges 
and opportunities of a rapidly changing globalised marketplace. 
In this paper we examine how differences among cities in medium to long run growth, and 
shifts in the growth paths of cities relative to one another, are in part due to differences in the 
process, nature and extent of structural transformation.56 We have taken industrial sectors as 
the unit of our analysis (rather than, say, types of firms) and have considered structural 
transformation in Britain as it relates to a process in which some sectors expand relatively 
quickly and thus increase their relative share of national output, whilst others do the opposite.  
We begin by reviewing perspectives on the perceived role of economic structure on the growth 
of cities in Section 2. We briefly discuss several theoretical perspectives from both economics 
and economic geography. Structural transformation has so far however received relatively little 
consideration as a factor in explaining economic growth in cities. Notwithstanding this lack of 
attention in theories of growth, structural transformation and its uneven geographical effects, 
has been well documented as an empirical phenomenon. In the 1970s and 1980s many cities 
in Europe and North America were hard hit by deindustrialisation. And in more recent years, a 
structural transformation appears to be taking place within the service sector, with some parts 
of the service sector growing rapidly and showing considerable dynamism, while other parts 
seem to be more stagnant and lagging in productivity.  
Section 3 examines what has happened to the economic growth of Britain’s major cities over 
the last forty-five years using a novel dataset, covering some 85 cities, specifically constructed 
to reflect functional economically meaningful travel-to-work areas. The cities range in 
employment size (in 2014) from 5.35 million (London) to 83,400 (Merthyr Tydfil) with 
employment and output data for 81 sectors of activity for each city. We focus on city growth in 
output, and show that there have been considerable differences in the growth paths observed. 
We distinguish three distinct types of performance: those cities that have grown considerably 
faster than the nation, those that have grown at the national rate and those that have exhibited 
relative decline in their output growth. We also distinguish the two special cases of London and 
Aberdeen. London is the United Kingdom’s largest city and its capital. Aberdeen has been the 
centre of the North Sea oil industry over the period. We use this analysis to understand more 
about how structural change has influenced the patterns of growth observed later in the article.  
 
56 The research for this paper was undertaken as part of a project funded by the ESRC (ES/N006135/1) into Structural 
Transformation, Adaptability and City Economic Evolutions, as part of its Urban Transformations Programme. We are grateful to 
the ESRC for its support. 
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Section 4 considers structural change in Britain over the period 1971 to 2014. It examines 
structural change according to whether a sector has increased or decreased its relative share 
of national output. This enables us to focus on distinct types of transformative change at the 
sectoral level. 
The article then moves in sections 5 and 6 to examine to what extent and in what manner 
differences in the growth of British cities can be ‘explained’ by changes in the national structure 
of the British economy. The article adopts a modified version of the conventional shift share 
approach to assess the contribution of economic structure to the growth trajectories of each of 
the categories of cities distinguished in Section 3. 
Section 7 outlines the impact on employment of structural transformation in the period from 
1971-2014. Deindustrialisation has had very marked effects on most cities in Britain, but 
especially the slowest growing cities have seen very significant losses of employment. This 
group of cities has never fully recovered from the structural transformation in the 1970s and 
1980s, and also the quality and robustness of the employment growth that has been taken 
place since is very much in question. 
We finish with some conclusions and questions for further research in Section 8. 
3.2 Structural transformation and city growth 
Cities grow for a variety of reasons (see Storper, 2013). Indeed, a large body of economic 
theory now exists concerned with why economic activity agglomerates in cities, how 
agglomeration influences productivity, human capital formation, wages and innovation, and the 
role played by planning systems (the literature is extensive, but see, for example, Fujita and 
Thisse, 2002; Henderson, 2003; Glaeser, 2008; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Cheshire et al. 
2014). These key insights are most certainly relevant for understanding city growth. However, 
these literatures have much less to say about the medium to long-term evolution of city 
economies, about structural transformation and its relationship to diverse city growth paths.  
Structural transformation refers to the changing sectoral composition of output and 
employment over time, a stylised fact for which there is copious evidence (Kuznets, 1957, 
1971; Pasinetti, 1993; Freeman and Louca, 2001; Cornwall and Cornwall, 1994; Metcalfe, 
Foster and Ramlogan, 2006; Kruger, 2008). Traditional growth theory always had difficulty 
incorporating structural change, although the notion has found extensive use within the study 
of economic development. But for those economists who reject the distinction between 
development and growth (see Kuznets, 1971; Pasinetti, 1981; Baranzi and Scazzieri, 1990; 
Rodrik, 2006), and for present-day evolutionary economists (such as Metcalfe, 2003; Metcalfe 
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et al, 2006), structural change or structural transformation is an integral feature of a dynamic 
modern economy, and the study of ‘structural dynamics’ necessary for understanding the 
growth process. As Roncolato and Kucera (2014, p. 399) put it, “sustainable economic growth 
requires structural transformation”. Similarly, in the new evolutionary economic geography, 
particular attention is focused on the path dependence of local economic structures, on the 
process of new path creation - that is the emergence of new industries and technologies – and 
on the adaptability and resilience of local economies (see Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma 
and Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010; Bailey and Berkeley, 2014; Martin and Sunley, 2015). 
It took the path-breaking work of authors such as Kaldor (1966, 1967, 1968), Kuznets (1973) 
and Pasinetti (1981, 1993) to move structural change to centre stage in growth theory. Thus, 
according to Kuznets:  
rapid changes in production structure are inevitable – given the differential impact of 
technological innovations on the several production sectors, the differing income 
elasticity of domestic demand for various consumer goods, and the changing 
comparative advantage in foreign trade (1973, p. 250). 
Likewise, in Pasinetti’s scheme, structural change is conceived as a multi-sectoral economy 
evolving through time under the influence of technical progress and changes in final demand 
consumption. Technical change occurs unevenly among sectors, so that the rate of change of 
productivity differs from sector to sector (and by implication from region to region).57 
Correspondingly, demand changes at different rates among different products. Moreover, 
technical change may take the form of the introduction of new products, and hence the 
emergence of new activities and new sectors. In short, structural dynamics are inherent to the 
growth process. In Kaldor’s seminal works on economic growth theory, manufacturing was 
assigned particular importance as the driver of economic growth primarily because it has 
greatest potential for dynamic returns to scale (Kaldor, op cit; see also Thirlwall, 1983), the 
implication being that a shift to services could well slow down productivity growth. In a later 
contribution, Baumol et al (1989) discuss the considerable diversity of productivity 
developments that can be observed across industries and sectors, and emphasise not only 
the fact that structural change is an ongoing long-run phenomenon, but also that productivity 
growth is particularly relevant in the long run.  
 
57 Interestingly, in explaining the stimulus for his new theory, Pasinetti attributed it in part to “the extremely uneven development 
– from sector to sector, from region to region – of the environment in which I lived (post-war Europe) at the time I began my 
training in economics” (Pasinetti, 1981; p. xi).  
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Empirically, structural transformation has in recent decades been particularly apparent and 
disruptive through the process of deindustrialisation. Deindustrialisation refers to the 
contraction and decline of the weight of manufacturing industry within an economy (Martin and 
Rowthorn, 1986; Pike, 2009). This may only be a relative decline (loss of importance of 
manufacturing as a proportion to other sectors), but there may also be an absolute decline 
(decline in output and employment). In many of the most advanced economies in Western 
Europe and North America a relative decline of manufacturing began in the 1960s, with the 
service sector growing at a faster rate than manufacturing. But especially after the first oil crisis 
of 1973, the pace of change accelerated, and in many traditional segments of manufacturing 
(such as steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering, car manufacturing, chemicals, etc.) an 
absolute decline in employment (and in some sectors, also output) set in. This coincided with 
large-scale rationalisation- and modernisation-operations with concomitant downsizing and 
plant-closings (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).  
The ‘maturity thesis’ regarding deindustrialisation postulates that the relative decline of 
manufacturing is a ‘natural’ consequence of rising incomes and living standards, as consumer 
demand shifts from manufactured goods to services of various kinds (Rowthorn, 1986; 
Hudson, 2011). This parallels some of the theoretical insights of Kuznets, Pasinetti, and Kaldor 
cited earlier. In addition, as economies develop, their comparative advantages vis-à-vis other 
economies will change; so there will be increasing pressures to shift into in more high-value 
economic activities which correspond with higher wages and higher skill-levels (Pike, 2009; 
Hudson, 2011). Forms of manufacturing which mainly rely on cheap and semi-skilled labour 
will then move to other places where wages, living standards and overall levels of education 
are lower. These factors have meant that – in economically advanced nations – the scope for 
output growth in manufacturing has been smaller than in other sections of their economies. 
Moreover, technological change and productivity improvements have meant that employment 
in industry has fallen drastically, as a consequence of on-going automation and the increasing 
importance of economies of scale.  
Some of these patterns of deindustrialisation seem to be mirrored by recent trends of structural 
transformation within the service sector. Some tradeable parts of the service sector – in 
particular those providing ‘innovation jobs’ (Moretti, 2013), such as IT, life sciences, finance, 
advertising, design, entertainment, etc. – exhibit considerable dynamism and show continuing 
growth in employment and output. Other segments of the service sector, such as personal 
services, leisure activities health care, and education, have been more stagnant in terms of 
the application of new technologies; and while experiencing substantial employment growth 
they have shown much slower productivity advance (Berger and Frey, 2016; LSE Growth 
Commission, 2017). How far new advances in digitalisation, robotics and machine learning, 
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will threaten jobs in these activities is an increasingly pertinent issue (Berger and Frey, 2016; 
Baldwin, 2016). But some recent accounts have argued that mature economies such as the 
UK are experiencing a dominant shift of employment to low-productivity, non-tradable services, 
and that this can be described as ‘growth-reducing structural change’ as it will weaken future 
innovation and productivity growth (Rodrik, 2016). The balance between different types of 
service industry growth is clearly crucial. 
These structural transformations have affected different cities and regions differently across 
Europe and North America. Certain places in which manufacturing formed the backbone of 
their economy were especially badly affected by deindustrialisation, undergoing serious falls 
in industrial employment. After the initial shock in the 1970s and 1980s, some of these places 
managed to find renewed growth in advanced manufacturing and service industries; but 
recovery has been very uneven (Birch et al., 2010; Power et al., 2010; Hobor, 2013; Cowell, 
2015). In part, the success with which cities have reorientated their economies has depended 
on policies adopted during and after deindustrialisation, and the institutional structures within 
which cities and regions operate (especially with regard to the powers and resources available 
at the subnational level). Indeed, particular macro-economic policies – such as measures to 
protect the value of the currency and a lack of an industrial strategy – together with weak 
regional policies and an economic governance structure which is exceptionally centralised, 
have undoubtedly contributed to the particular intensity and high degree of disruption of 
deindustrialisation in the United Kingdom (Martin, 1986; Pike 2009; Birch et al., 2010; McCann, 
2016). But many other factors also appear important in coping effectively with structural 
transformations, such as location, human capital formation, the knowledge and innovation 
base, agglomeration effects, infrastructure connections, entrepreneurial culture, etc. These 
determine whether an urban economy manages to develop new activities that incorporate 
important and dynamic functions (i.e. especially ‘innovation jobs’) in national and international 
value chains, reducing its dependence on ‘branch plants’, public sector expenditure, and low-
productivity services (Massey, 1995; Moretti, 2013; Baldwin, 2016; Storper et al., 2015). Such 
activities will then also contribute to its tradeable base and generate additional income within 
the economy of the city, driving employment and output in other activities through multiplier 
effects (Rowthorn, 2010; Moretti, 2013; Martin et al., 2016a). A growing body of work in 
economic geography has examined how industries emerge from related and antecedent 
sectors. It has been argued that those cities that possess a platform of technologically related 
industries are better able to diversify and adapt their economies by spawning more new sectors 
and industries (Frenken and Boschma, 2007; Neffke et al, 2011). However, many of the claims 
about the ways in which the diversification and branching of industrial structures shape long-
term urban growth have not been tested empirically. 
56 
 
What is clear, then, is that the growth path of a given city will be the outcome of a complex and 
evolving interaction of ’external’ (national and indeed global) factors and city-specific factors 
and conditions.  Following Metcalfe et al (2006), we can think of a city’s economy as being an 
ensemble’ of activities – a structural ensemble – that is constantly changing as a result of this 
interaction. Such a structural ensemble can be examined and decomposed in different ways, 
of course. Our analysis has taken industrial sectors as the primary units of a city’s structural 
ensemble. However, it is entirely plausible to distinguish other constituent elements, like types 
(or sizes) of firms or occupational composition. Ultimately, structural change will involve 
several such dimensions: for example, the decline of manufacturing jobs is almost certain to 
lead to the decline or even disappearance of certain types of occupation. Nevertheless, given 
our interest is in the ‘great transformation’ from an industrial to a post-industrial economy, we 
focus attention here on sectors.58 The differential growth of a city’s firms and industrial sectors 
imparts structural transformation, while the aggregate pattern of that transformation will shape 
a city’s growth path, relative to other cities. An ensemble approach suggests that the 
development of industries in a particular city may be strongly or weakly inter-related (e.g. 
through demand linkages, skills and knowledge spillovers) so that the performance of an 
industry in a particular urban area may depend on how it is set within and interacts with a wider 
group of local industries. 
What is to be analysed and explained are the differential growth rates of output, employment 
and productivity across an industrial ensemble – here the sectoral ensemble of a city. Without 
differential growth there is no structural change, no evolution of the sectoral shares of city 
output, employment or productivity. If the growth rate of output in sector i in city j is denoted by 
gij, the growth rate of aggregate output in the city by gj, and the growth rate of the share of 
sector i in the total output of the city by 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑔
, then by definition 
 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑔 = 𝑔𝑖𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗 
and similarly for employment  
𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑒 = 𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑒𝑗 
Obviously, if all growth rates, 𝑔𝑖𝑗  (or 𝑒𝑖𝑗),  are equal, the case of proportional growth, the output 
(employment) structure of a city is frozen, and there is no structural change or transformation. 
Further, 
 
58 We also have constructed time series on the occupational structures of our 85 cities, from 1971 to 2014. The analysis of this 




𝑒 + 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑔 + 𝑞𝑗 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑗 and 𝑞𝑗 are the growth rates of productivity in sector i in city j and total city productivity 
respectively. Consequently, in an industry in which productivity increases at the city average 
rate, the output share of that sector will change at the same rate as its employment share. 
Hence proportionate growth implies that all sectors in a city have a common rate of productivity 
growth, which is unlikely to be the case. The key point is that the differential growth rates of 
the sectors making up a city’s industrial ensemble, and what makes those growth rates differ, 
are of central importance in shaping that city’s aggregate growth path over time and in relation 
to that of other cities.  
3.3 City Growth Evolutions 
In order to examine the patterns of change across British cities we focus on cumulative 
differential growth, whereby, starting in our base year 1971, we subtract from each city’s growth 
rate in each year the corresponding national (Great Britain) rate, and cumulate these 
differences over time (see Blanchard and Katz, 1992, for the development of this approach). 
The overall performance of the 85 cities, measured in terms of their cumulative differential 
growth in output and employment over 1971-2014, is shown in Figure 3.1. 
A number of features emerge. It is clear that the differential growth of both output and 
employment across cities has been substantial. Further, the patterns for output and 
employment are closely correlated: those cities that have experienced the fastest rates of 
growth of employment also tend to be those that have recorded the fastest rate of growth of 
employment, and vice versa. Some cities, such as Milton Keynes, Northampton, Telford, 
Crawley and Swindon have experienced average growth rates in their GVA and employment 
far exceeding the national average (and totalling to a cumulative differential of over 30-40 
percent over the period). Other cities, such as Liverpool, Glasgow, Newcastle, Birmingham, 
and Sheffield have grown well below the national rate in both output and employment. Still 
other cities have tracked national growth. Notwithstanding the high correlation between output 
and employment growth, however, some cities show a much slower performance in 
employment than in output, such as Sunderland, Middlesbrough, Manchester and 
Huddersfield. Still other cities seem to experience much stronger employment growth 




Figure 3.1:  Output growth and Employment growth over 1971-2014 in terms of cumulative percentage 


















Note: Southern cities defined as those in the following regions: London, South East, East of England, 
South West and East Midlands. Northern cities defined as those in the West Midlands, Yorkshire-
Humberside, North West, North East, Scotland and Wales. 
 
Another feature is that many of the fastest growing cities have been in the southern half of 
Britain (roughly south of a line between the Severn and Humber), and most of the slowest 
growing have been in the north. Notable exceptions to the latter group are Aberdeen (which 
has benefited from the North Sea oil industry), Telford (a New Town in Shropshire), 
Leamington Spa and Crewe. It is perhaps not inappropriate to refer to the pattern evident in 
Figure 3.1 as closely corresponding to the conventional depiction of Britain’s economic 
geography as mapping out a broad North-South’ divide (Martin 1988; Lewis and Townsend, 
1989; Rowthorn, 2010; Martin et al., 2016b).  
To assist analysis, the cities were grouped in terms of their output growth trajectory experience 
relative to the average national growth rate: namely, according to whether they had a 
cumulative differential growth significantly above, similar to, or significantly below, the national 
level over the period. A bandwidth of half a standard deviation below and half a standard 
deviation above the national rate was used to make this classification. We have separated out 
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the experience of London due to its relative size, and of Aberdeen because of its relatively 
unique experience propelled by the exploitation of North Sea oil. We thus identify five groups 
– or Clubs – and a residual group of non-urban TTWAs. Table 3.1 shows which cities are in 
which Club. 
Table 3.1: Clubs of British cities defined according to their relative GVA growth trajectory using half a 




GVA + Milton Keynes, Northampton, Basingstoke, Swindon, Telford, 
Leamington Spa, Crawley, Peterborough, Chichester, Tunbridge 
Wells, Mansfield, Reading, Guildford, High Wycombe & 
Aylesbury, Derby, Crewe, Norwich, Chesterfield, Bournemouth, 
Exeter, Cambridge, Slough & Heathrow, Lincoln, York, 




GVA 0 Trowbridge, Dunfermline & Kirkcaldy, Wakefield, Shrewsbury, 
Halifax, Blyth & Ashington, Colchester, Kettering & 
Wellingborough, Oxford, Stevenage, Gloucester, Doncaster, 
Leeds, Bristol, Nottingham, Chelmsford, Falkirk & Stirling, Luton, 
Leicester, Worcester & Kidderminster, Chester, Southend, 
Sunderland, Barnsley, Warrington & Wigan, Huddersfield, 
Brighton, Edinburgh, Bedford, Preston, Durham & Bishop 




GVA - Portsmouth, Coventry, Cardiff, Hull, Newport, Medway, Merthyr 
Tydfil, Motherwell & Airdrie, Middlesbrough & Stockton, Sheffield, 
Blackburn, Plymouth, Newcastle, Birmingham, Dudley, 
Birkenhead, Blackpool, Stoke-on-Trent, Dundee, Swansea, 
Glasgow, Wolverhampton, Liverpool 
London  London 
Aberdeen  Aberdeen 
Non-urban 
TTWAs 
 TTWAs which are not classified as cities 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the growth of GVA relative to the nation for the Clubs from 
1971 until 2014. We have excluded Aberdeen as an outlier. Figure 3.3 then displays what this 
has implied for the average annual growth rates over the period; with also an indication of the 





Figure 3.2:  GVA: Cumulative differential percentage growth relative to GB: London, Club I 
















Figure 3.3:  Annual compound growth rates for GVA over 1971-2014: average for clubs, 


















The relative fast-growing city Club I had an average growth rate of 2.76% (Figure 3) but some 
cities within the club did better than that, achieving almost 4.5%. The overall average growth 
of Club I cities exceeded that of London by a significant margin, and that of the non-urban 
travel to work areas. The club grew over a third faster than the Club II that tracked the national 
rate. Club II had relatively little dispersion within it. Club III grew at around half the rate of Club 
I at 1.42%, and there was wide club dispersion with the weakest performer growing at half the 
club average.  
The cities in Club I have thus been characterised by very strong overall growth in output 
throughout the period of study; though this seems to have levelled off somewhat in the last 15 
years of the period under investigation. This club includes Milton Keynes, Northampton, 
Telford, Peterborough, Reading, Cambridge, and Southampton. Several of these cities were 
promoted as New Towns and assisted by British spatial policy to become centres of growth. 
The New Town approach was to facilitate a planned approach to economic development 
whereby a Development Corporation was established with extensive powers relating to land 
assembly and the provision of infrastructure in order to promote economic development. The 
evidence suggests that they may have been quite successful in this respect. Club II has tracked 
the growth of the nation quite closely and includes cities like Oxford, Leeds, Bristol, 
Nottingham, Leicester, and Manchester. Club III comprises 23 cities that have more or less 
consistently grown well below the national rate. This club comprises many of the oldest 
industrial areas and includes Cardiff, Middlesbrough, Sheffield, Newcastle, Birmingham, 
Swansea, Glasgow, and Liverpool. 
London shows a particularly interesting growth trajectory throughout the study period. After a 
period of relative decline up until the mid-1980s it then ‘turned-around’ and has grown relatively 
more quickly than that of the national average since. It is also of interest to note that the TTWA 
residual group has tended to grow slightly above the national average over the study period, 
in line with the relatively better performance of near accessible areas around the cities in the 
post-war period, as documented by Keeble and Tyler (1995). 
3.4 Structural Transformation in the British Economy  
As already noted earlier, the United Kingdom was the first major industrial nation to experience 
a strong relative decline in the growth of its manufacturing sector, a process that began in the 
mid-1960s, some time before the same process affected other nations (Rhodes, 1986). It has 
also been the case that the United Kingdom has experienced the greatest relative employment 
decline in the sector of all its major competitors (Townsend, 1983). Figure 3.4 shows the broad 
pattern of output change in Britain over the period for larger aggregations of the 81 sectors 
62 
 
(see Appendix). The differential growth performance across sectors reveals the scale of the 
change in the last five decades. As Table 3.2 shows, over the period overall output in the 
national economy has grown by around 150% since 1971. As outlined in section 3.2, sectors 
that have grown below the national average growth rate, will have seen their share in national 
output decrease, while sectors that have grown at a faster pace, will have expanded their 
share. Growth of output in manufacturing sectors, including high-tech has been far below the 
average, and hence their share has fallen: in some cases (especially in metals and textiles) 
output has actually declined. The sectors in which output has grown considerably faster than 
the British average – and hence now represent a larger share of output – have been oil and 
gas extraction, retail and personal services and especially Knowledge Intensive Business 
Services (KIBS). 
 




















Table 3.2: Sectoral change across the British economy over 1971-2014 
 Indexed change in GVA in 
2014 (base 1971=100) 
Indexed change of broad sector 
group relative to growth of GB 
Agriculture and fishing 158.6 63.6 
Coal and Other mining 76.6 30.7 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
400.9 160.7 
Metals and related 75.0 30.1 
Textiles and related 34.2 13.7 
Light manufacturing 124.8 50.0 
High tech manufacturing 160.1 64.2 
Utilities 226.9 90.9 
Construction 150.8 60.4 
Transport and logistics 236.8 94.9 






Public services 197.8 79.2 
Total 249.5 100.0 
 
The process of deindustrialisation has resulted in manufacturing declining from nearly 22% of 
output in 1971 to just over 10% of output in 2014. But also within the services some sections 
of the service economy (especially the Knowledge Intensive Business Services and to a lesser 
extent retail and personal services) have been growing at a faster rate than other sections. 
The share of services (both private and public) went from about 50% of output in 1971 to 68% 
in 2014; but within services, KIBS increased its share of total service output from about a 
quarter to nearly half. 
We can now identify the sectors which have managed to grow above average over the period 
from 1971-2014 (and thus have seen an expansion of their share), and those which have 
performed below average (and hence will have decreased their share). Moreover, we can 
further distinguish between sectors according to their labour productivity performance, which 
reflects their dynamism and capability to generate high-value employment. Figure 3.5 shows 
the 81 sectors plotted according to their annual average output growth and growth in 
productivity over the 1971-2014 period. We can distinguish between four performance types, 
which are listed in Table 3.3. The first group contains those sectors that have had a growth of 
output and productivity below the national average.  
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Figure 3.5:  Sectoral growth in output and productivity in terms of annual compound 
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This includes large sectors such as public administration and defence, education, and 
construction. The second group has had slow output growth, but above the national average 
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productivity growth compared to the national average as a result of employment loss. This 
group includes most of manufacturing. The third group has had faster growth of output but 
slower productivity growth than the national average. This includes most personal services, 
health care, and several of the KIBS. The fourth group are those that have experienced 
relatively faster output and also productivity growth, and are thus the most impressive 
performers across the sectoral groups. This group encompasses most of the KIBS, retail, 
pharmaceuticals, and oil and gas extraction. 
3.5 Structural Transformation in British cities 
This section is concerned to assess the how the structural transformation discussed in the 
previous section, has played out over the various cities in Great Britain. The economic growth 
prospects of cities will be importantly conditioned by the initial presence of certain sectors at 
the beginning of the period, and the general development of sectors over the period. Hence 
we will first look at how economic activities were distributed over the country in 1971 and how 
this has changed over the period until 2014. We will then analyse what this has meant for 
changes in GVA for the cities from 1971 until 2014. 
Table 3.4 shows the economic structure of the clubs of cities in 1971. Clearly manufacturing 
was still a relatively important segment of the economy, with nearly 22% of the output in the 
nation. It is also clear that there was an overrepresentation of manufacturing – which as 
highlighted in section 3.4, has grown very little – in Clubs II and III, with Club II also specialising 
more in textiles and Club III more in metals and related industries. Private services – where a 
lot of the growth has taken place in the subsequent period – made up about 37% of the British 
economy in 1971. There is not that much disparity between the economic structures of the 
various types of cities and also the non-urban TTWAs in this respect. Also, private services 
had comparable share between the three main clubs of cities and in the non-urban TTWAs. 
The exception here is London, in which private services formed a much greater share (51%), 
mainly because of a far greater share of Knowledge Intensive Business Services (although 
transport and logistics also had a larger share than in the national economy). Hence London 
seemed to have been somewhat better placed to benefit from the structural transformations 
that were going to occur in the next decades, whereas Clubs II and III were at a comparative 
disadvantage. For the sake of contrast and of completeness, we have included Aberdeen as 
well in this table. 
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Table 3.4: Economic structure in clubs of cities in 1971, with total GVA in 1971 for broad 
groups of sectors and for clubs (in million £s, 2011 Current Market Value) 


















        
Agriculture and 
fishing 
0.2% 1.4% 0.8% 0.7% 2.2% 3.9% 1.0% 5,218 
Coal and Other 
mining 
0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 1.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2,074 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 1,430 
Metals and related 
 
2.1% 3.7% 3.5% 7.4% 5.4% 1.2% 4.4% 23,959 
Textiles and related 
 
1.4% 1.3% 4.1% 1.6% 2.3% 0.9% 2.2% 12,029 
Light manufacturing 
 
5.3% 8.5% 8.4% 9.5% 8.5% 16.3% 8.1% 43,733 
High tech 
manufacturing 
4.3% 8.1% 9.2% 10.5% 5.3% 1.7% 7.7% 41,653 
Utilities 
 
1.1% 2.4% 3.0% 2.8% 3.1% 4.7% 2.5% 13,485 
Construction 
 
10.3% 10.5% 10.7% 11.5% 11.7% 13.2% 10.9% 59,022 
Transport and 
logistics 
15.1% 12.4% 10.7% 10.9% 10.7% 12.2% 11.9% 64,362 
Retail and personal 
services 




24.7% 9.1% 8.6% 9.0% 7.6% 8.7% 12.0% 64,529 
Public services 
 
23.9% 28.3% 26.5% 23.6% 27.1% 25.7% 25.7% 138,334 
Performance 
types 
















Figures 3.6 to 3.10 show how the relative distribution of broad types of sectors over the clubs 
changed over time, by displaying the development of the location quotients. Agriculture and 
fishing, coal and other mining, and oil and gas extraction, are excluded as these made up 
relatively small shares of the British economy, and are moreover activities that mainly take 
place outside of cities. 






















19.3% 15.6% 15.7% 13.9% 14.5% 15.8% 15.8% 85,406 















Share of Club in 
1971 
 
20.8% 15.7% 24.7% 24.1% 14.1% 0.7% 100.0%  
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London already had relatively low concentrations of manufacturing activity, and these have 
been falling further over the period. The very high concentrations of output in Knowledge 
Intensive Business Services have remained high. But interestingly, the relative share declined 
somewhat over the 1970s before being restored in the 1980s probably because of the 
cessation of government policy activity designed to disperse office-based activity from London 
to its surrounding areas. Towards the end of the 1990s, the relative concentration began to fall 
somewhat again. London has experienced a marked drop in the concentration of output in 
transport and logistics and the public sector throughout the period. 
The cities in the fast-growing Club I had somewhat lower concentrations of manufacturing 
initially. But they have increased their relative concentration in high tech manufacturing over 
the period, particularly after the mid-1990s (Figure 3.7). These cities have noticeably increased 
their relative concentration in transport and logistics and also Knowledge Intensive Business 
Services, whilst their share of public service output has gone down. 
The cities in Club II, Figure 3.8, have historically been characterised by relatively greater 
concentration of textile related activity, which – even though this sector has declined very 
significantly at the national level – has remained concentrated in these cities. In terms of private 
services (as well as other types of manufacturing) there seems to be a convergence taking 
place, in which the cities in Club II increasingly emulate the economic structure of the nation 
as a whole. 
The cities in Club III were historically characterised by a relatively high share of manufacturing, 
in particular of manufacturing in metal related industries, as is clear from Figure 3.9. This 
pattern has persisted. As noted manufacturing output has grown only very little over the period, 
hence there may be an indication that the comparatively high concentrations of manufacturing 
have contributed to the slow growth of these cities in general. The more fast growing private 
services remain underrepresented in the cities in Club III, and this is especially true for the 
Knowledge Intensive Business Services. By contrast, public services seem to have increased 
their share in these cities considerably relative to the nation as a whole. This may have 
provided something of a compensating development, but an increasing dependence on public 
services carries its own problems as a basis for sustained high growth over the long term. 
Figure 3.10 makes clear that manufacturing is increasingly concentrated outside of the cities, 
in less urbanised and rural locations. Knowledge Intensive Business Services still seem to 
have a clear predilection for cities however, and the concentration of KIBS in more rural parts 
of the country has remained quite low.  
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These developments in the geographical distribution of industries over Great Britain are also 
reflected in the sectoral breakdown of changes in output across the various clubs over the 
period. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the breakdown of output change over the period. Table 
3.5 exhibits which sections of the economy experienced negative output change - i.e. decline 
in output - over the period. At the bottom of the table, the total absolute decline in each of the 
clubs is presented, which is broken down into the percentage contribution of each broad sector 
group and again of each sector performance type. Table 3.6 presents a similar breakdown for 
positive output change – in other words, growth in GVA – and shows the primary sources of 
growth in each of the clubs. Added together the negative change in Table 3.5 and positive 
change in Table 3.6, will represent the overall (net) GVA growth over the period for each club. 
With regard to negative output change, it is clear that London and the cities in Club III have 
had to deal with more decline in their sectors than other parts of the country. In both cases this 
was due to substantial losses of output in manufacturing, which perhaps also had a further 
negative effect on transport and logistics. In London, furthermore, public administration and 
defence have lost output. In Club III, some parts of its metal related industry (in particular basic 
steel making and manufacture of metal products) and of its high tech manufacturing (especially 
production of motor vehicles and of machinery) have sustained heavy losses. In Club II the 
dramatic decline of the textile industry in Britain is clearly noticeable, but other segments in 
manufacturing have not suffered as much as in Club III and in London.  
There have been very large differences in the capacity to generate output growth between the 
clubs over the period. On the one hand, there are the well-performing cities in Club I and 
London, which have seen a lot of expansion across their economies.  
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Table 3.5: Breakdown of negative GVA change (million £s, 2011 CMV), by broad sector groups and 
performance types for clubs of cities; 1971-2014 

















Broad sector groups         
Agriculture and fishing 0.6%  0.2% 0.3%  22.1% 0.5% -171 
Coal and Other mining 1.4% 1.4% 6.3% 0.9% 7.4%  2.7% -973 
Oil, Gas and Mining support   7.2% 1.0% 0.5%  1.9% -672 
Metals and related 
 
16.6% 25.5% 11.1% 33.4% 50.9% 6.5% 24.9% -8,860 
Textiles and related 
 
11.3% 27.2% 51.3% 10.5% 35.8% 6.1% 22.2% -7,917 
Light manufacturing 
 
21.1% 20.0% 7.2% 12.7% 2.7% 56.9% 13.9% -4,944 
High tech manufacturing 28.1% 7.6% 7.3% 28.5%   20.1% -7,173 
Utilities 
 
3.4% 18.4% 9.4% 6.9% 2.7%  6.7% -2,395 
Construction 
 
       0 
Transport and logistics 9.2%   5.8%   4.7% -1,659 
Retail and personal services        0 
Knowledge Intensive Business 
Services 
     8.4% 0.1% -25 
Public services 
 
8.3%      2.3% -822 
Performance types         
GVA below average, Prod below 
average. 
14.5% 18.4% 9.8% 9.1% 41.5% 6.5% 14.0% -4,981 
GVA below average, Prod 
above average 
85.5% 81.6% 82.9% 89.9% 58.0% 82.5% 84.0% -29,914 
GVA above average, Prod 
below average 
  0.2%    0.0% -12 
GVA above average, Prod 
above average 
  7.2% 1.0% 0.5% 11.0% 2.0% -704 















GVA in 1971 
 
111,959 84,466 133,067 130,019 76,202 3,579 539,291  
Negative GVA-change as % of 
GVA in 1971 







Table 3.6:  Breakdown of positive GVA change (million £s, 2011 CMV), by broad sector groups and 
performance types for clubs of cities; 1971-2014 

















Broad sector groups         
Agriculture and fishing  0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 1.2%  0.4% 3,229 
Coal and Other mining 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%   0.3% 0.1% 488 
Oil, Gas and Mining 
support 
0.1% 0.3%   0.1% 32.0% 0.6% 4,975 
Metals and related 
 
 0.3% 0.4%  1.2% 1.3% 0.3% 2,882 
Textiles and related 
 
     0.0% 0.0% 4 
Light manufacturing 
 
0.2% 1.4% 2.2% 0.9% 5.8% 2.4% 1.9% 15,780 
High tech 
manufacturing 
0.3% 5.8% 3.1% 4.8% 6.9% 3.0% 3.8% 32,190 
Utilities 
 
1.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.9% 2.8% 0.9% 2.3% 19,506 
Construction 
 
2.2% 4.7% 4.5% 1.1% 5.1% 2.0% 3.6% 29,984 
Transport and logistics 7.2% 14.5% 11.2% 9.9% 10.4% 8.7% 10.7% 89,726 
Retail and personal 
services 
12.4% 17.5% 19.8% 20.1% 20.6% 15.0% 17.6% 148,014 
Knowledge Intensive 
Business Services 
66.0% 39.1% 37.8% 34.6% 26.3% 25.7% 42.6% 358,813 
Public services 
 
10.0% 13.3% 18.0% 25.4% 19.5% 8.7% 16.2% 136,100 
Performance types         
GVA below average, 
Prod below average. 
13.2% 18.5% 18.5% 15.8% 19.6% 11.3% 18.5% 142,168 
GVA below average, 
Prod above average 
1.4% 7.3% 6.4% 3.5% 13.1% 7.0% 7.3% 49,959 
GVA above average, 
Prod below average 
42.6% 34.7% 39.6% 43.8% 35.9% 26.0% 34.7% 328,999 
GVA above average, 
Prod above average 
42.8% 39.4% 35.5% 37.0% 31.4% 55.7% 39.4% 320,565 


















GVA in 1971 
 
111,959 84,466 133,067 130,019 76,202 3,579 539,291  
Positive GVA-change 
as % of GVA in 1971 





On the other hand, there are the poorly performing cities in Club III, which in addition to 
experiencing more decline in output, have also not been able to generate much output growth 
compared to other cities. Club II and non-urban TTWAs, have been tracking the national 
average in this respect. It is also immediately clear from this table that very little growth has 
come from manufacturing, with the exception perhaps of some parts of high-tech 
manufacturing (mainly pharmaceuticals, production of computers, and of motor vehicles) in 
Club I and non-urban TTWAs. By far the greatest share of growth in all the clubs has been in 
private services, especially KIBS and to a lesser extent retail and personal services. In London, 
KIBS account for around two thirds of positive change in output. Also Club I shows a greater 
increase of output because of growth in KIBS than the other clubs. The nature of the growth 
of KIBS between London and the cities of Club I is somewhat different though; with growth in 
London more driven by financial services, legal and accounting, and entertainment industries, 
and Club I more dominated by IT services and real estate activities. Club III is lagging behind 
somewhat in terms of the share of its growth due to KIBS. Club III by contrast shows a much 
greater share due to expansion of public services, especially health care and education. These 
developments then also explain the greater share of higher productivity growth activities in the 
output growth of London and Club I; while in Club III somewhat more of its growth is constituted 
of sectors with lower productivity growth.  
3.6 Contribution of Structural Factors to the Growth of British Cities 
The foregoing analysis would seem to suggest that output growth in cities has been strongly 
influenced by their initial sectoral structure and how that structure then changes over time; in 
other words, economic structure would appear to be a key determinant of city output growth. 
However, the performance of sectors is not uniform throughout the country, and thus the 
growth of cities may be importantly affected by sectors doing significantly better or worse in 
some cities than would be expected based on their national performance. The expansion or 
decline of some sectors can thus be concentrated in some cities while bypassing others. Hence 
a city’s structural ensemble and how that ensemble changes over time will only partially explain 
the growth of cities. Other factors will be important, such as differences in levels of innovation 
and entrepreneurship, as well as the geographical spread of the types of functions within 
sectors (head offices, R&D, administration, production, etc.). These differences may in turn 
reflect local advantages in terms of human capital, agglomeration, policy and governance, etc. 
(Martin et al., 2016a). To explore the relative contribution of structural versus other, city-specific 
‘competitiveness’ factors, we use a dynamic shift share analysis. 
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Shift share has been used extensively and there is a large literature discussing its application 
and relative strengths and weaknesses. Prominent amongst the literature is the work of 
Fothergill and Gudgin (1984), Selting and Loveridge (1990, 1992) and Loveridge and Selting 
(1998). A standard criticism is that the choice of weights used to represent the structural base 
influence the results. In an attempt to overcome this research has relied on dynamic versions 
that have the advantage over conventional models of allowing both growth rates and economic 
structure to change, rather than being pivoted on a set of weights at a particular point in time. 
Examples of this approach include Barff and Knight (1988), Chern et al. (2002) and Fritz and 
Streicher (2005). More recently, attention has been focused on incorporating regression 
analysis into shift share, with examples including Blien et al. (2013). 
We adopted the dynamic shift share decomposition procedure as used in Gardiner et al. 
(2013). This has the advantage of recording and updating the levels of sectoral composition 
and the changes within this on an annual basis, so the point of reference to distinguish between 
structural effects and local city-specific effects is allowed to shift over time. It also provides 
additional information on dynamic transition, which could not be obtained from the standard 
comparative-static shift-share method. The analysis has been conducted at an 81 sectoral 
level. 
The classic shift-share approach decomposes temporal change in a variable into three additive 
effects: 
(i) National component (NC) - the change that would occur if all regions' sectors grow at 
national rate 
(ii) Structure effect (SE) - the change that would occur if all regions' sectors grow at national 
sector rate (minus, or conditional on, the national share effect) 
(iii) Local effect (LE) - the difference between the actual change and the sum of national and 
industry shifts, i.e. a residual designed to capture local-specific factors such as 
competitiveness, concentration of higher value functions, local policy, etc. 
More formally, if we consider a variable X, defined over industry i, region r and time t, a 
temporal change between time t and t+n can be written as: 
 





















g = the growth of the variable X over the pre-defined time period (between t+n and t); 
gn = the national (percentage) growth of variable X during this period, 
gin = the national (percentage) growth by industry i of variable X during this period; and 
gir = the regional (percentage) growth by industry i of variable X during this period. 
By summing over all industries in any given city, we arrive at the overall national, industrial mix 
and residual shift components: 
 
 
Using the dynamic version of the technique, and thus decomposing city changes in output on 
a year-by-year basis, we were able to investigate the contribution that changes in economic 
structure have made to each city Club’s output growth differential over time. This differential 
growth already incorporates the national component, hence we focus on the contribution of the 
structure effect and local effect to the positive or negative gap in performance compared to 
national growth. Moreover, in order to see how matters evolve over the study period, we can 
track the relative contributions of the structure effect and local effect in the cumulative 
development of this gap over time. Figure 3.11 shows the results. 
The findings in the case of London are clear. Throughout the period, London benefited from 
its particular economic structure; that is to say, London has benefited from having a high 
proportion of nationally fast growing sectors. However, London has certainly not managed to 
benefit as much as expected, as the structure effect was offset by a negative local effect, which 
held on persistently over many years until the mid-1990s. But in recent years this local effect 
has become strongly positive, making up for much of the accumulated losses with regard to 
the potential growth of London in the decades before (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.11. The contribution of economic structure and of local factors to differential output growth 















































The structural effect also appears substantial in explaining the slow growth of the cities in Club 
III. Throughout the period, these cities have been at a disadvantage because of the 
composition of their economies, and especially until the mid-1980s this appears to explain 
about half of the negative gap in output growth with the nation as a whole. However, the 
negative impact of the local effect has been at least as large, and has only increased over time 
compared to the structural effect. This means that cites in this Club have not only lagged 
because they have an unfavourable mix of sectors, but that in general those sectors 
underperform compared to the performance of the sectors for the nation as a whole. This 
suggests that the various factors that influence a city’s overall competitiveness have become 
increasingly unfavourable. 
Club II and the non-urban TTWAs also had to cope with negative impacts of their industrial 
structure over the period, especially after the early 1980s. But these cities and non-urban 
TTWAs managed to compensate for this negative structure effect through a positive local effect 
for most of the period. Hence the performance of the sectors that are present in these locations 
has on the whole been better than expected. 
The strong growth of the Club I cities has almost entirely been due to highly positive local 
effects: the sectors in these cities have strongly outperformed the national average trends in 
those sectors. Only from the mid-1990s onwards does a modest positive structure effect 
emerge, as a result of a higher concentration of high-growth sectors. But the local effect clearly 
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dominates, and seems to reflect a growing competitive advantage of these cities compared to 
other parts of Great Britain, although this advantage seems to have stabilised following the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2008.  
3.7 Implications of Structural Transformation in British Cities for Employment 
Thus while structural transformation goes some way in accounting for the observed 
patterns of output growth across cities, a full explanation would need to examine the 
host of factors and processes that are subsumed under the ‘local effect’ identified 
above. This is beyond the scope of this paper. However, also of interest are the 
implications of the patterns of output growth, for city employment trends. As we saw in 
Figure 3.1, there is a reasonably close correlation between output growth and 
employment growth across British cities. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 explore this relationship 
further, and show the breakdown of employment changes in the city clubs across broad 
sector groups and across sector performance types. The general picture is very similar 
to the one painted in section 3.5 (in terms of GVA), with the same patterns of growth 
and decline in the various Clubs and sectors. But much more than when examining 
output, the churn between and within different segments of the economy comes into 
view. From an employment perspective, the scale of the process of structural 
transformation over the past five decades is quite remarkable. Even within parts of the 
economy which exhibit substantial growth of output – such as transport and logistics, 
public services, utilities, and to a much lesser extent KIBS (with some job loss in 
insurance & pensions) – considerable movements take place, which are not visible 
when looking at changes in GVA alone. 
Also the uneven effects of the process of structural transformation need to be 
highlighted. The decline in employment due to job loss in various sectors (especially 
in manufacturing), seems to have been particularly large in Club III, London, and Club 
II. But then London and Club II (and furthemore the non-urban TTWAs) seemed to 
have gained a lot of new employment in other other sectors (mainly services), following 
the national pattern in this respect. Employment in Club I clearly grew a lot faster than 
the average. Club III however has, by 2014, not even fully recovered from the losses 
of employment it sustained already in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The focus on employment moreover further highlights differences in productivity across 
sectors, and also across cities. Those sectors where there has been relatively 
favourable output and productivity growth, compared to the nation, mainly most of the 
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KIBS, are of particular interest. About 40% of the growth in output in Great Britain over 
the period from 1971 until 2014 has come from these sectors, yet they have contributed 
less than 20% of the growth in employment. By far the most employment growth has 
been in sectors which have indeed also grown relatively fast in output, but in which the 
increase of output per job – labour productivity – has been below average (such as 
personal services, health and social care, and warehousing). The remaining source of 
employment growth has been in sectors which have experienced low output growth 
and consequently also low productivity growth (such as education, construction, and 
accommodation and leisure). 
Moreover, the geographical distribution of the growth of high value-added employment 
across the cities is again quite uneven, being concentrated in Club I and London. In 
contrast, they have only constituted a small part of employment growth of the cities in 
Club III, in which employment gains have instead consisted disproportionally of jobs in 
sectors which have experienced below average growth in productivity. Thus, structural 
transformation in the British economy also seems reflected in divergent growth of 
productivity across cities, and thus ultimately real incomes.  The divergent 
development of productivity across British cities – a critical issue attracting increasing 
attention from the UK Government in relation to its new Industrial Strategy (HM 
Treasury, 2017) – is examined in Martin et al. (2017). 
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Table 3.7: Breakdown of negative employment change, by broad sector groups and performance 
types for clubs of cities; 1971-2014 
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(2.9%) 
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Retail and personal services -4,827 
(0.4%) 
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Employment in 1971 
 
4,536,668 3,892,775 6,660,088 6,653,791 3,746,650 156,233 25,646,205 
Negative empl.-change as % 
of employment in 1971 
-27.8% -21.3% -27.8% -32.6% -17.5% -26.0% -26.5% 
83 
 
Table 3.8: Breakdown of positive employment change, by broad sector groups and performance types 
for clubs of cities; 1971-2014 
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Employment in 1971 
 
4,536,668 3,892,775 6,660,088 6,653,791 3,746,650 156,233 25,646,205 
Positive empl.-change as 
% of employment in 1971 




Structural change is an ongoing process in dynamic economies. What the foregoing analysis 
demonstrates is that the profound structural transformations in the British since the beginning 
of the 1970s have played out quite differently across the country’s various cities, shaping to 
a significant extent their divergent growth trajectories. Moreover the relative importance of 
structural change compared to other determinants of growth has varied across different types 
of city. 
The cities in Club I (mainly cities in the South of England) – and London - have benefitted 
substantially from structural transformation, and have seen strong growth on the back of high-
growth sectors, especially KIBS. In contrast, the cities in Club III (mainly cities in the North of 
England, Wales and Scotland) have seen decline or little growth in the traditional mainstays 
of their economy (mainly in manufacturing), and at the same time have been insufficiently 
able to grow and attract high-value private service activities. A third group of cities – Club II 
(those that have grown at more or less the national rate) – also have had to cope with the 
negative effects of structural change (though on average not quite to the same extent), but 
fared much better, and managed to make a relatively successful transition to a post-industrial 
economy, albeit with deep new patterns of inequality and labour market divisions. Non-urban 
TTWAs have on the whole had to face less of the negative impacts of change in the economic 
structure; moreover they actually seem to have profited to some extent from some 
manufacturing moving out of cities. Furthermore, the growth in private and public services in 
such areas has in general been on a par with the average for the nation. However, structural 
factors cannot in themselves account for the strong growth of cities in Club I, and many cities 
in Club II (and the non-urban TTWAs) also managed to deal with structural transformation 
better than Club III. Moreover, these factors are also insufficient to explain the very lacklustre 
performance of London until the turn of the century with a sudden turn-around in its fortunes 
thereafter, as well as the full extent of the lagging growth in Club III cities. 
These results imply that the economic trajectories of cities are the complex and uneven 
outcomes of three fundamental sets of processes, all of which are interactive and potentially 
shaped by their policy and institutional contexts. These processes have often been 
distinguished in recent analyses of productivity growth. The first are those structural changes 
in output and employment shares which we have analysed here in depth. They centre on 
what we might term between-sector changes and refer to the rise of some industries and the 
decline of others. Our analysis has demonstrated the importance of these processes in some 
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cities and has allowed us to understand the extent to which post-industrial transition produces 
growth-reducing structural change in some categories of city. 
A second set of processes concerns within-sector changes and includes the way in which 
different parts of the same industry change and evolve over time. They highlight the way in 
which different firms within the same industry may have different productivity and innovation 
capabilities and track records. Cities host firms that are classified as belonging to the same 
industry but are actually quite different in their capabilities, employment, business models 
and strategies, and these ‘within-sector’ effects will also contribute to divergent economic 
performances. Our findings on the importance of ‘local effects’ in some types of cities may 
well indicate in part that these ‘within-sector’ effects also have a significant and growing 
spatial dimension. There are certainly many theoretical arguments which support and 
envisage this, as they suggest that globalisation and new supply chains and divisions of 
labour are widening differences between firms within industries and creating new types of 
specialisations in terms of functions, tasks and capabilities rather than entire sectors (Massey 
1995; Baldwin, 2016). Different rates of entrepreneurship and firm demographics, as well as 
investment and foreign ownership, may also be reinforcing these spatial variations.  
However, a third set of processes centring on the development of cities’ local supply factors 
are also interacting through time with both of these two types of industrial change. We know 
that there are important differences in the capabilities of cities to offer firms an attractive 
business environment through the supply of both appropriate ‘hard and soft’ infrastructure 
and the development of a local labour force sought by knowledge intensive and tradable 
industries. As we have argued elsewhere (Martin, et al 2016a) local areas start with an 
inherited pattern of land use and a resource base and institutions that were tailored to another 
era and the legacy of the past weighs heavily on their ability to adjust to new economic 
futures. Thus, the Club III cities tend to be amongst the oldest industrial cities with 
infrastructure, labour forces and a constrained land use pattern to match (See Fothergill and 
Gudgin, 1982). In constraint our fast growing Club I cities contain post second world war New 
Towns characterised by plentiful and planned land assembly, up to-date infrastructure and 
labour with skills more appropriate to the new age. While there is considerable scope for 
policy initiatives to modify and improve these local supply factors and characteristics, it is 
also the case that their development is primarily the outcome of a long-term cumulative and 
path dependent process in which industrial change plays a key role and accumulates different 
types of asset and institution (Storper, 2015). 
In the course of the dynamic specialisation seen in city economies, the relationships between 
these three sets of processes are deeply recursive through time. Moreover, while beyond the 
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scope of this paper, in order to properly understand the direction and degree of ‘within and 
between sector’ effects in a particular urban area we need to understand how city economies 
sit within regional ensemble of industries as well as within national and global markets and 
supply chain relationships (McCann, 2016).    
What this suggests is that unambiguously determining the effects of consequences of 
structural change for urban economic performance is much more complex and difficult than 
might be assumed. While our dynamic shift-share analysis has allowed us to rigorously 
distinguish and pull out the direct effects of structural change on variations in city growth, it 
is not intended to identify more indirect and evolutionary path dependent effects that stem 
from structural change. But these indirect effects may be important and may be closely 
integrated with both within-sector and local supply-side development in specific ensembles. 
More specifically, studies of deindustrialisation in particular cities have increasingly 
emphasised that it is a long-term process which has lasting damaging and continuing effects 
on communities and economies (Martin and Gardiner, forthcoming). Indeed sociologists have 
described ‘the half-life of deindustrialisation’ to capture these lasting inhibiting influences 
effects on cultures and individuals (see Linkon, 2013; Strangleman, 2016). 
In economic terms our evidence suggests that such effects have been particularly strong in 
Club III cities and it may be significant that cities in this group appear to have a stronger 
concentration of metals and related industries. Further investigation might find that the lasting 
effects of deindustrialisation may be strongest in such cities, where industrial plant and 
premises are hardest to convert, where land is often contaminated and where negative 
images of industrial decline are most often entrenched. Interestingly, Club II cities seem to 
have had greater concentrations in textiles which may have experienced less severe 
obstacles to conversion and renewal. But without further research we can at this stage only 
speculate about the causes of the differences between the two Clubs of cities in responding 
to negative structural change. It may be that varied legacies of decline have shaped within-
sector effects in service industries. It could also be that the two groups are distinguished more 
by their policy environments and character of their collective and institutional agency. 
Nevertheless, the broader point is that structural change and deindustrialisation are a key 
source of lasting path dependent effects in some cities (Martin and Sunley, 2006).  
While it is important not to paint too deterministic and bleak a picture, as deindustrialised 
economies undoubtedly contain many resources and assets for renewal, our interpretation is 
that the legacies of these economies have frequently constrained and filtered the 
development of growth of service sector firms, as well as the provision of a skilled and 
educated labour force that is well-suited to knowledge-intensive firm growth. There may well 
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be a type of spatial differentiation and sorting in which the emergence and growth of 
knowledge-intensive and high-productivity firms is shaped by the degree to which path 
dependence allows some cities to be more valued by these firms and their employees. Our 
decomposition techniques are not suited to fully capturing these long-term legacies and 
indirect effects as they will show up only as local competitiveness effects and residuals. They 
require much fuller and more detailed intensive investigation than we have been able to offer 
in this extensive and synthetic paper. Nevertheless, we hope to have highlighted their 






4 Reviving the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and Spatially 
Rebalancing the British Economy 
4.1 Introduction: The Rhetoric of Britain’s Spatially Unbalanced Economy 
From the late-1970s and early-1980s onwards a very particular model of economic growth 
was championed across many of the advanced nations, and indeed beyond. Based on 
deregulation, privatization, financialization, and enthusiastic belief in ever deeper free-market 
globalization, this model was hailed as finally bringing an end to recessions and inflation, as 
driving a new age of stable growth, what in the USA became labeled as the ‘Great 
Moderation’ (Bernanke, 2004), and in the UK as a new ‘NICE’ era (of non-inflationary 
continued expansion).59  Above all, it was a model driven by a dramatic and seemingly 
unstoppable expansion of finance and banking.   Banks made record profits, the world’s 
financial centres prospered, and many regions and cities, indeed whole nations, experienced 
rapid growth on the back of the booming housing and real estate markets that the banks were 
eager to fund and profit from.  In the UK, the financial success of London was openly 
celebrated by the Labour Government at the time, and even held up as a model for the rest 
of the country to follow:  
I believe it will be said of this age, the first decades of the 21st century, that out of the greatest 
restructuring of the global economy, perhaps even greater than the industrial revolution, a new 
world order was created…. [M]ost importantly of all in the new world order… [t]he financial 
services sector in Britain, and the City of London at the centre of it … shows how we can excel 
in a world of global competition.  Britain needs more of the vigour, ingenuity and aspiration 
that you [London’s financial class] already demonstrate is the hallmark of your success 
(Chancellor Gordon Brown, Mansion House Speech, June 20, 2007). 
 
No sooner had this praise been lavished, however, than the economic boom on which it was 
based was brought to an abrupt halt. The financial crisis revealed the boom for what it was, 
a form of development that was highly unbalanced: on a global level, between creditor and 
debtor nations (especially China and the USA respectively); within the Eurozone, between 
the strong core members such as Germany and France, and the weaker peripheral members 
such as Spain, Italy and Portugal; and within countries, between consumption and 
 
59 The acronym NICE is usually attributed to the former Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King.  
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investment, between services and production, between state revenues and spending, 
between rich and poor, and, spatially, between different cities and regions.  For while the 
‘long boom’ between the early-1990s and 2007 may have lifted most regions and cities, it 
lifted some much more than others. Indeed, in some instances, and the UK is a particularly 
prominent case, it reinforced regional inequalities. 
In recognition of these inequalities, since 2010, when the Conservative-Liberal Coalition 
Government came to power, a new spatial imaginary has risen to the fore in UK Government 
policy thinking on the need to ‘spatially rebalance’ the national economy. The argument is 
that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 had exposed the fact that the economy had become too 
dependent for growth on a narrow range of activities - especially finance - and on one corner 
of the country, namely a London and the Greater South East.  As David Cameron, shortly 
after he had been elected Prime Minister, opined: 
Our economy has become more and more unbalanced… Today our economy is heavily reliant 
on just a few industries and a few regions – particularly London and the South East.  This 
really matters. An economy with such a narrow foundation for growth is fundamentally 
unstable and wasteful – because we are not making use of the talent out there in all parts of 
our United Kingdom (Cameron, 2010). 
 
The Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, held to a similar view: 
For years, our prosperity has been pinned on financial wizardry in London’s Square Mile, with 
other sectors and other regions left behind. That imbalance left us hugely exposed when the 
banking crisis hit. And now Britain has a budget deficit higher than at any time since the 
Second World War. It is time to correct that imbalance. We need to spread growth across the 
whole country and across all sectors (Clegg, 2010).  
And yet more recently, Theresa May, David Cameron’s successor as Prime Minister, once 
again stressed the need to secure an  
an economy that’s fair and where everyone plays by the same rules. That means acting to 
tackle some of the economy’s structural problems that hold people back. Things like the 
shortage of affordable homes. The need to make big decisions on – and invest in - our 
infrastructure. The need to rebalance the economy across sectors and areas in order to 
spread wealth and prosperity around the country (May, 2016). 
 
The Government’s initial response was to prosecute a new localism, a new ‘local growth 
agenda’ (H.M Government, 2010). Local Enterprise Partnerships (to replace the previous 
Regional Development Agencies) were established, together with a regional growth fund, 
local enterprise zones, city deals, and various other measures, all intended to promote local 
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growth and greater ‘spatial balance’ across the economy.  And then, from mid-2014 onwards, 
the Chancellor George Osborne began to talk of his offensive to promote what he called a 
‘Northern Powerhouse’ to rival London in scale and dynamism: 
Something remarkable has happened to London over these recent decades. It has become a 
global capital, the home of international finance, attracting the young, the ambitious, the wealthy 
and the entrepreneurial from around the world in their tens of thousands. And it’s a great 
strength for our country that it contains such a global city…  But something remarkable has 
happened here in Manchester, and in Liverpool and Leeds and Newcastle and other northern 
cities over these last thirty years too. The once hollowed-out city centres are thriving again, with 
growing universities, iconic museums and cultural events, and huge improvements to the 
quality of life…  The cities of the north are individually strong, but collectively not strong enough. 
The whole is less than the sum of its parts. So the powerhouse of London dominates more and 
more. And that’s not healthy for our economy... We need a Northern Powerhouse too. Not one 
city, but a collection of northern cities - sufficiently close to each other that combined can take 
on the world (George Osborne, 2014) 
However, at the same time the Government has also been anxious that the growth of London 
is not hindered or compromised in any way.  Herein lies a key conundrum: how to achieve a 
greater degree of ‘spatial balance’ in the economy whilst also wanting to protect and enhance 
the gains from spatial agglomeration of economic activity and growth in the already 
prosperous London-South East mega-region.  Much of the debate surrounding this issue has 
revolved around a stark question: “is London good or bad for the rest of the UK”? On the one 
side are those who point to the benefits of the Greater London economic machine in 
generating demand for goods and services in the rest of the UK, as a vital source of export 
earnings, and as a major contributor to the taxes needed to help fund welfare payments and 
public spending across the nation as a whole (see for example, City of London Corporation, 
2011, 2014). But on the other side are those who see London as akin to a ‘country apart’, 
even a quasi-independent ‘city-state’, as a region which has become increasingly detached 
from the rest of the UK in terms of its level of prosperity, its economic growth, its global 
orientation, and its cyclical behaviour (Deutsche Bank, 2013).  Some go further, and regard 
it as having become a sort of ‘economic black hole’, sucking in key human and financial 
resources from, and to the detriment of, the rest of the country. For example, Vince Cable 
when he was Secretary of State for Business in the Coalition Government was quite emphatic 
that  
One of the big problems that we have at the moment…  is that London is becoming a kind of 
giant suction machine, draining the life out of the rest of the country (Cable, 2013)  
A similar view was subsequently voiced by Scotland’s First Minister: 
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London has a centrifugal pull on talent, investment and business from the rest of Europe and 
the world. That brings benefits to the broader UK economy. But as we know, that same 
centrifugal pull is felt by the rest of us across the UK, often to our detriment. The challenge 
for us all is how to balance this in our best interests – not by engaging in a race to the bottom, 
but by using our powers to create long-term comparative advantage and genuine economic 
value (Sturgen, 2014).  
 
This ‘spatial imbalance’ in the UK economy, of an economy tipped too far in favour of London 
and the South East, is not in fact some new or recent feature, but a long-standing problem, 
one that goes back to the Victorian period if not earlier.  We have been here before, 
repeatedly. As early as 1919, Sir Halford Mackinder, successively a prominent Oxford 
political geographer, Director of the London School of Economics, and Liberal Unionist 
(Conservative) MP, had argued for a more ‘balanced’ national socio-economy: 
As long as you allow a great metropolis to drain most of the best young brains from the local 
communities, to cite only one aspect of what goes on, so long must organizations centre 
unduly in the metropolis and become inevitably an organization of nation-wide classes and 
interests (Mackinder, 1919). 
 
Barely two decades later, in equally direct terms, the milestone report of the Barlow 
Commission in 1940 on the distribution of the nation’s industrial population expressed a 
similar view, again in language highly prescient of that used by Vince Cable nearly seventy-
five years later: 
The contribution in one area of such a large proportion of the national population as is 
contained in Greater London, and the attraction to the Metropolis of the best industrial, 
financial, commercial and general ability, represents a serious drain on the rest of the country 
(Barlow Commission, 1940). 
 
But how then to ‘power up’ the economies of the country’s northern cities in order to reduce 
this dominance of London?   What is the scale of the challenge?  In the remainder of this 
chapter we focus particularly on this latter question. We start by showing how a north-south 
pattern of spatial economic imbalance - of a more prosperous London and South East, and 
a lagging North and West - was already well established in the 19th C.  We then move forward 
to the period since the beginning of the 1970s. Using new novel data, we show how major 
northern cities have lagged behind in terms of growth of employment, output and productivity 
over the past forty years or so. A crucial aspect of the issue is shown to be the dramatic 
decline in the manufacturing export base of the northern cities, and, unlike London, their 
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failure to replace this shrinking base on a sufficient scale with new tradable activities. This 
problem is not readily attributed to northern cities being ‘too small’ as some observers have 
claimed. What is arguably more important is the fact that London has long enjoyed the 
position of hosting all of the key economic, financial and political institutions that govern the 
economy and determine national economic policy.  Spatial imbalance in the UK is not just an 
economic issue: it is also one of a major spatial imbalance in the location and operation of 
the key levers of economic, financial, political and administrative power.  The UK is one of 
the most politically centralised countries in the OCED: it is surely not simply coincidental that 
it also has one of highest levels of regional economic inequality. What emerges from our brief 
analysis in this chapter is that spatial economic imbalance is in fact an entrenched, persistent 
and indeed institutionalized feature of the national economy, and as such is a major challenge 
for policymakers. Although new policies are being introduced that are aimed at ‘spatially 
rebalancing the economy’ – including the creation of a ‘Northern Powerhouse’ to rival that of 
London – and even a partial devolution of fiscal powers and policies to cities is underway, we 
conclude that these will have only a limited impact on what has long been a systemic and 
deep-seated London-centric bias in Britain’s national political economy.   We begin our 
narrative with some economic history. 
4.2 The Long-standing Nature of Britain’s Spatially Unbalanced Economy  
According to many economic historians and geographers, during the 19th C it was the towns 
and cities of northern Britain – in the regions of the North West, North East and Yorkshire-
Humberside – that were the country’s economic ‘powerhouses’. Throughout the long 
Victorian period, so the argument runs, the ‘North’ was the most dynamic and prosperous 
part of the country, centred on the growth of key export-based industries, especially cotton 
and woollen textiles, shipbuilding, and heavy engineering equipment and manufactured 
products, associated with the expansion of Empire and Britain’s domination of international 
trade. For example, back in the 1880s, the Lancashire cotton mills ranked as one of wonders 
of the industrial world. Much of the Victorian industrial economy was located in the northern 
towns and regions of the country. Unemployment was primarily a problem of the ‘South’, with 
its difficulties of agricultural depression and the decline of old craft industries, especially in 
London. 
Immediately following the First World War, however, the story continues, adverse shifts in 
Britain’s world trade position imposed severe shocks on the industrial ‘North’. The decline of 
Empire and the rise of new international competitors, such as the United States, Germany 
and Japan, combined with a lack of technological modernisation in Britain’s old staple 
industries, restrictive domestic economic policies, and recurrent deep recessions in the 1920s 
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and early-1930s, resulted in structural decline and the emergence of acutely high 
unemployment in many northern towns and cities. Meanwhile, the ‘new growth industries’ of 
the period, based on light engineering, motor vehicles, and a variety of electrical and mass 
consumer goods, became clustered in London, the South East and the Midlands (Scott, 
2007). Hence, according to these same economic historians, a major reorientation occurred 
in the geography of the British economy: “in terms of many of the basic measures of social 
inequality, the geography of the country had to a large extent been reversed” (Massey, 1986, 
p.31 The old geography of sectoral specialisation and economic organisation, which had 
favoured the ‘North’, was being replaced by a new and different pattern of sectoral 
specialisation and organisation that favoured the ‘South’.  
Now while many aspects of this historical narrative are correct and well documented, there 
is also more recent evidence that suggests that some important qualifications and 
modifications are called for. New analyses by leading economic historians suggests that the 
argument that the national economy was led by the ‘North’ up until the inter-war years, when 
the ‘South’ suddenly took over that role, may be exaggerated, and that in fact even by the 
middle of the 19thC London had already pulled well ahead of the North of the country in terms 
of output and prosperity (Crafts, 2005; Geary and Stark, 2015, 2016) - see Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. London was the single largest centre of manufacturing industry in the country, even 
though for the most part it consisted of small scale factories and workshops. The city also 
had the nation’s largest port and docks.  In addition, and crucial in determining the city’s 
subsequent economic development several decades later, even by the early 19thC London 
had become firmly established as the nation’s trading and financial capital, and indeed one 
of the world’s most important financial centres, having taken over that role from Amsterdam. 
Up until the middle of the 19thC, the British banking system had been a regional and county-
based system, but through merger, acquisition and amalgamation, and successive waves of 
local bank closures, by the close of the century most of the surviving major banks had become 
headquartered in London, where the primary institutions of the Bank of England, Lloyds 
Insurance and the main Stock Exchange had been established more than two centuries 
earlier. 
Similarly, the spatial distribution of middle- and upper-class wealth in 19thC Britain was not 
concentrated in the industrial towns of the ‘North’, as is often claimed,60 but rather was 
focused on London (Rubenstein, 1977, 1981). The importance  
 
60 For example, in commenting on the ‘North-South Divide’ debate that arose in the mid-1980s, Lord Young 
the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry under the Thatcher Government ventured to claim that 
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Table 4.1: Regional Shares of UK GDP 1861-1911 
 1861 1881 1911 
 
London 17.1 19.9 20.1 
South East 11.2 10.9 13.1 
East Anglia 3.1 2.4 2.2 
South West 8.1 6.1 5.9 
East Midlands 4.7 4.6 5.4 
West Midlands 7.1        6.9 6.8 
Yorks-Humberside 6,8  7.3 7.7 
North West 11.1 13.3 13.7 
North  4.1 5.2 5.3 
Wales 4.3 4.2 4.4 










Source: Geary and Stark (2015) 
Note:  Because of the lack of consistent data for Northern Ireland, Geary and Stark use 
Ireland to define the UK.  
 
Table 4.2: Spatial Imbalance in the British Economy, 1901-1931 Regional GDP per Capita 
Relative to the Average (GB=100). Geary-Stark Estimates 
GB=100 1901 1911 1921   1931 
 
London 134.2 133.8 137.4 144.3  
South East 107.0 104.1 101.2 114.0 
East Anglia 83.7 83.5 83.5 82.7 
South West 91.7 92.4 91.3 92.3 
East Midlands 92.4 97.2 88.6 86.6 
West Midlands 86.0    90.5           82.1 95.7 
Yorks-Humberside 88.3 90.1 93.6 86.4 
North West 103.7 104.8 109.3 88.6 
North  85.8 83.0 83.1 81.1 
Wales 80.3 82.1 76.5 81.1 
Scotland 90.5 86.9 92.3 94.3 
 
“Until 70 years ago the North was always the richest part of the country…that is where all the great country 
houses are because that’s where the wealth was. Now some of it is in the South. It’s our turn, that’s all” 
(Quoted in Business, 1987, p.17). This was a highly simplistic and not altogether accurate reading of the 
country’s historical economic geography, and a dismissive interpretation of the widening gap between the 




Coefficient Variation, (%) 16.9 16.6 18.5 22.6 
Source of data: Geary and Stark (2015) 
Note: Geary and Stark use a Great Britain index base for this set of results, rather than 
a UK one in their analysis shown in Table 4.1.  Again, the lack of consistent data for 
Northern Ireland precluded inclusion of this region. 
 
of northern trading cities such as Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and Glasgow 
notwithstanding, more than 50 percent of middle-class income in Victorian times was 
accounted for by London. This was due not just to its larger middle class population, but also 
to its higher middle-class per capita income. 
This brief excursion into economic history is not intended to refute the undoubted industrial 
success of much of northern Britain in the 19th C, and the crucial role that many northern 
towns and cities - such as Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle, Hull and 
Glasgow - played in the Industrial Revolution, the Victorian economy and the development of 
Empire that took place in that era.  They were unquestionably successful, and were certainly 
industrial powerhouses. However, as the new analyses by Crafts (2005) and Geary and Stark 
(2015, 2016) show, while the North West was certainly the second or third wealthiest region 
in the country, and while a distinct shift towards London and the South East definitely 
occurred in the inter-war period, the fact of the matter is that London was already in a league 
of its own by the middle of the 19th C. Doubt can thus be cast on the view that it was only in 
the interwar years that economic advantage ‘suddenly shifted’ to the ‘South’. London and the 
South East were established as the most prosperous areas of Britain well before the re-
orientation of the national economy that took place in the 1920s and 1930s.  It was precisely 
because these regions were already positioned as the prosperous core - in which the nation’s 
major financial, political and economic institutions were already well established - that they 
attracted the bulk of the new industries that emerged in the inter-war period. In a certain 
sense, the ‘greater London’ region – London and neighbouring parts of the South East – in 
effect ‘reinvented’ itself in those years, in as much that this part of Britain led the ‘new 
economy’ just as the ‘North’ experienced the structural upheavals and decline of the ‘old 
economy’ inherited from the previous century.   
What is clear is that the problem of ‘spatial imbalance’ in the British economy that has become 
the focus of political concern and rhetoric since 2010 is in fact hardly new. It has roots that 
go back well into the 19thC, if not earlier. Thus, while our leading politicians have been correct 
to recognise that the British economy is too spatially unbalanced, with growth too dependent 
on and concentrated in London and much of the surrounding South East, and although the 
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problem intensified during the long phase of uninterrupted growth between 1992-2007, the 
spatially unbalanced nature of the national economy is of much longer historical standing.  
This suggests that in explaining the current pattern of spatial economic imbalance it is not 
sufficient to appeal to contemporary factors and causes, but also necessary to understand 
how the past has shaped the present: there is a strong degree of path dependence in regional 
economic development (see Martin and Sunley, 2006). Furthermore, and a key element in 
making for such path dependence, past structures of spatial economic organization can in 
effect become institutionalized and reproduced by the national political economy – the 
geographical configuration of national economic and political power and policy.   This is a 
large part of the problem in the UK.  We return to this issue later in the chapter.  But first, we 
look at the economic performance of individual major northern English cities over the past 40 
years to get a sense of how they have fared relative to the rest of the country over this period, 
and hence the scale of the challenge of reviving the ‘Northern Power House’ as a route to 
spatially rebalancing the British economy. 
4.3 The Recent Economic Performance of Major Northern Powerhouse Cities 
As Jane Jacobs (1984) famously argued, it is not possible to understand a ‘national’ economy 
without reference to the performance of the cities and city-regions of which it is composed. It 
is in cities and city regions that the bulk of a nation’s wealth is created, its exports are 
produced, its jobs are located, and its incomes are spent.  It is perhaps somewhat ironic, 
therefore, that while national economic policy thinking has come to recognise the crucial role 
played by cities in shaping the nation’s economic fortunes and progress, UK governments 
have never collected regular or consistent data on the economies or economic performance 
of our cities. Our understanding of how economic growth has varied across urban Britain is 
surprisingly poor: we know relatively little about the productivity of our cities, their trade 
balances, or the innovativeness of their economies.  There is even no general agreement 
about how our cites should be meaningfully defined geographically.  
Constructing reliable and meaningful economic data series for British cities has been part of 
a major research programme with which we are involved.  This is concerned, inter alia, with 
compiling consistent time series on some key dimensions of city economic performance – 
particularly employment, output and productivity - back to the 1970s. The complete data set 
covers some 82 sectors of activity for 85 cities annually over the period 1971-2014. The cities 
are defined in terms of travel-to-work areas (using 2011 geographical definitions), and hence 
have a functional character. These are the most complete data series of their kind, and 
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enable us to provide some interesting insight into the comparative economic performance of 
individual cities and how that performance has varied over time.61 
A useful way of exploring this issue is to compute the cumulative difference between the 
annual growth rate (for example, of employment and output) in a given city and the 
corresponding rate for the country as a whole.62  This allows comparison of cities one against 
another by reference to their performance relative to a national ‘yardstick’. The computed 
cumulative differential growth series for employment and output for the major northern cores 
cities of Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle - the main cities that make 
up the ‘northern powerhouse’ area - together with London for comparison, are shown in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2.   A number of key features are evident. 
Figure 4.1:  Annual Growth of Employment in Northern Core Cities and London, 1971-
2014: Cumulative Deviation from Great Britain Average 
 
Source of data: Authors’ own data. See also Martin et al (2016) 
Notes: Total employment. Cities defined in terms of 2001 travel-to-work areas. 
 
61 Details of this ESRC-funded research programme, entitled Structural Transformation, Adaptability and 
City Economic Evolutions (Grant ES/N006135/1) can be found at http://www.cityevolutions.org.uk 
62 Technically, this is measured as  𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑇 = ∑  𝑦𝑖 
𝑇
 =1 − 𝑦𝑁 ), where  𝑦𝑖  is the percentage change in, say, 
employment or output in year t, and  𝑦𝑁  is the corresponding percentage change in Great Britain as a 
whole, and  𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑇  is the cumulative sum of the growth differential for city i from time t up to time T.  
This simple technique was used to interesting effect by Blanchard and Katz (1992) to chart the disparate 





















































































































First, it is clear that for both employment and output growth, all of the northern English core 
cities except Leeds have lagged well behind the national economy as a whole since the 
beginning of the 1970s, as indicated by their negative growth gaps. This was particularly the 
case up to the mid-1990s, since when they have tracked national economic growth more 
closely but have failed to recover any of their cumulative lost ground to any significant degree. 
As a result, by 2014, cumulative growth in Manchester, Sheffield and Newcastle had fallen 
behind the Great Britain average by some 20 percentage points.  Second, the plight of 
Liverpool is particularly striking: its cumulative growth gaps are well over 40 percentage 
points on both employment and output. Third, Leeds emerges as the only northern English 
core city to have more or less matched the growth record of the national economy as a whole 
over the forty-year period. In terms of output growth, in fact, from the late-1980s up to the 
recent recession its growth outstripped that nationally, and kept pace with London.  And 
London’s comparative performance is itself of key interest. Up to the early-1990s it too lagged 
behind national growth, much more so in the case of employment than for output.  However, 
since then it has undergone something of a major ‘turnaround’, experiencing much faster 
growth than the national economy, and the northern cities, except Leeds in output terms, so 
that by 2014 it had almost eliminated its cumulative growth gap in employment, and turned 
its cumulative negative growth gap in output into a positive growth lead.  What is also striking 
is that output growth recovered far more strongly in London after the 2008-2010 recession 
than in the northern cities, including Leeds, which like its other northern counterparts, has 
been much slower to recover.  
For any city, the comparative growth rates of output and employment define a corresponding 
rate of growth in labour productivity.63 Considerable concern has been expressed by the UK 
Government at the poor productivity performance of the national economy (HM Treasury, 
2016). The annual rate of productivity growth has in fact been on a downward trend since the 
late-1970s, in common with a number of other major advanced economies (Carmody, 2013)  
There is debate over the causes of this slowdown: whether it is due to the structural shift 
amongst the advanced economies from high-productivity growth manufacturing to lower- 
productivity growth services; to a failure of advances in technology (especially computing) to 
show up in productivity; to a slowdown in transformative innovation itself; to a slowdown in 
 
63 Estimating total factor productivity (TFP) by city is not possible because we do not have data on capital 
stock or investment over time at this spatial scale.  
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investment; to a lack of a skilled workforce; or to measurement problems (the argument that 
productivity in some service activities is possibly under-estimated).   
Figure 4.2: Annual Growth of Gross Value Added in Northern Core Cities and London, 









Source of data: Authors’ own data. See also Martin et al (2016) 
Notes: Gross Value Added, workplace based estimates. Cities defined in terms of 2001 travel-to-
work areas. 
 
Figure 4.3:  Labour Productivity across 85 British Cities, 1971 and 2014  
 



















































































































































































Whichever of these possible causes has been operative, an additional dimension to the 
productivity problem in the UK is the low productivity of many northern cities: most of these 
have labour productivity levels below the national average, while most southern cities have 
levels above the average; and the disparity has a high degree of persistence over time (see 
Figure 4.3).64  Moreover the labor productivity in the major ‘Northern Powerhouse’ cities has 
remained consistently below the national average over the past four decades or more, while in 
London labour productivity has steadily pulled ahead of that for the national economy as a 
whole, so that, for example, there is now a 50 percentage point gap between London and 
Manchester (see Figure 4.4).     
Figure 4.4:  Relative Labour Productivity (GVA per Employed Worker) in Northern Core 
Cities and London, 1971-2014, (Great Britain =100) 
 
Source of data: Authors’ own data. See also Martin et al (2017) 
 
64 Southern are cities defined as those in the following regions: London, South East, East of England, South 
West and East Midlands.  Northern cities are defined as those in the West Midlands, Yorkshire-


































































































































4.4 The Collapse of an Export Base 
One of the key arguments in Jane Jacob’s discussion of the importance of cities in the 
national economy is the role cities play in generating exports. This idea links closely of course 
with export-base theories of economic growth.  In Kaldor’s (1981) growth model, for example, 
other things being equal the more competitive (in terms of productivity) an economy’s  export 
sectors the greater will be the external demand for those exports, the faster will be the growth 
of output in those sectors (and via multiplier effects, the economy  more generally), which 
growth in its turn will stimulate investment, innovation and labour productivity, which will boost 
competitiveness still further, which then stimulates additional demand for that economy’s 
exports, and so on, in a circular and cumulative manner (see also Setterfield, 1998; Martin, 
2017). Kaldor himself used this framework to explain regional differences in economic growth. 
A city’s export or tradable base may thus be expected to play a crucial role in determining its 
growth performance.  
Building on these ideas, Rowthorn (2010) argues that, in the absence of actual regional trade 
data, the ‘export base’ is a useful proxy because it “consists of all those activities which bring 
income into the region by providing a good or service to the outside world, or provide locals 
with a good or service which they would otherwise have to import.” He therefore suggested 
that the ‘export base’ of a region could be approximated by the following sectors: agriculture, 
manufacturing, extractive industries, finance and business services, and hotels and 
restaurants.  He goes on to argue that the much-debated ‘North-South Divide’ in the UK’s 
economic landscape can be attributed to the fact that the North has seen a particularly severe 
decline in its manufacturing export sector while the southern regions, particularly the Greater 
South East, have specialised more in high-end tradable services. In relative terms, he 
estimates that the cumulative decline of employment in the northern private export base since 
1971 has been around 30 percent. 
Using the detailed sectoral employment and output series referred to in the previous section, 
Martin et al (2016) employ two definitions of a region’s ‘export intensity’, based on those 
sectors that nationally export at least 50 percent and 25 percent of their output overseas. 
Using the latter measure to define the export base of the three main regions making up the 
‘Northern Powerhouse’, Figure 4.5 confirms Rowthorn’s general finding: in both Yorkshire-
Humberside and the North West export-base employment has shrunk by around 25-30 
percent since the beginning of the 1970s, although in the North East region the contraction 
has been almost 50 percent.    A significant proportion of this decline occurred in the 
recessions of the early-1980s and early-1990s. In all three of the Northern Powerhouse 
regions the erosion in export base employment was particularly rapid during the 1970s and 
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first-half of the1980s, precisely when these regions experienced pronounced 
deindustrialization. These trends stand in stark contrast to that for London.  While London’s 
export base employment also shrunk up until the early-1990s, it then underwent a major 
turnaround and increased sharply thereafter so that by 2014 it had more than made up for 
the previous decline.  If we look at the major cities within the Northern Powerhouse regions, 
only Leeds show a similar pattern: after witnessing a major fall in export base employment 
during the 1970s and 1980s, it too then experienced something of a recovery, although since 
the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 it has failed to keep up with the capital (Figure 4.6).   
Figure 4.5: Export Base Employment in the Northern Powerhouse Regions and 
London, 1971-2014 (Indexed 1971=100) 
 
 
Source of data: Authors’ own data 
A closer look at these trends by broad sector (Table 4.3) indicates that in the 1971-1991 
subperiod, in London and all of the major Northern Powerhouse cities the dramatic decline 
in employment in manufacturing export sectors far outweighed the increase in employment 
in exporting knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS), which include finance and related 
activities. While in all cases the scale of the absolute decline of employment in exporting 
manufacturing activities lessened during the 1991-2014 subperiod, only in three cities – 
London, Leeds and Manchester – was this loss offset by the increase in employment in 
































































growth in the KIBS export base more than compensated for the decline of the manufacturing 
export base in terms of employment. 
Figure 4.6: Export Base Employment in the Northern Core Cities and London, 1971-
2014 (Indexed 1971=100) 
 
 
Source of data: Authors’ own data 
 




    
   1971-91   1991-2014 1971-2014 
London 
   
Manufacturing -607856 -188818 -796674 
KIBS 208492 738584 947076 
Other Sectors 11031 130831 141862 
Total -388333 680597 292264 
    
Leeds 
   
Manufacturing -60085 -36921 -97006 



































































Other Sectors -759 5559 4800 
Total -32945 18895 -14050 
    
Liverpool 
   
Manufacturing -117211 -24964 -142175 
KIBS 8808 21495 30303 
Other Sectors -4772 5570 798 
Total -113175 2101 -111074 
    
Manchester 
   
Manufacturing -246875 -107640 -354515 
KIBS 56783 121909 178692 
Other Sectors -8765 11469 2704 
Total -198857 25738 -173119 
    
Newcastle 
   
Manufacturing -70741 -36438 -107179 
KIBS 15496 20477 35973 
Other Sectors -7341 2433 -4908 
Total -62586 -13528 -76114 
    
Sheffield 
   
Manufacturing -73510 -29254 -102764 
KIBS 17260 18887 36147 
Other Sectors -997 3689 2692 
Total -57247 -6678 -63925 
                Source of data: Authors’ own data 
 
The problem with using these export base employment estimates is that they assume that a 
given sector behaves in the same way in the regions and cities as it does nationally. 
Depending on the sector, this is obviously a questionable assumption. For example, the 
finance sector in Liverpool or Leeds is assumed to have the same export propensity as that 
of London, and that all that differs is the relative importance (in employment share terms) of 
financial services in each city’s economy.  Thus, while the results are interesting, they must 
be taken in the context of the assumptions on which they are based. As far as actual regional 
105 
 
trade is concerned, there are some limited estimates produced by HMRC.65  Unfortunately, 
these data only refer to manufactured goods: data for services are patchy and not reliable.  
Nevertheless, they provide some insight into certain aspects of the trading position of the 
northern regions relative to the rest of the UK. 
The results for the three ‘Northern Powerhouse’ regions as a whole show that the growth in 
tradable goods exports has outstripped that of the rest of the UK over the 1996-2015 period 
(Figure 4.7), which on the surface would seem to give a different picture from that given by 
the relative growth trends of total output in the major Northern Powerhouse cities (Figure 4.2). 
However, this picture relates only to goods exports, and excludes trade in high-value services 
(including finance), in which London has a particular specialization. Further, it is not just 
exports that are important. What also matters in the long run is each region’s or city’s trade 
balance (Rowthorn, 2010). The degree to which a region or city imports goods from overseas 
contributes to the national trade balance, as well to its own long-run performance.  It is well 
known that the UK as a whole has been running a trade deficit in manufactured goods for 
some time, and that it has worsened over recent years. The HMRC data contain estimates 
of the manufactured goods trade balance by region, and these show, perhaps not 
surprisingly, that in 2015 half of the nation’s trade deficit in goods was accounted for by 
London (Table 4.4).   However, while the Northern Powerhouse regions’ balance of trade in 
manufactured goods was in surplus in the mid-1990s, this too has turned into a deficit over 
the past two decades, with only the North East region still showing a small excess of exports 
over imports.  This of course means that the UK and its regions now depend crucially on 








65 It should also be borne in mind that the HMRC trade figures are in current prices, and thus 
reflect both movements in the volume of trade as well as their prices. 
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Figure 4.7: International Exports of Manufactured Goods from the Northern 
Powerhouse Regions and London, 1995-2015 (Nominal Prices, 1996=100) 
 
Source of data: HMRC data on regional (NUTS1) goods exports and imports 
 
Table 4.4: Balance of Trade in Manufactured Goods, Northern Powerhouse Regions, 
London and UK, 1996-2015 (£m) 
 
 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 
 
North East 2654 2234 2109 1549 761 
North West 2945 2099 -313 4369 -790 
Yorks-Humberside 1368 -1908 -966 -2488 -6366 
Total NPH regions 6968 2425 831 3430 -6394 
London -14900 -21228 -16959 -34949 -49816 
UK -2041 -31034 -60565 -97556 -100086 
     Source of data: HMRC data on regional (NUTS1) goods exports and imports 
 
According to TheCityUK (2017), London’s financial sector, together with related professional 
services (legal services, accountancy and management consultancy) generated an 
estimated trade surplus of some £71 billion in 2014, which more than offset its goods trade 
deficit of £40 billion for that year.   Unfortunately, there are no comparable data for the other 
UK regions, let alone other cities, so we do not know the contribution of tradable services to 
the trade balance of the Northern Powerhouse regions or cities. However, the Centre for 
































































(Table 4.5), and this suggests  - not unexpectedly – that the export  value per job of London’s 
tradable services sector far outstrips that for the major northern cities.66  These estimates 
also suggest that, with the exception of Manchester, despite the deindustrialisation they have 
suffered over recent decades, the major Northern Power house cities still export more 
manufactured goods than they do services.  In this respect, their economies differ markedly 
from that of London.  












Leeds 8,260 4,470 3,790 
Liverpool 12,920 6,950 5,970 
Manchester 11,470 5,370 6,100 
Newcastle 8,900 5,680 3,210 
Sheffield 8,640 5,810 2,820 
London 23,470 5,770 17,710 
UK average 15,690 8,240 7,450 
       Source: Centre for Cities (2017) and Centre for Cities Data Tool 
       Note: Total city employment is used as the denominator for both Goods and Services 
       Exports, so that the sum of the two equals the value of total exports per job. 
 
A number of key points emerge from this brief analysis of the economic performance of the 
major Northern Powerhouse cities over the past four decades. In what has been a period of 
historic change and transformation of the UK economy – most notably the shift from an 
industrial to a service-based, globalized, and financialised ‘post-industrial’ mode of growth – 
the Northern Powerhouse cities have fallen increasingly behind London in terms of 
employment and output growth, and productivity.  Deindustrialisation has seriously eroded 
their manufacturing export base, but unlike London, they have yet to rebuild that base around 
tradable, high-value service activities on a scale to compensate for the loss of manufacturing 
capacity. Another implication is that while London’s labour productivity has pulled well ahead 
 
66 The definition of cities used by the Centre for Cities is the Primary Urban Area, essentially the contiguous 
Local Authority Districts which contain the built-up area of a city. These differ from the Travel-to-Work 
Area definitions used in our analyses. The Centre for Cities estimate the value of exports per service job 
by apportioning national service export data to cities on the assumption that each city’s service sector has 
the same export orientation as it does nationally.  The estimates should thus be interpreted with the same 
caveat that applies to our estimates of city export intensity used above.     
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of the national average since the mid-1980s, that in the major northern cities has remained 
below the national figure, with the result that the ‘productivity gap’ between London and the 
northern cites has widened.  Overall, the divide between the more prosperous London and 
the South East regions on the one hand, and the regions making up the ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’– the North West, Yorkshire Humberside, and the North East – on the other, 
that, as we have seen, existed back in the 19thC, is as pronounced as ever.  (Table 4.6). 
Indeed, the lead of London is arguably greater now than it was more than a century ago (cf. 
Table 4.2).  
Table 4.6:  Regional Gross Value Added per capita, 1971-2014, indexed to UK=100 
 
       
UK=100 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007 
 
2014 
       
London  153.3 163.7 163.0 165.6 169.3 174.3 
South East 105.7 104.3 107.1 110.8 106.0 109.4 
East of England 103.8 100.1 98.1 97.4 95.3 92.9 
South West 90.9 94.1 92.0 
00 
92.3 90.6 89.3 
East Midlands 80.7 85.0 84.7 82.9 83.4 82.3 
West Midlands 96.4 89.8 90.0 87.4 84.4 83.4 
Yorkshire-Humberside 80.7 85.5 84.7 81.4 85.8 80.2 
North West 93.9 85.8 85.0 86.1 87.7 85.3 
North East 75.3 79.2 75.8 72.0 75.5 73.5 
Wales 78.5 78.2 75.3 71.5 73.7 72.0 















Source of  data: ONS and Cambridge Econometrics 
Notes:  Gross value added per capita in 2011 prices.  Workplace (production-based) estimates.  Converted to per 
capita values by dividing by resident population not resident workforce. Government Office Regions. CV is the 
Coefficient of Variation, a measure of the regional ‘spread’ (disparity) in per capita relativities: the larger the value 
the more regionally uneven or unbalanced is the economy.  
4.5 Why has Spatial Economic Imbalance been so Persistent? 
The fact that the pattern and scale of spatial economic disparity across the UK are not much 
different today than they were more a century ago raises some fundamental questions about 
the operation of the economy, as well as for policy.  After all, according to conventional 
economic theory, large spatial disparities in economic performance and prosperity should not 
persist over long periods of time. Market forces - notably the free movement of labour and 
capital – should automatically operate in a self-correcting way to reduce such gaps.  To be 
sure, there may be short-run frictions to such adjustments, but in the medium to long term 
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term we should see a convergence across regions and cities in per capita incomes, 
productivity and the like. The lack of any significant convergence can be given various 
interpretations.  
The first, often advanced by advocates of conventional economic theory, is that there must 
be major impediments and barriers that are preventing market forces from operating freely. 
Such ‘market failure’, they go on to argue, is the only justifiable basis for policy intervention 
– especially on the ‘supply side’ of the economy.  Yet the UK has had some form of regional 
and urban policy directed at promoting faster growth and levels of prosperity in economically 
lagging areas in the country for almost 90 years, since the late-1920s.  A second line of 
argument is thus that these policies have failed. Some are of the view, for example, that the 
resources devoted to regional and other spatial policy measures has never been adequate 
to the scale of the task. Others levy the charge that regional policy has never been sufficiently 
strategic or developmental in its goals.  A further interpretation, again one that tends to be 
preferred by the followers of conventional economic theory, is that the lack of any substantial 
and lasting positive impact confirms that regional and urban policy can never achieve much 
since it is trying to work ‘against the forces of the market’, which in the UK ‘naturally’ favour 
the concentration of growth in the already prosperous London and the South East (for an 
extreme version of this argument, see Leunig and Swaffield, 2008). In general, these spatial 
economists are of the view that there is no case for spatially targeted or selective policies, 
only general (nation-wide) policies aimed at improving the movement of skilled labour (and 
capital) to where the markets opportunities and rewards are greatest, in combination with the 
deregulation of land and housing markets (by dismantling planning systems) in and around 
particular cities – especially London -  so that so that further growth can be more easily 
accommodated there. This line of reasoning reached its most extreme in the Policy Exchange 
argument that:  
There is no realistic prospect that our [Northern] regeneration towns and cities can converge 
with London and the South East. There is, however, a very real prospect of encouraging 
significant numbers of people to move from those towns to London and the South East. … 
The implications of economic geography for the South and particularly the South East are 
clear. Britain will be unambiguously richer if we allow more people to live in London and its 
hinterland (Leunig and Swaffied, 2007).  
A third and quite different conceptual account of the persistent nature of spatial economic 
imbalance is that market forces, even if allowed free rein, do not tend of themselves to reduce 
or eliminate spatial imbalance in economic growth and prosperity, but rather tend to 
perpetuate or even intensify such imbalance.  The main process at work in this case is that 
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of the increasing returns associated with spatial agglomeration of economic activity.  Spatial 
agglomeration is seen as conferring various external economies on firms, including ‘home 
market size’ effects, the attraction of skilled workers, increased knowledge flows and 
interactions between firms, backward and forward linkages between firms, and so on, all of 
which are held to increase productivity, innovation, and higher wages.   Correspondingly, 
spatial economic imbalance is not necessarily seen as problematic or inefficient, witness the 
HM Treasury statement that  
Theory and evidence suggests that allowing regional concentration of economic activity will 
increase national growth. As long as economies of scale, knowledge spillovers and a local 
pool of skilled labour result in productivity gains that outweigh congestion costs, the economy 
will benefit from agglomeration… policies that aim to spread growth amongst regions are 
running counter to the natural growth process and are difficult to justify on efficiency grounds 
(HM Treasury, 2007). 
 
And the same view seemed to lurk in the Government Paper on Understanding Local Growth: 
This new understanding [the New Economic Geography] of how economics works across 
space also alters the expected equilibrium. As both people and firms move to areas of high 
productivity there will be no simple convergence of productivity levels. Even with fully 
functioning markets, there can be an uneven distribution of economic performance, and 
persistent differences that are not necessarily due to market failure (Department of Business, 
innovation and Skills, 2010, p.23)  
 
The theory being referred to here - Krugman-style New Economic Geography  - has on 
various occasions been used to promote the idea of an ‘equity-efficiency trade-off’, as in the 
quote above, whereby the pursuit of a more spatially balanced economy is believed to be at 
the cost of national economic efficiency (Martin, 2008; 2015). The empirical evidence for such 
a ‘trade-off’, however, is far from equivocal. While some studies claim to find a negative 
relationship between national growth and the degree of spatial agglomeration or regional 
inequality (Dall’erba and Hewings, 2003; P. Martin 2005; Crozet and Koening, 2007), others 
do not (Sbergami, 2002; Bosker, 2007; Martin, 2008). To add to this ambiguity, Krugman 
himself (2009) has recently voiced some doubt as to whether increasing returns to spatial 
agglomeration as important as they once were:  
There’s good reason to believe that the world economy has, over time, actually become less 
characterised by the kinds of increasing returns effects emphasized by new trade theory and 
new economic geography. In the case of geography, in fact, the peak of increasing returns 




So even one of its former leading exponents seems less convinced that spatial agglomeration 
necessarily promotes faster growth.  Nevertheless, the spatial agglomeration argument has 
proved a powerful discourse. It underpins the contention that one of the reasons that Britain’s 
northern cities – especially the major cities making up the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ – have 
lagged in economic performance is that they are too small, with the consequence that they 
do not benefit from the agglomeration economies found in large cities like London. Thus, 
according to Overman and Rice (2008) while medium-sized cities in England are, roughly 
speaking, about the size that Zipf’s law would predict given the size of London, the largest 
city, the major second-tier cities (which include ‘core’ cities like Manchester, Birmingham, 
Sheffield and Newcastle) all lie below the ‘Zipf line’ and hence are smaller than would be 
predicted.67 They go on to state that “this feature is not a consequence of London being too 
‘large’”, but rather that “second tier cities may be too small” (op cit, p.30). Such an argument 
would suggest that increasing the size of the core cities, and especially those of the ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’, would boost the advantages of agglomeration and hence their economic 
performance. However, as other authors have cautioned, Zipf’s law should not be expected 
to hold in countries that have a capital that is also the political centre, as is the case with 
London.  As Krugman (1996) himself emphasises in his discussion of Zipf’s law, such political 
centres “are different creatures from the rest of the urban system”. A similar point is made by 
Gabaix (1999) who argues that “In most countries Zipf plots usually present an outlier, the 
capital, which has a bigger size than Zipf’s law would warrant. There is nothing surprising 
there because the capital is indeed a peculiar object, driven by unique political forces.” (op 
cit, p.756, emphasis added).68 
The argument that northern cities are ‘undersized’ is thus open to debate; improving their 
performance is a much more complex issue than simply increasing their size. The fact is that 
some of the fastest rates of productivity growth across Britain’s urban system over the past 
four decades have been recorded among smaller and medium-sized cities, especially those 
in southern England (Martin et al, 2016): there is no simple relationship between city size and 
growth, and the lack of any such relationship appears to be a common feature across most 
 
67 Zipf’s law refers to the relationship between city size and city rank. If cities are ranked by population 
size and the slope of a plot of the log of city rank (by size) against the log of size is -1, this is referred to as 
Zipf’s law.  
68 In an important study of city size distributions in 75 countries, Soo (2005) found that departures of the 
rank-versus size relationship from a slope of -1 are explained by political factors rather than by 
economic geography factors like economies of scale or agglomeration economies. 
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OECD countries (Dijkstra and McCann, 2013).  A different way of looking at the issue might 
be to argue that the benefits of agglomeration –can be realized not by making Northern cities 
substantially bigger but by vastly improving the connectivity between them so as to enable 
them to function as an efficiently-interconnected and integrated multi-centric ‘super-city 
regional system’, in which the whole could indeed be “greater than the sum of its parts” (City 
Growth Commission, 2014). Investing in the infrastructures required to achieve that would 
arguably yield a greater economic dividend for the Northern cities than the High Speed 2 rail 
connection between London, Birmingham and Manchester, the case for which has never 
been convincingly proven.     
The key question remains: why has spatial economic imbalance in the UK been so 
persistent?  Another way of posing this question is to ask why is it that the London-South 
East corner of the country has been able to successfully ‘reinvent’ its economy and its export 
base twice over the last century – in the 1920s-1930s, and again since the 1990s – while 
northern regions and cities have found it much more difficult to do so? Why is it that the 
legacies of an industrial past, and what Linkon (2013, 2014) calls the ‘half-life of 
deindustrialization’ (see also Strangleman, 2016), lingered longer and have been more 
inhibiting to economic reorientation and diversification in the northern cities and regions than 
in London? Part of the answer obviously lies in the different capabilities, specialisms and 
structures as between the northern regions and cities on the one hand and London on the 
other.  London suffered deindustrialisation over the 1970 and 1980s no less than many 
northern cities. But it also had other key sectors of activities - especially finance, banking and 
the raft of related services that both support and depend on finance – which had long been 
established there around which a new phase of growth could be organized. Northern cities 
did not have the same potential growth sectors ‘waiting in the wings’.  So, part of the different 
experience of London compared to northern cities undoubtedly resided the inherited scope 
for economic diversification. 
But without question, part also lies in the fact that London has long been the power-centre of 
national economic, financial and political life. As such it has long exerted a dominating 
influence over the orientation, operation and priorities of those institutions that shape the 
national economy. While most of the policies followed by those institutions are ostensibly 
‘non-spatial’ and supposedly geographically (and socially) ‘neutral’, invariably they have 
profoundly uneven effects, spatially and socially. As Lord Heseltine argued in the mid-1980s, 
all too often those policies have effectively functioned as ‘counter-regional’ policies, operating 
in favour of and serving to protect or reinforce the interests and priorities of London (and even 
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more specifically the financial City) over the conditions and interests of the rest of the 
country.69   
4.6 Conclusion: What is to be Done? 
Although it is certainly the case that in today’s globalized economy the notion of ‘combined 
and uneven geographical development’ needs to be reworked to reflect the fact that many of 
our cities and regions are linked as much if not more to global markets, production networks 
and value chains than they are to one another (see, for example, Baldwin, 2016), how they 
compete and function in those global arenas nevertheless remains strongly influenced by 
and dependent on national economic policies and interventions.  And in the UK, those policies 
and interventions are shaped by London-centric institutions and priorities.  In recent decades, 
successive Governments have been concerned – one might say obsessed - to enhance and 
protect the role and competitiveness of London as a global city and global financial centre. 
Indeed, for many, finance is seen as the   central role that the UK can and should play in the 
new global economy, as the primary or perhaps only activity in which it commands a 
comparative advantage. Hence the attention given to London. There is little discussion about 
what other actual or potential competitive strengths the UK has that can also be promoted to 
help the nation compete in the global economy.  Thus, while the banks could not be allowed 
to fail in the crisis, the threat to the UK steel-making sector by the dumping of cheap Chinese 
steel, or the loss of domestic manufacturing and technology firms through takeover by foreign 
competitors receive no such defensive support. Yet to maintain London’s success, and its 
attractiveness to financial institutions, skilled workers and foreign investment, has become 
ever more costly: ever more major infrastructural investment is needed just to protect, let 
alone enhance, London’s competitiveness.  Though often held up as a beacon of prosperity 
driven by ‘market forces’, London’s economy is hugely underwritten by the state (Oxford 
Economics, 2007). The attention and support accorded by central Government to our major 
northern cities, to help them to establish competitive roles in today’s global economy, has 
been marginal by comparison.  
But with the Government’s new-found concern over spatial economic imbalance, and its new 
spatial imaginary of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and the ‘Midlands Engine’, are we now at a 
policy crossroads? Is the new political credo of ‘spatially rebalancing the economy’ being 
translated into policy actions capable of achieving that goal? Over recent years the 
 
69 This argument was set out in a speech that Michael Heseltine gave to the Brick Development Association 
in London in the mid-1980s. He was Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at the time.  
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departments of Government responsible for economic policy – Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, Communities and Local Government, and even the Treasury - have all 
‘discovered geography’ and the ‘importance of place’.  Several new policy initiatives have 
been introduced and announced with the aim of setting the national economy on a higher 
productivity growth path, and spatially rebalancing the economy as part of that objective, 
including: new Local Enterprise Partnerships, a Local Growth Agenda, City Deals, a National 
Infrastructure Commission, a Productivity Commission, a Patient Capital Review, an 
Industrial Strategy Green Paper, changes to local business rates, and the beginnings of 
devolution of (limited) fiscal and policy powers to cities and city- regions (conditional on the 
establishment of ‘metro-mayors’). While these and others measures are to be welcomed, it 
remains unclear whether together they add up to a strategy that is sufficiently radical, bold 
and coherent to secure the desired outcome, especially as the Government continues at the 
same time to pursue its programme of fiscal austerity, including cuts in central grants to local 
government.   
Some thirty years ago, Michael Heseltine, a long-time ‘one-nation’ Conservative, bemoaned 
the over-centralization of the national political economy in London: 
     In a sense we are becoming a rather monopolistic political society. I don't say that in the narrow 
party sense. I say it in terms of the domination of Britain by the City of London, in terms of 
ownership and wealth. I say it in terms of the lack of obvious roots of power outside the major 
political parties and the increasing location of the major corporate headquarters in London, the 
drift south of the public sector… (Heseltine, 1987, Quoted in Marxism Today, p.17). 
 
Even further back, in the 1960s, that journalistic bastion of free-market economic thinking, 
The Economist, was moved to argue that what the north of Britain needed was its own 
‘London’.   It has more recently reiterated that view: 
So much of what is wrong with Britain today stems from the fact that it is unusually centralised. 
Draw a circle with a 60-mile radius centred on Charing Cross. Within that circle, the vast majority 
of public spending is administered. Also: all major decisions pertaining to foreign policy, defence, 
the economy, the national debt, interest rates…  That circle contains all the major banks, most 
of the major theatres, the media and arts worlds, the five best universities (according to the 
Times Higher Education rankings for 2017), the hubs of all the country’s major industries, 70% 
of the FTSE 100, most of Britain’s airport capacity. The divide between Britain inside the circle 
and Britain outside it concentrates too much power within too few city districts … So, while 
moving Britain’s capital would not solve every problem, it would go a long way to addressing the 
complaints that lead to today’s divided country. It would contribute hugely to the rebalancing of 
the economy. It would help drive the urban integration needed to raise productivity and thus 




Stimulated in part by Heseltine’s (2012) provocative call for a devolution of fiscal and other 
powers, the UK has begun the first tentative steps in this direction.  But just how far down 
this path the London-based political establishment and financial elites will be willing to go, 
remains to be seen (indeed, the Coalition Government’s initial enthusiasm for devolution 
seems to have lost some momentum under Theresa May’s Conservative administration).70 
At the same time, the ‘combined authority’ model of devolution that has been championed 
does not readily mesh with the complex two-tier layering of local political power and 
responsibilities that exists across the country: many local authorities are themselves not yet 
convinced that the proposed model of devolution will bring much material benefit.  
Nevertheless, the fact is that other OECD countries have devolved or federalized systems of 
political-economic governance that seem to work more effectively and productively than the 
UK’s over-centralised model, and most enjoy much greater regional economic balance.  A 
century and a half of spatially unbalanced prosperity and growth in the UK is surely sufficient 
cause to warrant a fundamental reform of the nation’s political economy.  At present the 
changes underway are ad hoc, rather than based on a detailed analysis of what the most 
beneficial and effective political and geographical configuration across the whole nation 
would look like. What is clear, however, is that the growing popular disaffection now evident 
across the cities and regions with the remoteness and self-serving nature of the London 










70 Only six cities or city-regions are due to hold mayoral elections in May 2017 (Cambridgeshire-




5 The City Dimension of the Productivity Growth 
Puzzle 
5.1 Introduction 
As Paul Krugman (1994) states, while productivity is certainly not the only measure of an 
economy’s performance, it is certainly a key attribute, since it influences the generation of 
the wealth necessary to support high incomes and public services. As such, it is a basic 
determinant of societal welfare. Of course, productivity is not the same thing as welfare: the 
latter also includes a wide range of ‘non-market’ activities and free services that are not 
costed or captured by conventional measures of output, such as GDP or GVA, and thus do 
not enter into calculations of productivity, even though they contribute to societal wellbeing 
(Coyle, 2014). Nevertheless, until some better concept of ‘output’ is devised, traditional 
measures of productivity will continue to be used to make temporal and geographical 
comparisons of ‘economic performance’. And over the long-run, wage growth and per capita 
income in an economy depend on productivity growth. To that extent, a low level or a slow 
rate of growth of productivity is justifiably a cause for concern.  And in many advanced 
economies, there is just such concern, for in most OECD countries labour productivity growth 
has been on a downward trend since the 1970s (Lindbeck, 1983; Carmody, 2013).  
There has in fact been considerable debate over this slowdown in productivity growth. Some 
attribute the apparent decline to measurement problems, to the fact that technological 
advances and shifts simply do not show up in conventional measures of (both labour and 
total factor) productivity (the so-called ‘Solow Productivity Paradox’ – see Triplett, 1999; 
Crafts, 2002).  Others dispute this argument, however, and contend that the slowdown is real 
(Owen, 2011; Cowen 2016; Gordon, 2016; Syverson, 2016).   According to Gordon (2016), 
for example, innovation has stalled, and technological progress no longer produces the gains 
in GDP that it once did (see also Pilat et al, 2002; Dupont et al, 2011).  A similar view is 
espoused by Cowen (2016), who argues that high-tech developments have not saved 
advanced economies from a slowdown in productivity.  Yet another explanation points to the 
fall in business dynamism over the past two to three decades (European Central Bank, 2016), 
as reflected in new firm formation rates: new firms are assumed to embody more advanced 
technology and to be more productive than old existing firms. Still others suggest that the 
slowdown derives in part at least from an over-regulation of product and labour markets (e.g. 
Conway and Nicoletti, 2007), while others focus on misallocations and mismatching of skilled 
and educated labour (OECD, 2015).  
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One of the most contentious arguments locates the cause in the structural changes that have 
transformed advanced economies over recent decades, specifically the shift from 
manufacturing and production industries to economies based overwhelmingly on services. 
The contention is that many services (such as retail, hospitality, personal services, public 
services, and even some professional and business services) have limited potential for high 
productivity growth, and may even be ‘stagnant’ as far as productivity is concerned (Baumol, 
1967; Baumol et al, 1985; Williamson, 1991; Kim, 2006).  What this narrative suggests, in 
other words, is that the observed slowdown in productivity growth has been an inevitable 
consequence of the progressive shift to a ‘post-industrial’ service economy that has occurred 
over the past 40 years or so. Other authors, however, take a more guarded view, pointing 
out that just as some services may have limited scope for productivity advance, so too do 
some manufacturing activities. Further, many services function as intermediary inputs to the 
manufacturing sector, and may not only help to raise the productivity of the latter, but 
themselves may have as much scope for increasing their own productivity (Oulton, 2001).  
The trend for manufacturing firms to outsource certain routine service activities that were 
previously carried out ‘in house’, while at the same time often developing their own customer-
orientated service activities (from finance to after-care), may well also have impacted on the 
measurement and allocation of productivity advance as between ‘manufacturing’ and 
‘services’ in complex ways.  To compound matters, it may well be that measuring output and 
hence productivity in certain services is not at all straightforward; for example, the ‘value’ of 
certain services may have more to do with the quality of provision (including their 
performativity) than in their monetary cost or value.   The impact of structural change on 
productivity growth is thus a key but difficult issue, the more so since it is widely claimed that 
structural change is integral to the process of economic growth (Kuznets, 1957, 1973; 
Pasinetti, 1993; Laitner, 2000; Freeman and Louca, 2001; Cornwall and Cornwall, 1994; 
Metcalfe et al, 2006; Kruger, 2008; Roncolato and Kucera, 2014).  Yet, as Kruger (2008) 
points out, despite the importance of structural change for growth theory, the topic of 
structural change and its potential relevance for productivity growth are frequently neglected 
topics in economic research. How far structural change has contributed to the slowdown in 
productivity in the major economies is thus an important issue and in need of much more 
analysis. 
Such analysis is not just of national, macro-economic interest, however. In recent years, there 
has been a veritable explosion of interest in cities as the ‘engines’ of wealth creation in the 
national economy (Jacobs, 1984; Glaeser, 2011; Florida, 2008; Moretti, 2013). One of the 
many facts to have emerged from this burgeoning body of work is that cities appear to differ 
in their growth paths of employment and per capita incomes (see for example, Glaeser, 2005; 
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Markusen and Shrock, 2006; Moretti, 2013; Power et al, 2010; Hobor, 2013; Dijkstra et al, 
2013; Michaels et al, 2013; Cowell, 2014, Storper et al, 2015; Martin et al, 2014; Martin, 2016; 
Martin et al, 2016). In most of these studies, the differences (and often divergence) in growth 
paths between cities is attributed, in part at least, to differences in their economic structures 
and specialisms, and particularly the extent to which cities have suffered from 
deindustrialisation and the success with which they have managed to rebuild their economies 
around a new service and ‘creative sectors’ mode of growth.  Less is known about how far 
and in what ways the slowdown of national productivity growth in the advanced economies 
can be related to differential patterns of productivity change across cities.  Given that in such 
nations cities account for the bulk of the aggregate economy, a city-level analysis could 
clearly help throw light on the causes of productivity growth slowdown.  This point is stressed 
by Muro and Parilla (2017), who in commenting on the United States situation argue that    
While the pundits are right to debate the facts and causes of slowing productivity 
growth at the national level, they would do well also to explore the local dimension of 
the problem. After all, while many of the proposed causes of malaise—less 
competition in industries and fewer technological breakthroughs among others—
remain national, many of them may be distinctly local. 
By ‘local’ they refer specifically to the need to examine what has been happening across US 
cities.  
This is precisely the focus of this paper, in which our aim is to analyse the productivity growth 
paths of British cities since the beginning of the 1970s, and how far and in what ways these 
city experiences help to throw light on the ‘puzzle’ of national-level productivity slowdown. 
Such an enquiry is in fact particularly pertinent in the British case since over recent years a 
major debate has resurfaced over the spatially unbalanced nature of the national economy, 
specifically the disparity in growth and prosperity between a buoyant south of the country and 
a less dynamic north (see Martin, 2015).  Arguments over this ‘north-south divide’ in fact go 
back to the 1980s (see Martin, 1987) – indeed, in some respects, back as far as the 1930s – 
but more recently the focus of the debate has shifted from the regional level to the city scale: 
the reasons for the slower growth of northern Britain, it is argued, are to be found in the cities 
of the north, and their failure to match the growth rates of those in the south.  In terms of 
employment and output growth, most southern cities have pulled well ahead of their northern 
counterparts (see Martin et al, 2016). The logical question that then follows is what these 
disparities in employment and output growth across cities imply for labour productivity 
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growth.71 How far the slowdown in national labour productivity growth is itself the outcome of 
different trends in productivity advance across the country’s cities is thus a pertinent policy 
issue, especially given the UK Government’s recent recognition of the need for a ‘place-
based’ dimension to national industrial policy (HM Treasury, 2015; Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2017). Further, the 2016 UK referendum vote to leave the 
European Union – so-called ‘Brexit’ - makes the need to improve the productivity of the 
nation’s cities and regions all the more urgent, given that they could well face tariffs on their 
exports to Europe and will need to compete in other overseas markets to export their goods 
and services. 
5.2 Labour Productivity Growth Paths of British Cities 
While much of the concern over productivity growth in the UK, and in other major economies, 
has been over its recent slowdown, in fact the problem is of much longer standing (see, for 
example, Dolman, 2009; Carmody, 2013). Figure 5.1 shows the post-war trend in labour 
productivity growth (real gross domestic product per person employed) in the UK economy, 
with other major OECD countries for comparison.72  The general trend across these 
countries, allowing for cyclical effects, has been one of a long-run slowdown in productivity 
growth over the post-war period, especially since the mid- or late-1960s. The UK experience 
has been broadly in line with this pattern. After a rising trend from the beginning of the 1950s 
to the mid-1960s, the trend rate of productivity then fell up to the mid-1970s, remained flat up 
to the early-1990s, and then fell again. In the UK, as in many other OECD countries, since 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, productivity growth has been all but stagnant. How 




71 Because of the lack of any reliable or consistent time series data on capital stock at the 
local or city levels in the UK, it was not possible to analyse total or multiple factor productivity. 
Some truly heroic assumptions would have to be made to derive such time series estimates. 
Thus, throughout the paper, productivity refers to labour productivity, that is output (gross 
value added) per employed worker. These estimates are workplace based, not residence 
based. 
72 A very similar picture emerges if labour productivity is measured by output per hour worked, as also 
recorded in the Conference Board Total Data Base. 
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Figure 5.1: Long Run Trends in the Annual Growth Rate of Labour Productivity in the UK 
and other Leading Economies, 1951-2016 
 
Source of data:  Conference Board Total Data Base (Productivity converted to 2015 US$, 2011 PPP). 
Labour productivity measured as GDP per person employed. 
Note: A fifth-order polynomial in time gives a close-fit trend (with an R2 of at least 0.70) for a majority of 
the countries) and is thus shown here. In the case of the UK, a fourth order polynomial trend provides 
almost as good a fit, but the fifth-order trend is shown here for consistency. In her study of national 
productivity trends over the period 1965-2012, Carmody (2013) used a Hodrick-Prescott filter to identify 
trends, with very similar results, with a declining trend found in every country over the period. 
 
The variation in labour productivity levels across the 85 cities in 1971 and in 2014 is shown 
in Figure 5.2. The cities have been grouped into ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ sets according to 
the region of their location, using the conventional way of dividing the UK into these two broad 
geographical areas. This gives 45 ‘northern’ cities and 40 ‘southern’. Also shown is the 
national average (Great Britain) productivity level for the two years. What is striking is that all 
bar four northern cities (Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Chester and Telford) are in the bottom left-
hand quadrant of the Figure, having productivity levels less than the national average both at 
the beginning of the period and at the end.  However, at the same time, the correlation 
between productivity levels in 1971 and 2014, though reasonably high (R=0.686), is not 
perfect, indicating that certain shifts in relative position occurred over the period; in other 






























































































































Figure 5.2:  Labour Productivity Across 85 British Cities, 1971 and 2014 (Gross Value 
Added per employed worker, 2011 prices 
 
Source: Authors’ data 
Note:  Following the ‘conventional’ ‘North-South’ division of regional Britain, ‘southern’ cities are defined 
as those in the following regions: London, South East, East of England, South West and East Midlands; 
while ‘northern’ cities are defined as those in the West Midlands, Yorkshire-Humberside, North East, 
North East, Scotland and Wales. 
Great Britain averages shown by intersecting dashed lines. Major cities shown in bold. 
 
In this context, an interesting feature emerges in the relationship across cities between their 
initial productivity levels and their subsequent productivity growth when the whole study 
period is divided into sub-periods, 1971-1981, 1981-1991, 1991-2001, and 2001-2014 
(Figure 5.3). This reveals that over time the relationship across cities between initial 
productivity levels and subsequent growth has progressively changed from being negative, 
indicating that cities which had initially low labour productivity tended subsequently to 
experience faster productivity growth and ‘catch up’ with cities that initially had higher 
productivity levels, to a weakly positive relationship. Thus, while productivity levels tended to 
converge over the 1970s and 1980s, this tendency disappeared over the 1990s and 2000s. 
Further, and significantly, if we group the 85 cities into those in the ‘south’ of Britain, and 
those in the ‘north’, there is clear evidence of a ‘switch’ in relative labour productivity growth 
































































cities as a group outpacing southern cities in the first period, but the latter out-performing the 
former in the more recent period (Table 5.1).     
Figure 5.3:  Shifting Patterns of Labour Productivity Growth across British 































































































































Source: Authors’ data 
Note:  Southern cities and northern cities defined and depicted as in Figure 5.2. Aberdeen is excluded from 




























































































































Table 5.1:  Productivity Growth in Southern and Northern Cities 







      London 
Northern Cities 
      Manchester 











         2.05 
         1.95 
         1.51 
         1.63 
         1.54 
         1.69 
                Source: Authors’ data 
 Note:  Southern cities and northern cities defined as in Figure 5.2. 
 
However, while the average annual growth rate of the southern cities in the second period 
was higher than that group managed in the first period, it was nevertheless lower than that 
achieved by the northern cities in that earlier period (see also Figure 5.4).  At the same time, 
the growth rate of the northern group of cities slowed appreciably between the two subperiods 
in question. The net result is that aggregate productivity growth for the economy as a whole 
slowed down: the slowdown of the northern cities between 1971-1991 and 1991-2014 has 
been a major contributing negative factor, for which the improvement in performance of the 
southern cities in the 1991-2014 period has not been able to compensate.  There are, then, 
two interrelated questions that arise from these city dimensions of the national ‘productivity 
puzzle’, namely: why the trend productivity growth rate of northern cities fell after 1991, and 
why the trend rate of productivity growth of southern cities after 1991, while certainly an 
improvement over that for 1971-1991, has not matched that of the northern cities during that 









Figure 5.4: Long Run Trends in the Annual Growth Rate of Labour Productivity in 
Southern and Northern Cities, 1971-2014 
 
Source: Authors’ data  
Note: A fifth-order polynomial is used to estimate the trend for each city group. The latter are as defined 
for Figure 5.2. 
5.3 Structural Change and Productivity Growth 
The fact that different cities across the UK have experienced different degrees of productivity 
growth slowdown immediately suggests that the causes or factors involved have themselves 
varied between cities, and particularly as between those in southern Britain and those in the 
north. 
 
Within economic geography, much of the recent discussion of city (and regional) economic 
performance, including productivity, has focused on the issue of economic structure, and in 
particular on whether a specialised structure or a diversified one is most conducive to city 
(regional) growth (for a review of these two main perspectives, see for example, van der 
Panne, 2009). While some find that a diversified structure is more likely to promote innovation 
and productivity advance, in line with the notion of Jacobsian-type urban externalities, others 
find that specialisation is more beneficial, thus supporting the case for Marshall-Arrow-Romer 
type economies. Yet others have sought to move beyond the debate by positing that it is 
‘related variety’ (or related diversity) that is the most conducive to growth and productivity 
advance, because it is the presence of activities that share similar or complementary inputs, 






















































































and the development of new, innovative activities, which help maintain productivity growth 
over time (Frenken et al, 2007; Boschma, 2016). Further, still others have proposed that it is 
‘clustered diversity’ that matters, that is the presence of several Porterian- type dynamic 
business clusters (Farhauer and Kröll, 2012).   
Nevertheless, according to some economic geographers, it is specialisation that is the motor 
of city growth (Storper, 2013; Storper, et al, 2015). In their analysis of US cities, Kemeny and 
Storper (2014), seek to answer the question of what drives a city’s economic performance by 
distinguishing two types of specialisation:  relative specialisation in particular sectors, as 
measured by sector shares of a city’s total employment (or output) - the conventional way of 
measuring city or regional specialisation - and what they call absolute specialisation, that is 
actual sectoral size, as measured for example by its total employment (or output). They argue 
that of the two measures, the clearest case is for the absolute measure. In contrast, they 
argue, there is less consensus around whether having a high or increasing share of an activity 
– an increase in (what they call) relative specialisation - would improve productivity. However, 
by focusing on the absolute size of sectors in cities, these authors would seem to be blurring 
the distinctions between concentration, agglomeration and specialisation made by Brakman, 
Garretsen and Marrewijk (2009). In fact, much of Kemeny and Storper’s discussion is really 
in terms of agglomeration, and in any case their analysis of city performance is in terms of 
comparative wage levels rather than comparative productivity growth.  
What may matter more is not sectoral specialisation or diversity (or variety, related or 
unrelated) as such, but what those sectors are. Arguably a key determinant of a city’s 
economic performance and productivity growth is the nature and success of its export or 
tradable base (Kaldor, 1981).  The demand for a city’s exports (both to the rest of the 
domestic economy as well as to international markets) will influence its output growth. 
According to Verdoorn’s law (and also Frabricant’s law), the rate of growth of output of a 
sector determines the potential for scale effects, increasing returns, new investment, and 
innovation in that sector (and by extension through the multiplier, in other local sectors of 
activity).73  These effects will influence productivity growth, which in turn (and depending on 
local versus external wages, and hence prices), will shape the competitiveness of the sector 
in export markets, and thence the demand for its output.  This circular and cumulative 
causation process is normally assumed to operate in a positive direction (Kaldor, 1981), and 
 
73 For a useful discussion of Verdoorn’s and Fabricant’s laws and how they relate to productivity growth 
see Scott (1989). How these laws link to processes of cumulative causation in a geographical setting is 
discussed in Martin (2017). 
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was argued to apply much more to manufacturing than to services.  But if the demand for a 
city’s exports begins to decline (for example by being undermined by cheaper cost 
competitors elsewhere), then this circular process could be interrupted or even go into 
reverse, leading to a stagnation or even fall in productivity, thence a loss of competitiveness 
(again depending on what happens to wages and prices), and further erosion of export 
demand and slower output growth. Of course, the sector’s firms may respond by shedding 
labour and/or investing in labour saving equipment in order to maintain or revive productivity 
advance. But if sustained, the loss of a city’s tradable base could have a major dampening 
effect on the city’s overall rate of productivity growth.  
To some extent this is what has happened in manufacturing over recent decades, in the UK 
and most other industrialised economies.  Faced by the rise of cheap labour competitors 
overseas, manufacturing firms in countries like the UK sought to increase productivity and 
hence maintain or grow demand and output by raising efficiency by shedding their less-skilled 
workforces. For a while at least, such rationalisation or deindustrialisation – the historic 
reduction in the absolute size of the manufacturing workforce – was accompanied by, and 
helped to maintain, productivity growth. But note that, in this instance, productivity growth 
was associated with a decline, not an increase in the absolute size of the manufacturing 
sector, an association that would seem to run counter to the Kemeny-Storper thesis. Of 
course, this route for securing higher productivity obviously has it limits, however, and 
eventually productivity growth in manufacturing becomes crucially dependent on innovation 
and investment.  
But as some export sectors may shrink in absolute or relative employment terms, so others 
may expand, both absolutely and relatively. Thus, what matters also is what scope these 
expanding activities have for exports and productivity growth. Do these new sectors benefit 
from specialisation economies (of a relative or absolute kind) to the same extent and in the 
same way as the tradable activities that are experiencing employment decline? Specialisation 
economies may be specific to the activities concerned. Or the new sectors may not have the 
same scope for innovation, or for exports. These are precisely among the arguments that 
have been made about the shift to a post-industrial economy. The key point is that, as 
Rowthorn (2010, p. 373) stresses, the “long-run prosperity of a region is determined  by the 
strength of its export base”, where the latter includes not just manufacturing but also tradable 
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services of various kinds, particularly knowledge based professional and business services 
(so-called KIBS). This argument applies no less to cities.74  
Changes over time in sectoral structure may therefore have either positive or negative 
consequences for a city’s long-run productivity growth. Such changes reflect not just the 
different rates of employment (or output) growth (or decline) of different sectors, but also 
structural shifts and recompositions associated with the branching and recombination of 
sectors to produce new activities with associated productivity characteristics. We have 
already mentioned the most obvious ‘between-sector’ structural change associated with the 
long-run decline in importance, in employment terms for example, of manufacturing, and the 
ongoing growth in importance of services.  
5.4 The Changing Economic Structure of British Cities  
The scale of this structural change from an economy based on production industries 
(manufacturing, construction and utilities) to one dominated by private market services, 
followed by public services (central and local government), has been dramatic. The decline 
in UK production75 employment from its peak of 11.2 million (or 41.1 percent of total jobs) in 
1966 to 5.7 million (18.6 percent) in 2014 represents one of the most rapid rates of 
deindustrialisation in the western world. Likewise, having increased over the two decades 
after the Second War, the share of production industries in total output steadily increased to 
reach a peak of 38.6 percent in 1969, and thereafter progressively declined, falling to 19.2 
percent by 2014.  At the same time employment in private market services increased from 
8.8 million (34.1 percent) in 1969 to 15.1 million (50.8 percent).  If we add in local and central 
government, the service economy increased its share of total employment from 53.3 percent 
in 1969 to 79.1 percent in 2014, and its share of total national Gross Value Added from 38.4 
percent to 80.1 percent over the same period.  The macro-structure of the national economy 
today looks very different indeed from that of forty or so years ago. 
Both northern and southern cities have been transformed by these changes (Figure 5.5). But 
some significant differences are also evident between the two groups. In 1971, the share of 
total employment accounted for by manufacturing in northern cities, as a group, was 
 
74 In his study, Rowthorn shows how the tradable sectors of the northern regions of Britain have lost 
substantial employment, compared to southern regions, over the past forty years. He does not, however, 
examine productivity growth as between these two broad divisions of the country. As we have just argued, 
it is possible, at least for a while, for a region, or city, to sustain or even improve productivity growth 
precisely by shedding labour.  
75 Manufacturing plus construction, mining, electricity, gas and water. 
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substantially higher than in southern cities (34.7 percent and 24.9 percent, respectively). 
Since then, the share of manufacturing has fallen relentlessly in both groups, but faster in 
northern cities, so that by 2014 the absolute difference between the two groups of cities had 
been much reduced (9.4 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively).  At the same time, while the 
share of public (government) services in total employment was initially higher in southern 
cities, and has grown in both groups over the period, by 1991 northern cities had ‘caught up’ 
with their southern counterparts, and thereafter have moved ahead.  As for knowledge-
intensive business services (KIBS), their share of total employment has risen steadily in both 
northern and southern cities, with the share in the former consistently below that in the latter, 
and failing over time to match the growth of that sector in southern cities.   Interestingly, in 
the southern city group, taken as a whole, KIBS overtook manufacturing in employment share 
terms in the early-1980s, whereas it was not until nearly two decades later that this occurred 
in the northern city group.  
Figure 5.5:  Structural Change in Southern and Northern British Cities: Employment 
Shares by Broad Sector, 1971-2014 
 
Source: Authors’ own data 
Note: Southern cities and northern cities defined as in Figure 2. Employment share are of the Great 



















































































To explore these structural trends in more city and sectoral detail, we used the coefficient of 
relative specialization (see Isard, 1960; Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975).76 This has been deployed 
by Krugman on a number of occasions to examine city and regional specialization (Krugman, 
1991; 1993), and for that reason is often called the ‘Krugman Index’.  It takes the form  
 
 𝑅 𝑗 = ∑ |
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖 
 |              (1) 
 
where, 𝑠𝑖𝑗 is the share of total employment (or output) in city j accounted for by sector i at 
time t, 𝑠𝑖
  is the corresponding employment (or output) share of that sector in the comparator 
‘reference economy’ also at time t, and N is the number of sectors involved in the analysis. 
As defined, the index takes the value of zero when a city (or region) has exactly the same 
structure as the reference economy (since each absolute sectoral share difference in (1) 
would itself be zero), and a maximum of 2 in the case where the city shared no sector in 
common with the reference economy.77  According to Krugman, the index is a “rough way of 
quantifying differences in structures, and hence regional specialization” (1993, p. 250). 
Strictly speaking, however, it tells us more about structural dissimilarity between regions, or 
cities, than about regional or city specialization per se, since even if the index for a city is 
close to zero, suggesting little difference from the reference economy, the reference economy 
itself could be narrowly specialized in particular sectors, so in this case both the city and the 
nation would be equally and similarly specialized.  
Thus an additional measure is required in order to capture whether a city is specialised or 
diversified economically.  The obvious approach to measuring the degree of diversity of a 
city’s economic structure is to compare actual sectoral (employment or output) shares against 
 
76 There are several measures that can be used to summarise and compare city (and regional) economic 
structures and their evolution over time. For surveys of different measures, see, for example, Isard et al 
(1960); Bahl, et al (1971); Dixon and Thirwall (1975); Gibbs and Postan (1975); Kruger (2006); Palan 
(2010). These include the index of regional specialisation (Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975, Krugman; 1993), 
Shannon’s Entropy Index (for example, Aiginger and Davies, 2004; Aiginger and Pfaffermayr, 2004), the 
Index of Inequality in Production Structure (see Cuadrado-Roura et al., 1999; Haaland et al., 1999; 
Landesmann, 2000; Percoco et al., 2005), the Theil Index (Brülhart and Traeger, 2005; Ezcurra and 
Pascual, 2007), and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (for example, Sapir, 1996; Davis, 1998; Storper et al, 
2002; Aiginger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Beine and Coulombe, 2007). 
77 If the national economy is taken as the reference norm, then the maximum is 2[(N-1)]/N, since by 




an equi-proportion distribution of shares, that is a state of complete diversity or balanced 
structure.  The Hirschman-Herfindahl index is probably the most commonly used measure 
for this sort of analysis.  This is defined as the sum of the squared sectoral shares, 
                              𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗 
2𝑁
𝑖=1                        (2)  
                  
where, as in Equation (1), the shares 𝑠𝑖𝑗  are expressed as proportions of a city’s (or 
region’s) total employment (or output). The index ranges from a minimum of 1/N, when all 
sectoral shares are equal (maximum diversity) to an upper bound of 1, in which case a city 
would be mono-specialised, that is all of its activity is in just one industry. Because the 
sectoral shares are squared, the index gives more weight to large sectors.78  
Both the CRS (Krugman) Index and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index can be used for 
identifying and tracking structural change in individual cities and regions by comparing values 
of the indices at different points in time.79 In the case of the CRS, by using the national 
economy as the reference economy, the index can illuminate whether, how far, and how fast, 
city economic structures are converging (declining values of the index), or diverging 
(increasing values of the index).80 With respect to the HHI, if there is proportional growth 
across sectors, and hence no structural change, the index would remain constant over time 
(Metcalfe et al, 2006). Changes in the index thus indicate structural change: successive 
values that moved towards 1/N over time would indicate increasing equality (diversity) in 
economic structure, whereas a trend towards 1.0 would indicate increasing specialisation.  
Table 5.3 shows the calculated CRS (Krugman) indices of structural specialisation 
(dissimilarity) by employment across 82 sectors for selected cities (most and least initially 
specialised, and including London and other major cities) for 1971, 1991 and 2014 (the 
 
78 For this reason, the square root of the index is sometimes used (for example, Chisholm and Oeppen, 
1973). We use the standard version in what follows. 
79 There are measures that are intended to capture the scale and speed of structural change in a region or 
city economy directly, for example the Lilien Index (Lilien, 1982; Ansari et al, 2013), but these do not of 
themselves tell us much about whether that change is leading to diversification or specialisation of a 
region’s or city’s structure. Other studies have sought to measure excess industrial churn’ and its 
relationship to city growth (Duranton, 2007; Findeisen and Südekum, 2008). 
80 Note that the CRS can be also used to chart the changing economic structure of a city relative to its own 
‘starting’ structure, at say t=0, by setting the reference ‘norm’  𝑠𝑖𝑗 
   in (1) to 𝑠𝑖𝑗0. In this instance, structural 
change would be indicated by rising values of the index over time, as the city increasingly diverged from 
its original mix of sectors.   
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results for all 85 cities are reported in Appendix B in the online version of the paper). For each 
city, the ‘reference economy’ in Equation (1) was defined as Great Britain minus the city in 
question, so as to avoid double counting (which would not be insignificant in the case of 
London, and to a lesser extent with Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Liverpool, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh). Several key features stand out. First, in 1971 cities differed markedly in the 
degree of relative structural specialisation (dissimilarity).  Second, the large cities (regional 
capitals) and London were less specialised than most other, smaller cities. Third, in the case 
of employment structure, all but one city (Slough) have experienced a decline in relative 
specialisation or structural dissimilarity since 1971. The trends in output structures are 
broadly similar, although some thirteen cities experienced a slight increase in relative 
specialisation, or divergence from the structure of the national economy (see Appendix B in 
the online version of the paper). Fourth, especially in the case of employment shares, in 
general the more specialised a city was in 1971, the greater the reduction in specialisation 
over the ensuing period. 
Table 5.3: Krugman Employment Structural Dissimilarity (Specialisation) Indices for 
Selected British Cities (82 sectors), 1971, 1991 and 2014 
 
 1971 1991 2017  1971 1991 2017 
 
Sunderland 0.717 0.417 0.385 Liverpool 0.447 0.265 0.234 
Mansfield 0.711 0.440 0.296 Nottingham 0.445 0.255 0.269 
Halifax 0.686 0.430 0.407 Edinburgh 0.434 0.316 0.314 
Swansea 0.679 0.321 0.352 Luton 0.434 0.298 0.281 
Merthyr Tydfil 0.677 0.409 0.380 Chelmsford 0.430 0.239 0.169 
Oxford 0.664 0.325 0.301 Southend 0.423 0.393 0.224 
Kettering 0.659 0.419 0.349 Worcester 0.418 0.309 0.264 
Wolverhampton 0.656 0.419 0.269 London 0.411 0.387 0.387 
Blackpool 0.647 0.518 0.399 Leeds 0.408 0.270 0.227 
Blackburn 0.634 0.410 0.348 Newcastle 0.369 0.258 0.252 
Dudley 0.624 0.403 0.357 Southampton 0.368 0.249 0.184 


















Notes:   London and major northern regional capitals in bold 
 Cities ranked in descending order of dissimilarity (specialisation) for 1971 
 
The corresponding HH indices for employment for selected cities for 1971, 1991 and 2014 
are given in Table 5.4 (with the full city results for employment and output in Tables B.3 and 
B.4 in Appendix B in the online version of the paper). These show several interesting features. 
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In general, cities tend to be more specialized in terms of output structures than in employment 
structures; this was especially the case in the 1970s and 1980s.  With respect to employment 
structures, nearly two-thirds of the cities experienced a decline in specialization over the 
period 1971-2014. Those cities that were more specialized initially underwent the largest 
declines. The HH structural indices for output shares show that almost all most cities became 
less specialized over the four decades.  As in the case of the Krugman indices, it would 
appear that the decline in specialisation was most evident in the 1971-1991 subperiod, and 
that structural change since then has been slower.    
Table 5.4: Herfindahl-Hirschman Employment Specialisation Indices for Selected British 
Cities (82 sectors), 1971, 1991 and 2014 
 1971 1991 2017  1971 1991 2017 
 
Oxford 0.081 0.052 0.054 Birmingham 0.042 0.037 0.042 
Sunderland 0.077 0.043 0.045 Liverpool 0.041 0.047 0.048 
Huddersfield 0.072 0.041 0.046 Newcastle 0.040 0.043 0.049 
Stoke-on-Trent 0.071 0.050 0.044 Cardiff 0.039 0.040 0.047 
Halifax 0.071 0.037 0.045 Glasgow 0.039 0.042 0.044 
Dudley 0.067 0.043 0.045 Shrewsbury 0.038 0.040 0.044 
Trowbridge 0.066 0.050 0.041 Southampton 0.038 0.042 0.045 
Bradford 0.060 0.045 0.045 Warrington 0.038 0.039 0.039 
Middlesbrough 0.060 0.045 0.050 Leeds 0.038 0.039 0.039 
Reading 0.060 0.043 0.048 Manchester 0.037 0.040 0.039 
Exeter 0.060 0.044 0.047 London 0.037 0.038 0.039 


















Notes:   London and major northern regional capitals in bold 
 Cities ranked in descending order of specialisation for 1971 
 
Thus, what these analyses show, at the level of 82 sectors, is a dual tendency for sectoral 
structural convergence and an overall decline in (relative) specialisation across the British 
city system over the past forty years or so.81 A key question, then is what these structural 
trends have implied for the city patterns of productivity growth identified in Section 5.2.  
 
81 We have a more detailed sectoral breakdown, for some 249 industries, for each of the 85 cities for the 
subperiod 1991-2014. Analysis of these data also indicated structural convergence and a decline in 




5.5 Structural Change and Productivity Growth Across British Cities 
To provide background for the city analysis, Table 5.5 summarises the relationship between 
structural shifts in employment and labour productivity for selected sectors for the British 
economy as a whole.  
 
Table 5:  Change in Employment Share and Average Annual Productivity Growth of 
Major Sectors of the British Economy,  
1971-1991 and 1991-2014  
 
Source: Authors’ own data 
Note: Employment shares are of the Great Britain total. For definitions of these broad sectors, see Table 
A1 in Appendix A. 
These show that productivity growth has tended to be higher in the production and 
manufacturing industries – precisely those that have seen their employment shares fall – than 
in various services, precisely the sectors that have experienced the highest increases in 
employment share. This would seem to support the argument, alluded to earlier, that a 
contributing factor behind the national productivity slowdown may well be the structural shift 
of the economy from manufacturing to private and public services, since the latter would 
appear to have achieved lower rates of productivity growth than the former. However, at the 
same time, and importantly, Table 5.5 also indicates that productivity growth fell in most 
sectors between the two periods, including in both high-tech manufacturing and knowledge 
intensive business services, often regarded as two key sources of dynamism in the 
 Change in Employment 
Share (Percent point) 
 
Average Annual Rate of 




























Textiles and Related -2.50 -1.36 -3.86 4.30 3.46 4.51 
Light Manufacturing -3.41 -2.89 -6.30 3.56 2.47 3.93 
High Tech Manufacturing -4.41 -2.58 -6.99 5.90 4.98 7.96 
Utilities -0.57 -0.17 -0.74 6.58 1.65 5.11 
Construction 0.67 -1.23 -0.56 0.43 0.84 0.69 
Transport and Logistics -1.05 -1.20 -2.25 2.32 2.42 2.98 
Retail and Personal Services 5.06 2.09 7.16 0.92 2.06 1.74 
Knowledge Intensive Business Services 6.19 6.53 12.72 2.53 2.34 3.06 
Public services 4.21 2.96 7.17 0.87 0.47 0.29 
All Industries (Great Britain) - - - 2.08 1.69 2.25 
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contemporary economy.  Retail and personal services were the main exception to this 
widespread slowdown.   Thus, while the structural reorientation of the economy would seem 
likely to have contributed to the slowdown of national productivity growth, it would also seem 
that part of that slowdown has been due to ‘within-sector’ factors that have reduced the rate 
of productivity advance across most sectors, regardless of structural change. 
To explore the relative contribution of these two main ‘sources’ of productivity growth across 
Britain’s cities, we use a well-established decomposition technique that has been employed 
to analyse the relative contribution of ‘between’ and ‘within’ sector effects to aggregate 
national productivity growth of individual countries and across sets of countries (Foster, et al, 
1998; Fagerberg, 2000; Pieper, 2000; Disney et al, 2003; Peneder, 2003; Kruger, 2006; 
Ocampo et al, 2009; Timmer and de Vries, 2009; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; and Kucera 
and Roncolato, 2012; Roncolato and Kucera, 2014). 82 Although the results of these studies 
vary according to time period, data frequency, whether structure is measured by employment 
shares or output shares, the choice of labour productivity or total factor productivity, and the 
particular variant of the decomposition technique used, somewhat surprisingly the balance of 
the findings is that the ‘within-sector’ effect dominates the ‘between-sector’ effect, ie. the 
effect due to structural change. In discussing these national studies, Haltiwanger (2000) has 
argued that structural change is much more intense within industries than between industries, 
even at detailed levels of sectoral disaggregation. At the same time, a number of studies 
have used the same sort of ‘within’ and ‘between’ firm decomposition to investigate 
productivity growth of a given sector (Baily et al, 1992, 2001; Foster et al, 1998; Bartlesman 
and Doms, 2000; Disney at el, 2003, Cantner and Kruger, 2006). In a similar way, these tend 
to find the ‘within-firm’ effect is greater than the ‘between-firm’ effect.  
Following Kruger (2006, 2008), we can decompose a city’s productivity growth rate over a 



















            
         (3) 
 
82 Several extensions and further disaggregations of Equation (3) have been proposed (Baily et al, 1992; 
Griliches and Regev, 1995; Olley and Pakes, 1995; Foster et al, 1998; Fagerberg, 2000; Disney et al, 
2003). For example, Baily et al (1992) and Foster et al (1998) derive versions with additional terms that 
represent the contributions of entering and exiting establishments to aggregate productivity growth. 
These effects cannot be investigated here for the time period that is of interest 
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where 𝑌𝑗 and 𝑦𝑖𝑗  refer, in our case, to total and sector-specific labour productivity levels (real 
GVA per employed worker) in city j at time t.   Note that 𝑌𝑗 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ,
 
𝑖=1 where 𝑠𝑖𝑗  is sector 
i’s share of city j’s total employment. The ∆ denotes the change in productivity and in 
employment shares between t and t+k. The first term on the right-hand side of (3) is 
interpreted as the ‘within-sector’ effect, which is the share-weighted average productivity 
growth of the individual industries in city j (the sectoral shares are held constant at their values 
at time t).  The second term represents the contribution of shifts in sectoral structure, holding 
initial sectoral productivity differentials constant (as measured by differences from the city 
average productivity level). It is positive if sectors initially with above average productivity 
levels experience increasing shares between period t and t+k on average, and industries with 
below-average productivity levels experience falling shares of total city employment, on 
average.  It will be negative if sectors with above (below)-average initial productivity levels 
experience falling (rising) shares of total city employment. The third term measures the 
combined effect of structural change and sectoral productivity growth rates over the period. 
It is positive if industries with positive rates of productivity growth tend to gain in terms of their 
shares (or more generally, if share change and productivity growth tend to have the same 
sign), and negative if sectors with positive productivity growth experience a decline in their 
share of city employment.  The second and third terms in equation (3) together represent the 
role of ‘structural change’ or ‘between-sector’ shifts in city productivity growth. 
The results are shown in Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6.  Figure 5.6 plots the within-sector and 
between-sector contributions to total percentage productivity change in Equation (3) against 
the total percentage productivity change, for each of the 85 cities, for the two subperiods 
1971-1991 and 1991-2014. As is clear, in both subperiods the overwhelming contribution to 
total productivity change across the cities was from ‘within-sector’ improvements (which are 









Figure 5.6.  Decomposition of City Productivity Growth, 1971-2014, into Structural-




Note: The graphs should be read vertically, so that the sum of the within-sector and corresponding 
structural-change components for a given city equal the total productivity change for that city, given on 
the horizontal axis, as shown for the examples of Sunderland and Swindon.   
This finding is in line with most of the decomposition studies of national and international 
productivity growth mentioned above, and indicates that the primary determinant of city 
productivity growth has come from improvements in performance within individual sectors of 



























































































 Table 5.6: Decomposition of City Productivity Growth: Structural Change and Within-
Sector Components, Selected Cities. Growth in Percentage points over period indicated 
 
                                                                             1971-1991 
                                       Top Ten Cities                                      Bottom Ten Cities 
 
 Total     Within    Structural                   Total     Within       Structural 
 
 
Sunderland 89.8 127.7 -37.9 Blackpool 17.6 26.4 -8.8 
Blyth 75.9 104.5 -28.6 Basingtoke 17.1 28.2 -11.1 
Mansfied 69.3 92.4 -23.1 Plymouth 16.5 22.2 -5.7 
York 64.9 51.2  13.7 Colchester 15.4 17.4 -2.0 
Merthyr Tydfil 62.0 101.0 -39.0 Eastbourne 13.8 18.3 -4.5 
Derby 60.5 71.9 -11.4 Hull 13.4 19.2 -5.8 
London 59.7 57.2 2.5 Oxford 12.7 25.7 -13.0 
Halifax 59.6 52.1 7.5 Medway 10.8 26.5 -15.7 
Middlesbrough 59.1 61.2 -2.1 High Wycombe   3.7   7.4 -3.7 
Doncaster 56.1 89.0 -32.9 Leamington -7.1 -6.0 -1.1 
 
                                                                             1991-2014 
                                       Top Ten Cities                                      Bottom Ten Cities 
 
 Total     Within    Structural                  Total        Within      Structural  
 
Swindon 67.8 61.1 6.7 Chelmsford 25.9 38.0 -12.1 
Reading 59.1 58.2 0.9 Bedford 25.0 41.3 -16.3 
Basingstoke 56.4 67.9 -11.5 Cardiff 24.8 27.8 -3.0 
Leamington 55.2 54.4 0.8 Doncaster 23.8 37.6 -13.8 
Crewe 54.2 58.3 -4.1 Colchester 23.4 33.7 -10.3 
Eastbourne 50.4 83.8 -33.4 Plymouth 22.6 34.2 -11.6 
Derby 49.9 54.6 -4.7 Hull 22.5 26.9 -4.4 
Bradford 47.5 51.0 -3.5 Swansea 20.6 28.1 -7.5 















-22.3              
 
   
The ‘between-sector’ or structural-change contribution (the second plus third terms on the 
right-hand side of Equation 3), is not only generally less important, but moreover in most 
cases is negative, indicating that cities have shifted structurally from higher productivity 
growth sectors into lower growth ones.  This effect appears to have been greater in the 1971-
1991 period, and reflects the falling employment shares of higher productivity growth sectors 
- mainly manufacturing – in cities over these years. In the 1991-2014 period, there is also 
some slight tendency for this negative shift to be less in those cities that recorded the highest 
rates of total productivity growth.   
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Overall, however, the evidence in Figure 5.6 suggests that first, for almost all cities, structural 
change has in fact had a negative effect on productivity growth (most cities have shifted from 
higher productivity growth activities into lower productivity growth ones), so that this accounts 
for part of the slowdown in productivity growth observed in most cities, but especially northern 
cities; second, productivity growth in British cities has been largely due to within-sector 
productivity developments, but that this component of productivity growth has also slowed 
over the study period, compounding the negative effect of structural change. Significant firm 
heterogeneity in productivity, product quality, and management practice, even with narrowly 
defined industrial sectors, has been well documented (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Redding, 
2012). In this sense, our results confirm the findings of earlier studies that emphasise that in 
mature industrialised economies there are persistent and large productivity differentials within 
individual industries and sectors which tend to dominate productivity growth (Bartelsman and 
Doms, 2000; Haltiwanger, 2000; Krüger, 2006).  
5.6 Between-City Differences in Within-Sector Productivity Growth  
At a broad level, there are two key causes of within-sector productivity change.  The first is a 
‘recomposition or reallocation effect’ and involves the entry and exit of firms and the re-
allocation of market shares between incumbent firms.  In general, a higher rate of firm and 
plant entry leads to faster productivity growth as new entrants tend to have higher productivity 
than those that exit or are closed.83  If large, efficient and well-organized firms and plants gain 
market share this will also of course push up productivity growth. Thus, varied entrepreneurial 
dynamics and large firm investments in new plants across cities will strongly shape their 
productivity growth. The second major set of (within-sector) processes centres on 
technological and organizational change among surviving firms which includes both the 
adoption of innovations as well as improved management, organizational practices and 
formats. Typically, these are shaped by the intensity of competition faced by firms, and by 
their regulatory and institutional context, and in the UK they are often proxied by the amount 
of capital employed per worker and linked to foreign ownership of the firm (see Webber et al, 
2009). Existing industry research implies that both of these two processes are likely to be 
responsible for the intra-industry urban variations in productivity that we have found (Disney 
et al, 2003), although the relative importance of these two processes may change in different 
periods (see, for example, Riley and Bondibene, 2016).  It is highly likely that the two sets of 
 
83 Harris and Moffat (2015) argue that firm entry and closure have been the most important cause of 
change to total factor productivity differentials across Local Enterprise Partnership areas in the UK, 
but struggle to link this to the economic characteristics of these areas. 
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processes are combined in cities in mutually reinforcing ways, especially through the growth 
of the highest-productivity firms. In many industries, market share is dominated by a small 
minority of firms (Hottman et al, 2016). Not only do these leading ‘frontier’ firms tend to be 
exporters but they also have high productivity, complex organisation, and better product 
quality and scope, and their growth reallocates market share away from weaker, less 
productive competitors (Melitz and Redding, 2012; Andrews et al, 2015). Micro-evidence 
indicates that the distribution of firms by productivity levels is more right-skewed and 
stretched in some British city-regions (Oguz, 2017), which suggests that some cities are likely 
to have a greater prevalence of these ‘frontier’ and exporting firms.  It is highly probable, then, 
that city productivity levels and trends depend considerably on the degree to which cities 
manage to host and encourage the emergence and growth of these efficient, exporting firms. 
The processes causing the emergence and growth of such firms in particular cities require 
much more attention. We hope to explore this issue in a future paper.  
Further, greater exposure of a city’s economy to global markets and competitors tends to 
produce a divergence in the performance of its higher and lower productivity firms (Ottaviano, 
2011). In several ways, the uneven diffusion of globalisation has widened differences 
amongst firms within industries. In addition, ICT and digitisation are bound up with firm entry 
and exit, are changing firm activities, and leading to the emergence of digital activities that 
blur industry boundaries (including, in some instances, between what constitutes 
‘manufacturing’ and ‘services’).  In this context, revisions to industry classifications are 
lagging well behind the growth of new activities and reorganisation of older ones. What this 
may imply is that the geography of ‘structural change’ is no longer well measured by changes 
in industrial classes and categories but needs to be analysed in a more fine-grained way 
within particular industries, for example in terms of firm capabilities, or occupational or task 
‘bundles’. 
There is thus a growing recognition that industry classifications may not capture those forms 
of activity change and restructuring that are widening differences within particular industries. 
Many industries now include firms that vary significantly in terms of the occupations they 
involve, the markets they reach, and the tasks and functions that they perform (see Baldwin, 
2016). Partly, of course, this is due to the new divisions of labour emerging from supply chain 
re-organisation and the specialisations of areas and cities in specific tasks, stages and 
occupations rather than in particular sectors. In fact, some 30 years ago, Massey 
(1984)  argued that the spatial organization of the British economy was shifting from a pattern 
based on urban and regional sectoral specialization — the pattern that had underpinned the 
industrial era of national economic growth during the 19th century and first half of the 20th —
to one based on urban and regional functional specialisation, a new spatial division of labour 
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in which shifts in technology and corporate organisation were leading to the spatial separation 
of the different stages and functions involved in an activity, with, say, head office functions in 
one location, research and development in another, and production in yet another (possibly 
even overseas). More recently, certain urban economists have argued that cities have been 
undergoing just this process, and have become less distinguished by their industrial 
structures than by their functional specialisms and roles (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; 
Duranton and Puga, 2005). As Duranton and Puga put it: 
Cities shift from specialising by sector—with integrated headquarters and plants — to 
specializing mainly by function —with headquarters and business services clustered in larger 
cities, and plants clustered in smaller cities (p. 343). 
 
Allied closely with this process has been the trend towards the outsourcing of certain 
functions, and the emergence of spatially distributed production networks, often global in 
nature. Baldwin and Everett (2014) refer to this spatial fragmentation of production and 
‘slicing up of the value chain’ amongst often numerous suppliers and intermediate producers, 
as the ‘second unbundling’ (the ‘first unbundling’ being the geographical separation of 
production and consumption enabled by the transport revolution of the 19th century). In 
effect, the vertical disintegration of many production processes (not only in manufacturing but 
also in some services) has been accompanied by spatial fragmentation and dispersal of the 
component activities that make up that process. Thus, it is perhaps not so much what sectors 
a city specialises in that matters for growth, but its comparative advantage to host particular 
stages or functions in a spatially distributed—even globally organised—production network 
(value chain) (Brakman et al., 2014 ). These sorts of processes and trends towards the 
increasing importance of ‘function’ over ‘sector’ may be another reason for the significance 
of the ‘within-sector’ component of city productivity growth. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the functional composition of sectors by city. In any 
case, the issue still remains why certain functions are likely to locate in some cities and other 
functions in others.  Duranton and Puga, in the quote above, argue that ‘higher-order’, and 
presumably higher-value-added, functions tend to locate in larger cities, and ‘lower-order’ 
functions in smaller cities. This is in line with those authors who argue that productivity is 
higher in large cities, because agglomeration gives rise to various external economies or 
increasing returns effects (such as knowledge spillovers, inter-firm linkages, market size, and 
a large labour pool) which confer particular advantages to   firms there.  These agglomeration 
externalities are all assumed to increase with city size, or city density. It has been estimated, 
for example, that a doubling of city size increases a city’s productivity level by between 4-8 
percent (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2003).  But not only are such estimates modest, they 
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are based on cross-city regressions of city size and productivity levels at a particular point in 
time, and do not consider how long-run productivity growth is related to changes in city size, 
nor how agglomeration externalities themselves may change over time.84  In many ways, the 
notion of ‘agglomeration’ has become something of a conceptual chimera, a portmanteau 
notion that has become overworked as an explanatory device. In fact, the empirical evidence 
for the importance of agglomeration externalities in shaping the economic performance of 
cities is far from unequivocal (for a detailed survey of the field, see Beaudry and 
Schiffauerova, 2009).85 
Further, both the nature and impact of agglomeration economies can be expected to vary 
over time with as a city’s developmental path evolves. As a city’s industries follow their own 
life cycles over time, so too may the scale and influence of the agglomeration effects 
associated with those industries: in short, agglomeration economies may also trace out 
evolutionary life cycles (Potter and Watts, 2011).  In addition, it is by no means inevitable that 
the benefits to a city’s firms of the various positive externalities that are believed to accrue 
from agglomeration increase linearly with increases in city size (or density). Various negative 
externalities or diseconomies - such as congestion, pollution, and high land and housing cost 
inflation - may set in as a city increases in size (or density), all of which may limit the 
productivity growth of the city’s firms. We know relatively little empirically about such 
possibilities, although Baldwin et al (2002, pp. 436-441) use a theoretical NEG framework to 
show how “the agglomeration process, if pushed too far, can also be detrimental to growth” 
(p. 437) precisely because of congestion and related negative externalities.  What might be 
as, if not more, important than city-size related agglomeration economies per se is a city’s 
access to and connectivity to other cities, as markets and pools of (commuter) labour, that is 
a city’s economic or market ‘potential’.  Cities that are close to a major centre, or that are part 
of a dense and well-connected regional network of other cities, may be able to benefit from 
market-size, supply-chain opportunities and workforce availability in ways that are denied to 
cities not so favourably located, connected and networked.  
 
84 It would hardly be feasible - or environmentally desirable - for a city to continue to double in size 
repeatedly over time as a way to raise its productivity. 
85 Empirical findings vary according to how agglomeration itself is measured or proxied, what other 
(conditioning) variables are included in regression models testing for the impact of agglomeration, and 
the type and scale of geographical units used. Such is the variation in findings that it is somewhat puzzling 
that the claims made for agglomeration have assumed the prominence they have: it might be argued that 
it is often a case of theory over evidence.  
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One important place-based influence on firm productivity singled out by recent research is 
the presence in a city of a high-skilled workforce.  Other things being equal, a well-qualified 
and highly skilled workforce is assumed to confer particular advantages to the firms located 
there by enabling them more easily to develop new processes, products and services, in 
short to be more productive and hence competitive. Having a high proportion of professional, 
technical and highly skilled workers and occupations may therefore attract firms that carry 
out high-order functions in a given sector of activity.  The presence of such firms in turn will 
attract these sections of the labour force. There is evidence, for example in the United States, 
that cities are becoming increasingly differentiated one from another by their relative human 
capital endowments, especially in terms of educational qualifications and skills (see, for 
example, Moretti, 2013).  So cities that have traditionally attracted skilled workers, or which 
have succeeded in upskilling their workforce over time, might be expected to achieve a higher 
trend rate of productivity growth across their activities than cities which have inherited a low-
skilled labour force from a previous phase of economic development, or which may have lost 
skills as a result of structural change and not been able to rebuild their labour forces around 
the new skills needed by today’s growth industries.  
 Another key influence on a firm’s productivity is its capability for innovation. There has long 
been a debate over whether local sectoral specialisation or diversity is the more conducive 
to innovation amongst a city’s or region’s firms. Some of the most compelling evidence 
suggests that a diversity of complementary activities may provide the most favourable local 
environment for innovation (a key contribution being Feldman and Audretsch, 1999).  But 
much will depend on how far innovation and technical advances diffuse across a city’s firms, 
and also between cities. Concern has emerged in recent years that even within a given 
sector, innovation and productivity advance are driven by just a few leading firms and that 
diffusion through the local population of firms is in fact limited, giving rise to a long tail of low 
innovation and lower productivity firms (World Bank, 2008; OECD, 2015; Haldane, 2017).    
It is not possible to model the influence of these and other potential ‘local’ determinants of 
productivity growth in our 85 cities in detail because of severe data limitations. However, 
exploratory analysis of some plausible correlates is possible using some data series we have 
also constructed for British cities, in addition to the output, employment and productivity 
variables used above (see Table 5.7). Reliable data on the share of skilled employment in a 
city’s total employment and on the number of patents per employee could not be constructed 





Table 5.7:  Correlates of City Productivity Growth 






































City productivity level in 1971 (1991) – gross value added per employed worker. 
Source: data constructed as described in Appendix A.  
 
 
Share of Manufacturing employment as percent of city total employment in 
1971(1991). Source: data constructed as described in Appendix A.  
 
 
Share of Knowledge-based Business Services IBS employment as percent of city total 
employment in 1971 (1991). Source: data constructed as described in Appendix A. 
KIBS defined as SIC categories 58-66, 68-78  
 
Share of public sector employment in 1971(1991). Source: Source: data constructed 
as described in Appendix A. SIC 84-86,91 
 
 
Krugman Specialisation index (82 sectors). Calculated using sectoral employment 
shares (82 sectors), as in Equation (1). Source of data: as in Appendix A.  
 




Access to economic mass (sum of GVA in all other TTWAs each inversely weighted by 
distance from reference city) 1971 (1991). City distances refer to straight line 
distances between city centres.  
 
 
Number of patents per inhabitant. (1991) Patent data from, the European Patent 
Office (EPO) by the 8 patent sections defined by the International Patent 
Classification. The EPO data are based on the European Commission’s NUTS3 areas, 
and were scaled to the 85 city TTWAs by an iterative sectoral employment allocation 
process, iterated across both geographical areas and patent classifications until the 
data reached convergence across both dimensions. Further details available are from 
the authors.  
 
Employment in high skilled occupations as percent of city total employment in 1981 
(1991). Source: data constructed by combining sectoral employment data (see 
Appendix A). data for employment by occupation in each TTWA in 2014 from the 
Annual Population Survey, and matrices of employment by sector and occupation 
(SIC-SOC matrices) for the nations and regions of the UK, for 1981-2014, as prepared 
by the Warwick Institute for Employment Research (IER). High-skilled occupations 
are defined as those belonging to Level 4 (Managers, Directors and Senior Officials, 




Apart from employment density and employment size variables, intended to capture city 
agglomeration-type influences, we also include a measure of each city’s ‘market potential’, 
that is its distance-weighted access to the economic mass (GVA) of all other cities and also 
non-city travel-to-work areas.   This is included to allow for the possible advantages 
associated with a city’s spatial proximity to market opportunities and supply linkages across 
the national economy, and possible regional scale multi-city agglomeration type effects. 
Simple correlations were calculated for the whole period, 1971-2014, and also for the two 
main subperiods, 1971-91 and 1991-2014, to allow for the change in dynamics identified 
earlier in the paper. 
The results are given in Table 5.8. The correlations for productivity growth over the whole 
period show a significant negative association with base year productivity levels, a positive 
association with the base year share of city employment in manufacturing and a negative 
association with the base year share of city employment in KIBS.  
































































































Both the correlation with the base year proxy for agglomeration (employment density) and 
that with city size ae both positive; while the correlations of productivity growth with the share 
of skilled occupations in total city employment (in 1981) and with patent intensity (at 1991) 
are negative.  Increasing shares of public employment also appear to be negatively related 
to city productivity growth. 
Again, of particular interest are the correlations when we compare the two main subperiods, 
1971-1991 and 1991-2014. The change in the correlation between city productivity growth 
and initial productivity level, from -0.792 to 0.011 is in line with the shifting relationship 
illustrated in Figure 5.3.   Equally marked is the change in sign of the correlations of city 
productivity with starting year shares of manufacturing and KIBS employment: whereas in 
the first subperiod, cities with larger share of manufacturing employment had higher 
subsequent rates of productivity growth, in the second subperiod it is cities with higher initial 
shares of KIBS employment that have higher growth. Higher shares of public sector 
employment are negatively associated with city productivity growth in both subperiods. What 
is also noteworthy is that the positive association with both the agglomeration proxy and city 
population size falls away in the second subperiod. Equally, the correlations with the share 
of high skilled occupations and patenting intensity both change from negative to positive, in 
line with arguments that these two factors have assumed increasing importance in driving 
city economic performance. The shift to a positive association between productivity growth 
and the proportion of employment in skilled occupations is consistent with the growing 
importance of function as against sectoral structure.  Perhaps surprisingly, access to market 
mass (economic potential) is insignificant in both subperiods. 
Clearly, more formal modelling would help to isolate the effect of both the structural and city-
specific ‘within-sector’ variables in Table 5.8, taking into account the interrelationships among 
the correlates themselves. We do not attempt that here, however, in part because two of the 
key variables in Table 8 are not measured on the same timeframe as productivity growth, 
and in part – and crucially - because we lack the sort of firm-level data that would give us 
more insight into ‘within-sector’ business dynamics and ecosystems in individual cities. Even 
though these results do not directly confirm the suggestion that the ‘second unbundling’ is an 
important factor regarding the change in productivity growth dynamics, the significant, 
positive correlations of productivity growth with the share of KIBS and share of high-skilled 
labour in the period for 1991 onwards, would be consistent with this thesis. Moreover, the 
simple correlations in Table 8 at least confirm the basic finding of the paper, namely that a 
major change in city productivity growth dynamics occurred around the end of 1980s-early 
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1990s, with the geographical locus of productivity growth shifting from northern industrial 
cities to southern, more service-orientated cities. This shift has contributed to the overall long-
run slowdown of national productivity growth over the past forty years or so in two ways: 
through the shrinkage of the industrial (manufacturing) base of northern cities and through 
the corresponding growth of a service-based economy across all cities (but led by southern 
cities) in which (the scope for and pace of) productivity growth appears to be more limited.  
5.7 Conclusions and Implications 
There is much concern and debate surrounding the causes of the productivity slowdown or 
‘puzzle’ that confronts the UK and other OECD economies. This paper has identified an urban 
dimension to add to the numerous other aspects that make up this puzzle. In Britain, the shift 
from manufacturing, in which productivity growth was generally high, to a service economy 
in much of which productivity growth appears to be lower (Table 5), has had a distinct 
geographical dimension. The deindustrialisation of northern cities seems to have seriously 
slowed down their productivity advance, while the shift to services does not seem to have 
offset this loss, and even in southern cities, which have led the growth of services, productivity 
growth has slowed (Figure 4). Admittedly, productivity within the service industries is open to 
measurement problems, and variations across different service activities are also large (Baily 
and Solow, 2001). But the negative impact on productivity growth of the shift to services 
across almost all of the cities studied here suggests this ongoing structural change may be 
far from unproblematic. 
It also raises issues for the long, but still ongoing, debate about whether and to what extent 
sectoral specialisation drives city growth. Perhaps unlike their American counterparts, British 
cities have become less sectorally specialised, and have converged in terms of the sectoral 
structures. Given that at the same time, productivity growth has slowed across Britain’s cities, 
it might be argued that this is precisely in line with the specialisation thesis, because by 
becoming less specialised British cities have lost the localisation economies that 
specialisation is believed to foster.  
However, the results of our decomposition analysis of city productivity growth also show that 
within-industry developments have in fact dominated productivity growth trends across cities, 
suggesting that it is now much less of a question of sectoral structure per se that determines 
a city’s productivity growth – especially since cities have steadily converged in their sectoral 
structures (Section 3) – and that instead what matters, and requires in-depth investigation, is 
how productivity growth varies according to the intra-sectoral functions and stages of 
production or service provision found in cities. That is functional structure and specialisation 
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may be more important for productivity growth than sectoral structure and specialisation. The 
positive association between productivity growth and the share of high-skill occupations in a 
city’s employment base (Table 8) lends some support to this idea, since higher-order 
occupations tend to be associated with higher-order functions and tasks within a given sector 
of activity. Other research that we are conducting involving a detailed analysis of the evolution 
of the occupational-skill profiles of British cities since 1981, indicates a significant and 
persistent divide between higher skill southern cities and lower skilled northern ones.  This in 
part reflects the different economic histories of these two city groups.  
Nevertheless, the findings from our analysis have some relevant implications for policy. There 
is currently keen interest by the UK Government in its new industrial strategy capable 
(Department of Business, Energy, Innovation and Skills, 2017) of achieving two main, 
interrelated objectives:  improving the productivity growth rate of the national economy, and 
achieving a more geographically even pattern of that growth (Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2017). The declared recognition is that to achieve these goals 
a ‘place-based’ approach is necessary. While it is arguable whether, as it stands at the time 
of writing, the Government’s strategy is actually sufficiently place-based, our findings in this 
paper certainly support the need for such a perspective. Despite the phase of ‘catch-up’ over 
the 1970s and 1980s, productivity in most northern cities remains below that of most southern 
cities (Figure 3).  Thus, while there is a need to raise productivity growth across the whole 
economy – and this will require, among other things, increases in investment by firms, 
improvements in the skills of the workforce, a high rate of innovation by firms, and 
improvements in public infrastructures (physical and digital), both north and south - the task 
is more pressing in northern cities. Restoring the tradable base of Northern cities and 
upgrading their role in international supply chains in key sectors, will need explicit attention. 
The more so, given the UK’s imminent withdrawal from the European Union. Depending on 
the eventual terms of that withdrawal, British cities may lose their preferential access to the 
European market and face added competitive pressures from global competitors, making a 
high rate of productivity growth all the more crucial. Our analysis in this paper has 
undoubtedly raised more questions than it has answered. But one thing it has demonstrated 
is that discussions around – and indeed policy actions directed at – the ‘productivity puzzle’ 
facing the UK need to take explicit account of the geographical bases and consequences of 
the problem.  
Further, although the findings in this paper relate to the British context, they have a wider 
empirical and theoretical relevance. As was shown in Section 2. Several major advanced 
economies have also experienced a slowdown in their trend rate of productivity growth.  And 
as Muro and Parilla (2017) argue in the case of the United States, the city dimension may 
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well have a major bearing on understanding the dynamics and possible contributing causes 
of this slowdown in other advanced economies. The finding of our British analysis points to 
the validity of this argument. The specifics may well differ from country to country, but it could 
well be that the geographies of productivity growth (and slowdown) are not simply by product 
of national trends but constitutive of them.  At the same time, our findings for British cities 
raise some questions for the literatures that argue for the significance of specialisation and 
economic structure for city economic performance.  Much more research is needed, directed 
at changing structures and dynamics over quite long periods of time, rather than static cross 
section analyses at a particular point in time.   One thing does seem clear, however: improving 
productivity is more than a ‘macro-economic’ issue. After all, as Jane Jacobs (1984) argued 
strenuously more than thirty years ago, it is in cities and city-regions where the wealth of 
nations is created, with nations becoming wealthy as their cities become more productive, 






6 In Search of the Skilled City 
6.1 Introduction 
The accumulation of skills and human capital are central to the process of urban economic 
growth (Chinitz 1961).  Moreover, the significance of skilled occupations is said to have 
increased dramatically in recent decades and become crucial to post-industrial city growth 
and the main priority for urban economic policy (Cheshire et al. 2014, HM Government, 
2011). According to Parkinson (2016, p. 632), for example, “A skilled workforce is a critical 
feature of competitive cities. Modern economies increasingly depend upon knowledge-
intensive sectors, even within manufacturing. Policymakers and businesses typically rate this 
as the most significant single factor”.  
Despite the broad consensus on the importance of skills, much less agreement exists on 
exactly how skills and skilled occupations are changing across cities.  Instead, there are 
several influential narratives about how skills are shaping the dynamism of city economies. 
One argues that there is an increasing divergence between high and low-skill cities which is 
producing a ‘winner takes all’ geography in which skilled people are drawn to successful cities 
(Moretti, 2013). Another envisages the consolidation of skills-equilibria in different urban 
economies with labour supply and demand for skilled occupations at different skill levels 
becoming matched at low, medium or high positions (Green, et al., 2016). A further 
interpretation, popular in the UK, is that economic growth has been held back by education 
failures, shortages in skills supply, insufficient connection with employer needs, and limited 
devolution over skills policy (Brown et al. 2018, CBI, 2016).  
Despite these debates, there has been a relative lack of research on the geography of skilled 
occupations and their changes through time, especially outside of the US86. Furthermore, 
skills, and their use and application in particular jobs, are notoriously difficult to measure 
directly (Bacolod et al., 2009). This paper aims to begin to remedy this lack of research. It 
starts by examining research on the rise of the ‘skilled city’ and identifies its three main 
propositions about the relations between city characteristics and skilled jobs. The first is that 
the proportion of the workforce in high-skilled occupations has driven stronger employment 
 
86 Indeed, much of the most influential literature on skills, education and city growth is based on analyses for the United 
States, especially the writings of Glaeser and co-authors (see, for example, Glaeser and Saiz, 2003; Glaeser and Berry, 2006) 
and Moretti, (2013). Peck (2016) argues that Glaeser’s significant policy influence represents the construction of a neoliberal 
urban orthodoxy.  
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growth across cities. The second is that initially high skilled cities have seen faster growth in 
high-skilled occupations, thereby widening the gap with less skilled cities. The third is that 
larger and denser cities have generated higher growth rates in higher-skilled occupations. 
Using a detailed and comprehensive dataset for occupational change in 85 cities between 
1981 and 2015, the paper assesses whether these propositions help to explain the economic 
performance of cities in Britain. Addressing a further neglected area in the skilled city work, 
it then briefly examines the pattern of occupational polarisation seen in British cities over this 
period and identifies important regional differences.  The results confirm the close interactive 
relationship between growth and high-skilled occupations. However, some of the other 
‘skilled city’ arguments, such as ‘smart cities becoming smarter’ and a positive relationship 
between agglomeration and high skilled employment growth, have only limited applicability 
in Britain.  
6.2 The Rise of the ‘Skilled City’ 
It has long been recognised that human capital is a key constituent of endogenous urban 
development and long-run city growth (Martin and Sunley, 1998; Simon and Nardinelli, 2002; 
1996). Glaeser and Saiz (2003) find that, for more than a century, better educated cities in 
the US have grown faster than comparable cities with less human capital (see also Glaeser 
et al. 2014; Simon, 1998).  Many authors have since gone further to argue that the 
significance of human capital has increased and become the key engine of city growth. 
Indeed, this research has been a principal contribution in the resurgence of urban economics 
and its strong influence on city policy since the 1990s (Cheshire et al., 2014). Glaeser (2009, 
49) writes, “In the twenty-first century, idea production appears to have become the major 
business of many metropolitan areas, and skilled workers seem to be the most important 
element in the production of ideas”. Thus, “the key to urban success or failure in today’s 
economy is simple: high-skill cities prosper; low-skill ones stagnate or decline” (Glaeser 1996, 
p. 3; see also Glaeser et al., 1995; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Moretti (2013), referring to 
the US experience, describes a ‘Great Divergence’ beginning in the 1980s between 
‘innovation-hub’ cities with high educational levels, generating abundant knowledge spill-
overs, and cities with poorly educated workforces and outdated industries.  
The key argument here is that that the geographical concentration of skilled and educated 
people in cities raises productivity growth, underpinned by the stronger external economies 
of agglomeration in skilled cities (Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). Furthermore, globalisation 
has increased the economic returns from knowledge creation and dissemination, and raised 
the rewards for face-to-face knowledge sharing (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Glaeser, 2012). 
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In global North economies, cities have flourished as amenity and consumption nodes rather 
than production centres, and as magnets and generators of creative talent (ibid.).  
Several main and stylised propositions can be distilled from this literature for closer 
investigation in Britain’s cities.  While there is varying support for, and interpretations of the 
causes of, these propositions, they have become recurrent and core themes echoed in many 
policy reports. The first is that more skills and human capital generate stronger economic 
growth through positive externalities that raise productivity and innovation. These 
externalities and spill-overs are evidenced by the wage premium paid to skilled workers in 
cities (Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Gabe, 2009). In a post-industrial economy, occupations that 
require cognitive and social intelligence skills and assets are growing, whereas those that 
require physical skills are declining (Scott, 2009)87.  Hence, it is argued that cities with greater 
shares of cognitive and social types of skill are most likely to grow fastest (Bacolod et al., 
2009), and to better absorb knowledge and prove more adaptable. Differences in the kinds 
of skilled labour concentrated in cities explain their divergent economic performance 
(Markusen and Schrock 2006), highlighted and popularised by claims about the ‘creative 
class’ in urban economic growth (Florida et al., 2012).  
The second proposition is that skilled cities are becoming more skilled. As Glaeser and Berry 
(2006) put it, ‘smart places are getting smarter’. More initially highly skilled and educated 
cities are attracting more skilled labour (Berry and Glaeser, 2005). In Moretti’s (2013, p. 5) 
terms, “The success of a city fosters more success, as communities that can attract skilled 
workers and good jobs tend to attract even more. Communities that fail to attract skilled 
workers lose further ground”. Although high-skill cities have higher factor costs, skilled 
workers are more productive, earn higher wages and move to these cities to get on career 
‘escalators and elevators’ and benefit from externalities and networks that boost their 
experiences, earnings and careers (Gordon et al., 2015). The causes of this divergence have 
been debated vigorously.  A people-focused approach has argued that it is driven by the 
location decisions of skilled individuals. This claims that skilled people choose to live close to 
other skilled people to again access to valuable knowledge ‘windfalls’ and to enjoy amenity 
values and higher quality consumption facilities in larger urban centres (Glaeser et al., 2001). 
Florida’s creative class is a version of this approach, albeit with a somewhat different and 
wider understanding of amenities and pull-factors that are assumed to operate. An alternative 
production-based approach sees the uneven growth of industries, firm and innovation 
systems as the principal underlying cause of skill divergence (Moretti, 2013; Storper and 
 
87 Although in the UK it should be noted that there is evidence that the growth in skills demand and particularly demand for 
numeracy and literacy skills has faltered since 2012 (Henseke et al, 2018 ) 
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Scott, 2009).  Skilled cities are attracting industries that require more skills (Simon, 2004). 
However, both approaches see cumulative skill divergence as a key pattern.  
A third stylised proposition is the positive relationship between city size and skills. Here, it is 
argued that larger cities tend to have stronger concentrations of the high-skilled occupations 
and capabilities and generate faster growth in these occupations. A strong complementarity 
between city size, skills and learning is found in studies in the US and some other countries, 
reflected in the positive relationship between city size and productivity. Puga (2017) 
concludes that bigger cities have a disproportionate share of high skilled occupations and 
these size differences are growing (see also Florida et al., 2012).  The literature 
acknowledges some qualifications and complications, and in some accounts city size is not 
sufficient for high skilled growth.  Large and dense cities act as magnets for educated people 
only when they offer amenities that are attractive to discerning residents (Glaeser et al., 2001; 
Glaeser, 2012; Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). Markusen and Schrock (2006) report that 
some high skill, higher order occupations have grown fast in second-order metropolitan 
areas, but note that these may be part of world city conurbations because the largest cities 
exert a gravitational force on high order jobs. According to Scott (2009, p. 224), cognitive 
skills bear a distinct relationship to the urban hierarchy such that: 
 
large metropolitan areas in the USA are marked by especially dense concentrations of 
cognitive human capital, or, in other terms, mental, behavioural and cultural assets embodied 
in the labour force. Small metropolitan areas, in contrast, have a much greater proclivity to 
harbour human capital assets that entail more physical aptitudes such as strength, stamina, 
manual dexterity and mechanical skills.   
 
As Storper and Manville (2006) cautioned, this proposition about size can obscure different 
types of agglomeration because it includes the ‘emergence’ of sprawling newer cities as well 
as the ‘resurgence’ of older large and industrial cities. 
The growth of high skilled occupations, of course, tells only part of the story about recent 
occupational change. While the ‘skilled city’ work has focused on the top of the occupational 
hierarchy, the growth at the bottom and a decline in middling wage and medium skill jobs has 
been relatively neglected. The resulting occupational polarisation has been found in many 
mature industrialised and especially urban economies (Goos et al. 2014; Oesch and 
Rodriguez Menes, 2011; Michaels and Van Reenen, 2010). This ‘hollowing-out’ is explained 
primarily in terms of the impacts of computer and information technology raising demand for 
educated labour and eliminating routine and semi-skilled work (Autor et al., 2003; Autor, 
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2015). It is has also been increased by the global outsourcing of routine manufacturing 
employment (Hijzen et al., 2005; Gagliardi et al., 2015). The geography of this ‘hollowing-out’ 
has received relatively less attention, however, and its impacts across cities remain under-
studied. Moretti (2013) argues that traditional manufacturing cities have suffered most from 
‘hollowing-out’ and that this underlies their divergence from ‘innovation hubs’. The 
implication, then, is that there is a negative relationship between high skilled growth and the 
‘hollowing-out’ of middle-skill occupations across cities.  
Most of the empirical evidence in the ‘skilled city’ literature pertains to US cities (Dijkstra et 
al, 2013). There has been much less work on other countries, where the lack of detailed data 
has constrained analysis. It is unclear whether, how and when differences and path 
dependencies in other national and urban contexts continue to matter (Christopherson, 
2002). To begin remedying this gap, this paper aims to explore these main ‘skilled city’ 
propositions in the British context. Human capital in Britain has certainly been subject to 
divergent spatial trajectories (Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2000; Champion et al., 2014; 
Green, A., 2016; Cheshire et al., 2017), although there is some debate on their significance 
(McCann, 2016). The UK has moved strongly to a service economy within a relatively de-
regulated, although not highly geographically mobile, labour market, and its cities have 
experienced divergent economic trajectories since the early 1990s, if not before (Martin et 
al., 2016; Martin et al., 2017).  Given that human capital is endogenous to economic growth, 
we would expect to find strong relations between skills and city divergence. Here, we test 
whether and how far the skilled city propositions explain the experience of British cities. 
Beforehand, a note on data issues is in order. 
6.3 Measuring Skills and Defining Occupations 
Measuring and tracking human capital and skills present substantive methodological 
challenges. It is difficult directly to assess the combinations of skills that workers are using in 
their work in different occupations at different times, and there are only a limited number of 
often partial skill surveys. Most studies are forced use some kind of proxies of skills.  The 
skilled city literature discussed above often uses percentage of population educated to 
degree level.  However, this educational measure has been widely criticised as some types 
of skill are acquired through experience and interactions with others rather than through 
formal education, and a college education is not a prerequisite for all high knowledge 
occupations (Florida et al., 2012; Gabe, 2009; Florida and Mellander, 2018).  Occupation 
profiles are a more direct proxy of skill levels and can show more detailed types of skill 
differentiation (Bacolod et al., 2009).  Occupations are themselves, of course, made up of a 
bundle of tasks and activities that may change over time. In the UK, skill surveys indicate that 
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skills, and especially literacy and inter-personal or influencing skills, in the same occupation 
have been increasing (Green, F. 2016).  Nevertheless, it is still useful to classify occupations 
by the bundles of tasks and skills that they involve in order to distinguish occupations that 
involve mainly cognitive and social intelligence skills from those using mainly physical and 
manual skills.  
 
Unfortunately, no official, regularly collected and detailed time series data on occupations or 
skills are produced for the various cities in the UK88. Thus, a major step in the analysis 
involved the construction of as accurate and consistent a data set as possible from the few 
data sources on occupations and skills that do exist. Here, the method uses the division of 
standard occupational groups into four skill levels used by the UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills (Table 6.1).  Jobs are classified in groups according to the concept of 
‘skill level’ and ‘skill specialisation’. For the UK, the four levels are distinguished by the 
duration of training and/or work experience as well as the qualification level required.  Table 
6.2 shows the allocation of occupational groups to the four skill levels. Focusing on the skilled 
city propositions, discussed above, the Level 4 group is of specific interest because its 
members have well above average levels of ‘data’ and ‘people’ skills (Dickerson and Wilson, 
2012). A degree level qualification is normally required for jobs at Level 4 whereas Level 3 
occupations typically require technical qualifications. However, Skill Level 4 usefully excludes 
those graduates who are not working in high-skilled jobs and includes non-graduates who 
have risen to senior management corporate positions.  
Table 6.1: A Summary of Skill Levels based on SOC10 groups 





Equates with general education, short periods of work-related training, includes 




Occupations require a good general education plus a longer period of work-related 
training or work experience. These include machine operation, driving, caring 
occupations, retailing, and clerical and secretarial occupations. 
 
3  Requires a period of post-compulsory education, e.g. technical occupations, trades 
occupations and small businesses. Educational qualifications at sub-degree level 
and/or a significant period of work experience are typical. 
 
 
88 While th Labour Force Survey collects such data, the robustness of the data at smaller spatial scales is poor.  
156 
 
4 Includes ‘professional’ occupations and high level managerial positions in corporate 
enterprises or national/local government. Require a degree or equivalent period of 
relevant work experience. 
Source: Dickerson et al. (2012, p.72-75) 
 
Table 6.2: Allocation of Occupational Groups to Skill Levels 
 Major Group  Sub-major Groups Skill 
Level 
1 Managers, directors and senior 
officials 
11 Corporate managers and directors 4 
12 Other managers and proprietors 3 
2 Professional occupations 21 Science, research, engineering and 
technology professionals 
4 
22 Health professionals 4 
23 Teaching and educational 
professionals 
4 
24 Business, media and public service 
professionals 
4 
3 Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
31 Science, engineering and technology 
associate professionals 
3 
32 Health and social care associate 
professionals 
3 
33 Protective service occupations 3 
34 Culture, media and sports 
occupations 
3 
35 Business and public service associate 
professionals 
3 
4 Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 
41 Administrative occupations 2 
42 Secretarial and related occupations 2 
5 Skilled trades occupations 51 Skilled agricultural and related trades  3 
52 Skilled metal, electrical and electronic 
trades 
3 
53 Skilled construction and building 
trades 
3 
54 Textiles, printing and other skilled 
trades 
3 
6 Caring, leisure and other service 
occupations 
61 Caring personal service occupations 2 
62 Leisure, travel and related personal 
service occupations 
2 
7 Sales and customer service 
occupations 
71 Sales occupations 2 
72 Customer service occupations 2 
8 Process, plants and machine 
operatives 
81 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
2 
82 Transport and mobile machine 
operatives 
2 
9 Elementary occupations  91 Elementary trades and related 
occupations 
1 




Source: Dickerson et al (20120 page 75).  
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Using these definitions, in what follows, we focus on 85 cities in Britain between 1981 and 
201589. The cities are defined geographically by Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) using 2011 
boundaries. The key criterion is that 75% of the total workforce both lives and resides in this 
area. On this basis we identified 85 cities with populations above 200,00090.  This dataset 
construction involved three main stages: i) estimating Standard Industrial Classifcation – 
Standard Occupational Classification (SIC-SOC) matrices of employment by sector and 
occupation for each TTWA drawing upon the Working Futures 2014-24 matrices. Working 
Futures is a quantitative assessment of employment trends based on a detailed and 
comprehensive mnodel of the UK labour market, produced by the Warwick Insitute for 
Employment Research. We then calculated SIC-SOC data for local authority districts and 
converted these to TTWAs; ii) adjusting and scaling the first estimates of TTWA SIC-SOC 
matrices to ensure consistency with employment by occupation data and TTWA employment 
by sector data for 1981-2014; and, iii) extending the 2014 SIC-SOC matrices backwards to 
produce consistent series for 1981-2014 which involved calculating the growth rates of TTWA 
occupation shares of employment over the period, and applying these to employment data 
by sector for each year to produce TTWA employment by occupation for 1981-2014. A final 
data review ensured the results were internally consistent with the input data and the data 
calculation processes, and credible (e.g. not unusually volatile or showing other unusual 
patterns).  
The dataset is based on rigorous estimations and utilises the most detailed information 
available. However, it is not free of some inconsistences and breaks over time, for example 
as new job classifications appear and data collection methods alter. In many TTWAs there 
are data disjunctures around 1991-1992. This is because all historical time series on the 
growth of occupational employment in the UK, including those estimated by the Warwick 
Institute for Employment Research’s (IER) for ‘Working Futures 2014-24’, have to rely upon 
the Labour Force Survey (see Briscoe and Wilson, 2003).  While this allows the construction 
of a broadly consistent time series from the late 1970s, over the period 1979-2012 the LFS 
 
89 These are the cities that are the basis of the larger Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) project on the economic performance of 
British cities over 1971-2015, of which this paper forms a part (see https://www.cityevolutions.org.uk). The 85 cities concerned accounted for 
84 percent of UK employment in 2015. 
90 This self-containment figure is based on the total workforce and produces 228 Travel To Work Areass. However, TTWAs for 
different occupational groups vary in size and the degree of containment in these areas will be lower for the highest skilled 
workers. The Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2016) estimates that there are 153 TTWAs for the highest qualified 
employees and 461 for the lowest qualified. Our cities therefore represent amalgamations of smaller, lower skilled TTWAs and 
have significant external commuting flows for the highest skilled. On the whole, however, using TTWAs to define our cities 
results in urban areas that have greater meaning as functional labour markets than cities defined as, say, administrative units 
or as contiguous physically built-up spaces. 
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changed occupational coding three times and each has to be bridged.  However, the 
significance of changes to occupational coding have been thoroughly explored and found not 
to drive changes to top occupations (Salvatori, 2015). The discontinuity in 1991 is likely to be 
due to changes in the LFS sampling frame when it became quarterly in 1992. In this paper, 
therefore, the analysis focuses upon relative change over the whole period and compares 
cities against the national average. 
6.4 High Skilled Occupations and Urban Economic Growth  
The first ‘skilled city’ proposition is that the growth of higher skills and human capital in a city 
generate stronger economic growth through various externalities that raise productivity, 
wages and innovation. We assess this by examining the relationship between total 
employment growth in a city over our period and the percentage of its employment in high 
skill Group 4 occupations in 1981, controlling for several other city-specific determinants 
pertinent to city economic dynamism91. For the latter, we examine the associations and 
relationships by including a number of variables highlighted in recent urban growth theories, 
namely: the log of employment as an indicator of city size (EMP81); the density of 
employment as an indicator of agglomeration (AGGLOM81); the shares of employment in 
manufacturing (MANSH81) and in knowledge intensive business services (KIBSSH81) (as 
indicators of economic structure); the level of productivity (PROD81); and, the degree of 
specialisation (or dissimilarity from the national industrial structure) measured by the 
Krugman Specialization Index (KSI81)92.  Size, agglomeration and specialisation in high 
human capital sectors are typically argued to have positive effects (see Duranton and Puga 
2014), although there is much debate about whether specialisation or diversity are in better 
for fostering long-run city employment growth (Storper,2013; Martin et al, 2016).  
The simple correlations between city employment growth and these city-specific variables 
are shown in Table 6.3). As expected, there is clearly a strong positive relationship between 
the share of high skills and employment growth: cities that initially had a high proportion of 
their employment in high skill occupations were also those that experienced the fastest rates 
of employment growth over the subsequent period. This finding is thus in line with the 
proposition that skilled cities tend to grow faster than less skilled one.   However, the 
 
91 In this paper we examine employment growth but in an accompanying paper we focus in detail on the determinants of city 
productivity growth in the UK (see Martin et al, 2018).  
92 This is defined as  
𝐾 𝐼𝑗 =  |
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑖𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖 
 | 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑗 is industry 𝑖
′s share of city 𝑗′s total employment, and𝑠𝑖 
 is that industry′s share of total national  employment. 
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relationships between employment growth and the indicators of city size and density are 
negative which does not support the interpretation that agglomeration has driven employment 
growth. As expected, the  
Table 6.3:  Correlation Analysis 
Included observations: 85       
         














  PROD81  KSI1 
  
EMPLG 
1981-2015  1.000        
 -----         
HSKILLSH81
  0.412    1.000 
 
      
 0.000 -----        
         
EMPL81  -0.301 0.198 1.000      
 0.005 0.069 -----       
         
AGGLOM81  -0.410 -0.034 0.687 1.000     
 0.000 0.759 0.000 -----      
         
MANSH81  -0.290 -0.332 -0.098 0.181 1.000    
 0.007 0.002 0.373 0.097 -----     
         
KIBSSH81  0.180 0.566 0.411 0.242 -0.639 1.000   
 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 -----    
         
PROD81  0.434 0.419 0.139 -0.095 -0.524 0.351 1.000  
 0.000 0.001 0.206 0.386 0.000 0.001 -----   
         
KSI81  -0.258 -0.440 -0.361 -0.077 0.470 -0.432 -0.355 1.000 
 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.001 -----  
         
         
 
relationship between employment growth and manufacturing share is negative. The first two 
decades of our period, 1981-2001, saw sustained deindustrialization in many cities, while the 
correlation with KIBs share is positive given the transition to service-based urban economies. 
Cities with initially high productivity levels saw faster employment growth over the period 
which is likely caused by their stronger firm dynamics and by more productive firms 
expanding their market shares. Interestingly, the specialization index is not strongly 
associated with employment growth. Specialization and the high skill share show a negative 
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relationship, suggesting that to the extent that cities are specialised, it is in less skilled 
sectors. 
In order to gauge whether the ‘skilled city’ findings can be replicated for our data we used an 
employment growth regression. In fact, empirical verification of the skilled city hypothesis has 
typically relied primarily on regression results, and regression has been the main method 
used by the influential work on urban growth. Crucially, it has been used to isolate the effects 
of human capital on economic growth relative to other ‘control’ factors that are often 
hypothesised as influencing economic performance (see for example, Glaeser and Saiz 
2003; Glaeser and Maré, 2006). Much of this work has focused on US cities, a characteristic 
study being that by Simon and Nardinelli (2002) who sought to assess the impact of skilled 
human capital on the employment growth across US cities over the course of the twentieth 
century.  In line with this body of work, we try here, in effect, to test and replicate these results 
for our British cities. Table 6.4 shows the results of a least squares regression for employment 
growth using these variables. In this regression, we add selected other variables potentially 
significant to urban growth in contemporary Britain. First, after Simon and Nardinelli (2002), 
we have used regional dummies (SE, SW, etc.) to assess whether regional location has an 
effect upon employment growth over and above the other characteristics of cities. Second, 
we include a capital city dummy (CAPCIT) to test whether London, Edinburgh and Cardiff 
have benefited from a discernible devolution and political decision-making centre effect. 
Finally, we include a New Town dummy (NWDUM) to assess whether the New Towns in our 
set of cities have benefited from this status and its associated institutional capabilities, 
resources and growth opportunities. Table 6.4 shows our final regression with only significant 
results (p-value at 0.1 or lower).   The full regression is given in Appendix A.  
     
The regression confirms that a city’s employment growth has been strongly and positively 
affected by its relative share of high skilled workers. Indeed, this effect is stronger here than 
in other comparable studies (e.g. Simon and Nardinelli 2002).  However, the results do not 
support the claim that this is due to the agglomeration of high-skilled workers in large and 
dense cities. In fact, the results indicate that smaller and lower density labour market areas 







Table 6.4:   Regression Analysis 
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: EMPLGR1981-2015  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Included observations: 85   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.291 0.905 2.531 0.014 
HSKILLSSH81 0.023 0.008 2.920 0.005 
EMPL81 -0.128 0.076 -1.672 0.100 
AGGLOM81 -0.209 0.059 -3.538 0.001 
KSI81 -0.758 0.466 -1.628 0.108 
PROD81 0.034 0.015 2.209 0.030 
NEDUM -0.424 0.162 -2.622 0.011 
NWDUM -0.208 0.116 -1.801 0.076 
SCDUM -0.654 0.129 -5.077 0.000 
WADUM -0.457 0.169 -2.707 0.008 
CAPCIT 0.386 0.211 1.833 0.071 
NEWTOWN 0.571 0.119 4.803 0.000 
     
     R-squared 0.707    Mean dependent var 0.757 
Adjusted R-squared 0.662    S.D. dependent var 0.509 
S.E. of regression 0.296    Akaike info criterion 0.530 
Sum squared resid 6.377    Schwarz criterion 0.875 
Log likelihood -10.538    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.669 
F-statistic 15.984    Durbin-Watson stat 2.132 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
     
 
The more productive areas in 1981 also grew most strongly in employment over the 1981-
2015 period. While its significance is marginal, there is an indication that employment growth 
was negatively affected by economic specialization for the reasons suggested above. The 
regional dummies show a strong disadvantage for some northern and western regions. Cities 
in the North East, North West, Wales and Scotland on average had less employment growth 
than in the other areas, even when taking other factors such as skills and productivity 
differences into account.  In contrast, there was a strong positive effect from New Town 
status. This may be because New Towns offered local conditions more conducive to 
employment growth than elsewhere, such as more permissive and streamlined planning, 
cheaper land and better infrastructure. However, we should be cautious as our set of cities 
include only five of the largest and most successful New Towns, with strong locational 
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advantages. In the following section, we investigate whether these results are underlain by a 
divergence in skill levels across British cities.  
6.5 Occupational Divergence across Cities?  
As we have seen, the skilled cities research suggests that cities with more skilled employment 
profiles are growing fastest in terms of the accumulation of skilled labour. Figure 6.1 shows 
the relationship between share of total employment in high skill (Level 4) occupations in 1981 
and the growth of this occupation group between 1981 and 2015. If ‘smart places are 
becoming smarter’, then we would expect to see a strong positive relationship.  The results 
clearly do not support the proposition and raise doubts about how far it applies in the case of 
Britain. In fact, it appears that there is only a very weak positive relationship, which is not 
statistically significant.  There are quite a number of cities that had relatively low levels of 
highly skilled occupations in 1981 but which have seen strong growth in these skilled jobs, 
and conversely, there are others which were already skilled but have seen only slow growth. 
However, there do appear to be differences between cities in the north and south of the 
country.93 There is a group of northern cities that have both a weak starting point and low 
rates of high skill growth.  In contrast, there is a group of predominantly Southern cities with 
well above average starting levels but with a very large range of growth. Some of these cities 
have benefited from the strongest rates of growth while others have experienced only 










93 Here we follow a conventional definition, and define Northern cities as those located in Scotland, Wales, the North East, 
North West, Yorkshire- Humberside and West Midlands.  
94 There are two clear outliers: Leamington Spa, which is highly skilled, and Mansfield which is very low-skilled. 
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Figure 6.1:  Growth in high skill occupations (Level 4) 1981-2015 against share of 



















Note: R2 values refer to regression of High Skill Employment growth 1981-2015, on High Skill Employment levels 
in 1981, for Northern and Southern cities as separate groups 
 
There does not appear to be a simple divergent pattern between high and low skill cities. 
While the national share of employment in our high skill occupations has increased from 24 
to 26.8 percent, over 1981-2015, striking differences in the nature of urban labour markets 
have been highly persistent. Indeed, the most cities have high-skill rates that are around twice 
(near 140% of the national average) those of the least skilled cities (around 70% of the 
national average) (Figure 6.2). What is clear is that, unlike in the US, there is little evidence 
of any new ‘great divergence’. Indeed, if anything, there is a very slight trend towards 






































































Figure 6.2: Relative Share of Employment in High Skill Level 4 Occupations in Most 
and Least Skilled Cities, 1981-2015, GB=100 
 
Addressing its relative neglect, at the bottom end of the skills distribution Figure 6.3 shows 
the relationship between the percentage of employment in low skill group (1) and change 
over the period for both northern and southern cities. For both groups of cities, there is 
evidence of a negative relationship: TTWAs with low levels of low skill employment have 
tended to see a faster increase in these types of jobs.  There has been a greater range of 
growth in southern cities, but in general there has been a convergence as low-skilled 
employment has grown. Once again, this is at odds with the idea of a US-style ‘great 
divergence’ in skills.  
The third stylised proposition is the claim that larger cities have larger concentrations of high-
skill occupations, and have seen faster growth in these occupations. We assess this by 
looking at relationships between city population size and change in the high-skilled and 
cognitive skills groups. Figure 6.4 shows that there is no evidence that the largest cities have 
seen faster growth in high-skilled occupations. Instead, there is only a very weak negative 
relationship which indicates that the larger cities in Britain (with the exception of London) 








































































































Figure 6.3:   City Employment Growth in Low Skill (Level 1) Occupations against Low 

















At the same time, agglomeration, proxied here by employment density (employment per km 
squared), has not been a key driver of high-skill growth (Figure 6.5). The range of 
performance for low-density cities has been much wider than the range of performance of 
higher density cities. Thus, the fastest growth in employment in high skilled occupations has 
evidently been in some relatively low density cities, which raises profound questions about 
the stylised relationships between agglomeration and the growth of high skilled industries 
and occupations claimed in several studies.  
Partly as a result of these trends, at the end of our period there is virtually no relationship 
across cities between their population size and the level of employment in high skill group 
level 4.  Any positive relationship disappears when London is excluded. We can conclude 
that size of city alone tells us little about the prevalence of skilled occupations across British 
cities. However, when we examine distance to London there does appear to be a modest 
negative relationship. Growth has been faster in high skill occupations in cities closer to 
London (Figure 6.6), and, in fact, a very similar relationship exists for the lowest skilled 
occupations.  
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Figure 6.4: City Employment Growth in High Skill (Level 4) Occupations, against City 
Population size 1981 
 
 
Figure 6.5:  City High Skill Employment (Level4) growth against City Employment 
























































































































It may well be of course that faster high skill growth raises low skill growth through demand 
linkages. The vibrancy of the regional labour market appears to be a much more significant 
factor than size or density of a city. The weight of evidence suggests that the north-south 
divide appears to be much more significant than either size of city, or its initial starting point, 
in terms of effects on changes to skill levels. 
6.6 Occupational Polarisation in British Cities 
Job polarisation has been evident in the UK’s labour market over recent decades as the 
effects of technological change and offshoring have increased high-skilled employment but 
hollowed-out medium skill level jobs and occupations. To date, however, there have been 
few investigations of the geography of this process. To start to examine this geography, a 
conventional assessment of job quality has been undertaken and the nine major occupational 
groups ranked by the median hourly wages level in 1998 (Table 6.5).   





(by Skill Level) 
 Median Hourly 
Wage £ 1998 
Median Hourly 
Wage £ 2016 
1 2. Professionals 13.81 19.75 
2 1. Managers and senior 
officials 
12.07 19.73 
3 3 Associate professional 
and technical 
9.89 15.00 
4 5. Skilled trades 7.48 11.50 
5 8. Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
6.34 10.20 
6 4. Administrative and 
secretarial 
6.28 10.54 
7 6. Caring, leisure and other 
services 
5.14 8.87 
8 7. Sales and customer 
service 
4.78 8.12 
9 9. Elementary occupations 4.59 7.84 
Source: ONS Annual Surveys of Hours and Earnings 1998 and 2016 Tables 2.5 
 
These wages are based on SOC 1990 groups, whereas our analysis is based on SOC 2010, 
so there may be some small discrepancies between the make-up of the major occupational 
groups. To address these, we have therefore compared the rankings of the occupational 
groups in 1998 with those in 2016. The only change is the administrative and secretarial 
group has jumped over process, plant and machine operatives in terms of hourly wage. With 
this exception, the rankings shown are stable and the relative position in 1998 provides a 
useful indication of the rewards from work in each group. In the figures in this section the 
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numbers of occupational groups refer to their wage rankings and not to the conventional 
numbers of the SOC Major Groups. 
Figure 6.7 shows the share of employment in these occupational groups in northern and 
southern cities in 1981.  
Figure 6.7: Share of employment in Major Occupational Group (ranked according to 




At that time northern cities had a higher share in occupational groups associated with 
manufacturing such as skilled trades (4), and plant and process operatives (5), while southern 
cities already had higher shares in the skilled and professional occupations (1 to 3).  Figure 
6.8 displays the changes in shares over the period and suggests there has been a trend 
towards a convergence in occupational structure. Such shifts have been stronger in northern 
cities where the shares at the top and bottom of the scale have been higher, and the middling 

































polarisation has been stronger and more disruptive in northern cities. We can investigate 
some of the causes further by looking at the absolute rates of change in these same 
occupation groups. 
Figure 6.8: Change in Share of Employment in Major Occupational Groups in 




Figure 6.9 shows the annual average change in each of the major occupational groups 
(ranked according to wages). It shows that the fastest employment growth has been in the 
Group ranked 7 (caring, leisure and other service occupations) followed by highest ranked 
professional occupation group.  Nationally, the middle-wage occupation groups ranked 4 
(skill trades) and 5 (process, plant and machine operatives) have either stagnated or 
declined. Overall, the findings confirm that the UK has seen a huge growth in relatively low 
skilled and low-wage jobs which is indicative of a shift in growth away from higher productivity 
toward lower productivity service industries.  Again, there are significant differences between 
northern and southern cities.  It is notable that in both sets of cities employment growth has 
been strong in Groups 6 (administrative and secretarial), 7 (care and leisure), and 8 (sales 
and customer service). Southern cities have seen marginally faster growth in elementary low-
skilled occupations.  For the professional group, growth in northern cities has been slightly 







































































which, given the growth in public sector employment over the period, is an indication of a 
much less dynamic private sector in these cities. The most significant contrast is in the middle 
of the distribution; while employment growth in middle wage occupations in southern cities 
has been low, in northern cities it has been negative. Job polarisation, then, appears more 
pronounced in northern cities.  
Figure 6.9: Change in employment in occupational groups ranked by median wages 




Smaller, traditionally industrial northern cities, such as Stoke, Sunderland and Middlesbrough 
have tended to see only very weak growth in higher-paying occupations and have benefited 
to only a small degree from the rise of professional and managerial employment.  In contrast, 
the fastest growing smaller cities such as Milton Keynes, Basingstoke and Oxford have not 
only benefitted strongly from the growth of professional and managerial classes but they have 
also retained some growth in a range of medium-wage occupations. Figure 10 shows the 
relationships between high and medium wage occupations. In northern cities there is little 
evidence of any relationship between Groups 1 and 5, while in southern cities there is a small 
positive relationship. This may be due to the demand externalities in local labour markets 
generated by high-skilled jobs (Moretti, 2013).  
How, then, could we explain the strength of this geographical polarisation?  It is unlikely that 
regional differences in the growth in graduate labour are primarily responsible given southern 














































information technology, automation, trade and outsourcing have had uneven spatial effects 
and that their negative effects on routine work have been felt more in cities that have 
experienced more severe deindustrialisation. While professional employment and the 
demand for high skills have grown in most cities, the reduction in middle-skill occupations 
appears more spatially uneven. In conclusion, we turn to some of the implications of these 
under-researched skill geographies.  




6.7 Conclusions  
In sum, the ‘skilled city’ view is only partially applicable to the economic evolution of cities in 
Britain since the early 1980s. There is a clear and strong relationship between the growth of 
more highly skilled occupations and total employment across these cities, reinforcing 
accounts of the recursive relationship between skilled labour accumulations and city 
economic growth (Storper and Scott, 2009). The presence of firms with more skilled 
employment is associated with faster employment growth, confirming the ‘skilled city’ 
arguments concerning the quality of firms and the mutually reinforcing combination of 
productivity, externalities, spill-over and innovation effects. But what our results also reveal 














































































over other cities in a cumulative way. Instead, it appears that the growth of skilled occupations 
waxes and wanes through time, shaped by firm and industry dynamics in particular cities. 
While the ‘skilled city’ narrative contains some recognition of these processes, many of its 
main and stylised propositions are too simplistic and are not fully supported by this analysis 
in the British context. In terms of occupational change, there is no evidence of a new ‘great 
divergence’ in skills between cities in Britain. Instead, our results show a substantial and 
persistent gap between the most and least skilled cities, a gap that has a clear north-south 
dimension. Further, there is little evidence that agglomeration has been a key driver of the 
growth in skilled occupations. While London has seen strong high-skilled growth for part of 
our period, in general the smaller and lower density labour market areas, most of which are 
in the south of England, have grown skilled employment faster than larger and higher density 
ones. This analysis therefore questions and at least qualifies the claim that agglomeration is 
the only guaranteed way of building skilled employment and developing new and dynamic 
knowledge-based urban economies. Regional economic differences between northern and 
southern regions have been more important than the size or density of cities.  
Such regional variations are important to considerations of the relatively neglected issue of 
job polarisation. Given our data, we have not been able to measure skill polarisation directly. 
Our analysis examined relative occupational polarisation and the comparative performance 
of cities. It revealed that occupational polarisation has been more marked in northern cites. 
While these cities have had faster growth in their share of employment in high skill 
occupations, their relative, and in many cases absolute, decline in medium-wage jobs has 
been stronger. This finding is consistent with studies of the impact of global trade, 
technological change and restructuring on these former manufacturing-based economies 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2016). This uneven geography of occupational change has contributed 
to a decline in economic and political cohesion in Britain and is likely to further exacerbate 










7 The Resilience of Cities to Economic Shocks 
7.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the study of cities has expanded apace.  The recognition that in 
most countries – whether advanced or developing – cities account for the bulk of a country’s 
population, its economic production and its wealth creation, has understandably thrust them 
to the forefront of academic research and policy attention. One key finding is that not all cities 
have enjoyed prosperous growth.  Indeed, the existence of marked – and persistent – 
economic growth differences amongst cities appears to be a widespread phenomenon, even 
in advanced countries (see, for example, Markusen and Schrock, 2006; Storper et al, 2015; 
Martin, 2016; Dijkstra et al, 2017; Tyler et al, 2017).   Considerable attention has thus focused 
on what makes for a ‘successful’ city in economic terms, and why some cities have been 
growing faster than others.  Several factors have been put forward to explain successful 
cities, including agglomeration economies, specialisation, the attraction of skilled and 
educated labour, and the presence of purposive and strategic governance arrangements.   
By comparison, less attention has been directed to the question of how cities react to and 
recover from major economic shocks. In urban economics, for example, the preoccupation 
with equilibrium economic outcomes and patterns has perhaps encouraged a view that city 
economic growth and development is a smooth and incremental process. In reality, of course, 
economies are inherently shock prone. Such shocks can take various forms, in terms of 
origin, nature, scale, duration and scope.  For example, at one level, the closure of a major 
local company may have serious negative impacts on that locality’s labour market and 
economic prosperity and prospects, even though at the national scale such a closure may be 
‘lost in the noise’ of everyday economic activity and flux. At a more macro-scale, a shock 
might be national in origin or causes and with impacts on most or all localities, cities and 
regions in the economy, though very possibly unequally and unevenly. Or it might be a shock 
that is more global in origin, reach and impact, though again possibly with spatially 
differentiated effects across countries, regions and cities.  This is not to say that economists 
do not study shocks: the analysis of business cycles and related fluctuations has long been 
a topic of theoretical and econometric enquiry. In the 1970s and 1980s, the empirics of 
regional business cycles attracted attention. And in the ‘new economic geography models’ 
that have been developed in recent years, a major change (shock) to trade costs, for 
example, can alter the equilibrium geographical distribution of economic activity. But, overall, 
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in the ‘new urban economics’ and ‘new economic geography’ of the past three decades, how 
cities and regions react to shocks to their growth paths has not been a major concern.  
In economic geography and regional studies, however, the geographical impact of shocks 
has recently become a prominent subject of enquiry.  And much of this interest has utilised 
the notion of ‘resilience’ as a way of conceptualising and analyzing how regions and cities 
react to and recover from disturbances and disruptions (see, for example, Cambridge Journal 
of Regions, Economy and Society, 2010; Bristow, 2010; Hassink, 2010; Hudson, 2010; Pike 
et al, 2010; Simmie and Martin, 2010; Martin, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015, Fingleton, 
Garretsen and Martin, 2012, 2015; Boschma, 2015; Modica and Reggiani, 2015; Sensier, 
Bristow and Healey, 2016; Angulo et al, 2018; Bristow and Healy, 2018; Martin, 2018; 
Webber, Healey and Bristow, 2018).95 This is not to suggest there is yet an agreed coherent 
‘theory’ of regional or urban economic resilience, nor that the concept is unproblematic;96 but 
the notion has helped to focus attention on the fact that regional and urban development is 
not some smooth process, but one that is frequently subject to various shocks originating at 
various spatial scales (Martin, 2018).  
In part this use of the notion of resilience in economic geography and regional studies mirrors 
a similar rise of ‘resilience thinking’ across a wide range of disciplines, and the literature on 
the topic is now extensive, including several key books (for example, Walker and Salt, 2006, 
2012; Lewis and Conaty, 2012; Zolli and Healy, 2012; Rodin, 2015; Sheffi, 2015; Caniglia et 
al 2017) and even a multidisciplinary journal Resilience devoted to the concept.97 Reflecting 
this diffusion of the idea, there are also numerous definitions of the term, both general and 
domain-specific. Notwithstanding this variation in definition across different fields, the 
common idea is that the notion of resilience refers to the capacity of an entity or system to 
resist, absorb, adjust to, and recover successfully from shocks or disturbances that disrupt 
that entity’s or system’s pre-shock state or development path.  The usual assumption is that 
such shocks are negative in nature, but even ‘positive’ shocks (such as a new technological 
breakthrough) can be disruptive and set in motion adjustments of a ‘destructive’ as well as 
‘creative’ nature. According to two key contributions (Zolli and Healy, 2012; Rodin, 2015), 
 
95 It is not our intention here to survey or assess the growing literature on the application of resilience ideas to analyse regional 
economic shocks: for detailed discussions, see, for example, Martin and Sunley (2015), and Modica and Reggiani (2015).  
96 For example, some have questioned the ‘value added’ of the concept, and argued that it offers no additional insight over other 
concepts such as competitiveness or sustainable development; others have complained that it reifies ‘the market’ and the belief 
in self-correcting market forces. Both sorts of critique can easily be countered (see Martin and Sunley, 2015). 
97 If we consider just the subject fields of environmental studies, business and management studies, planning, urban studies, 
economics and economic geography, then according to the Web of Science in 2000 some 60 works were published with the 
term ‘resilience’ in the title; in 2007 some 230 were published; and in 2017 more than 1200.  
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resilience is precisely the sort of analytical tool we need in order to understand and confront 
what they argue is an increasingly uncertain, risk-prone and volatile world.   
Several questions arise from such a perspective. How far do localities, regions, cities, or 
indeed whole national economies, actually differ in their resilience to shocks, that is in their 
resistance to and recovery from such disruptions? What causes such differences in 
resilience? Do shocks merely have transient or temporary effects, notwithstanding that 
recovery may take a while? Or do shocks, especially severe disruptions, have hysteretic 
effects, permanently altering the structure and trajectory of the affected economy in some 
way?  
Against this background and such questions, our aim in this paper is to examine the economic 
resilience of British cities to major recessionary shocks. Since the early-1970s, there have 
been four significant recessionary shocks to the British economy. How individual cities have 
been impacted by these common, nation-wide, disruptions is not only of intrinsic interest in 
its own right, but more especially because of the possible implications these shocks have 
had for the relative long-run growth paths of the cities. The past five decades have witnessed 
an historical shift in the structure and growth dynamics of the British economy, and our 
previous work has shown that these shifts have operated unevenly as between one city and 
another (Tyler, et al, 2017;  Martin et al, 2018). The extent to which this uneven transformation 
and development has both influenced and itself been shaped by the geographical impact of 
major recessions over the period is thus a relevant issue for investigation.  How far and in 
what ways has the pattern of resilience to recessionary shocks across British cities evolved 
since the early-1970s?  Can any changes that have occurred be linked to changes in 
economic structure across cities? Have differences in resilience between cities influenced 
their relative growth paths?   Insights to these issues may in turn have implications for what 
is almost certain to be another major historic economic shock about to impact the British 
economy, namely ‘Brexit’, the nation’s withdrawal from membership of the European Union. 
The analysis of the resilience of Britain’s cities to previous major shocks may provide at least 
some insight into how they will react to Brexit.  
The paper begins in Section 7.2 with a brief discussion of the last four major recessionary 
shocks to have disrupted the UK economy, and which are the focus of study here.  This is 
then followed (in Section 7.3) by a brief resumé of the idea of resilience and its relevance for 
the study of how cities and regions react to recessionary shocks.  More detailed expositions 
can be found in Martin and Sunley (2015), Martin (2018) and Modica and Reggiani (2015).  
Section 7.4 then presents an analysis of the resilience of 85 British cities to the last four 
recessions and reveals how the geography of resilience has been characterized by both 
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change and continuity over time, from one recessionary shock to the next.  This leads to a 
discussion and exploration of some of the possible factors that might account for these 
patterns. Section 7.5 then takes up the issue of the resilience of the 85 cities to the ‘Brexit 
shock’, both in terms of what the evidence from previous recessionary shocks might imply, 
and by means of tentative estimates of what might be expected under different scenarios, 
using sectoral estimates derived from a national macroeconomic trade model. 
7.2 A Tale of Four Recessions 
During the early-2000s a number of observers argued that western economies had become 
more stable, in the sense that fluctuations in economic growth had become less pronounced 
(Stock and Watson, 2003; Arias, Hansen and Ohanian, 2007; Labonte, 2008). Several 
reasons were advanced for what some called the ‘Great Moderation’: a structural shift away 
from cycle-prone manufacturing activity towards less cyclical services; better macro- and 
micro-economic management; and even a ‘fortunate’ absence of the sort of ‘exogenous’ 
shocks that had afflicted economies in the 1970s and 1980s. Others, however, have taken a 
quite different view, arguing that economic growth within the OCED countries has actually 
been on a systemic crisis trajectory since the beginning of the 1970s, with one major shock 
following another, culminating in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, and the ‘Great 
Recession’ this triggered. Thus, according to Streeck (2016) 
Looking back, the crash of 2008 was only the latest in a long sequence of political 
and economic disorders that began at the end of the post-war prosperity in the mid-
1970s. Successive crises have proved to be ever more severe, spreading more 
widely and rapidly through an increasingly interconnected global economy (p. 47). 
 
In fact, since the beginning of the 1970s, four main economic downturns have disrupted 
economic growth among the OECD nations: the mid-1970s, the early-1980s, the early-1990s, 
and the recent Great Recession itself.98  Figure 1 shows the anatomy of these four 
recessionary shocks, as measured in terms of output (GDP) for the specific case of the United 
Kingdom, with the Great Depression of the early-1930s included for comparison.  
Each of these recessionary shocks has varied in terms of both causes and severity. The 
recession of 1973-76, a classic ‘double-dip’ downturn, was sparked in part by the historic hike 
in OPEC oil-prices in 1973, and marked the end of the so-called ‘golden age’ of (relatively 
 
98 These cyclical shocks have obviously varied in intensity and precise timing from country to country, but the overall pattern is 
broadly common to all of the advanced economies.  
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‘recession-free’) post-war expansion. The recession of the early-1980s was caused by the 
combination of an over-valued sterling currency, which reduced demand for the country’s 
exports, high interest rates, and a major tightening of monetary and fiscal policy designed to 
reduce inflation, which was then running at over 15 percent per annum. It was a shock that 
particularly hit manufacturing, which had in any case been undergoing deindustrialization 
since the late-1960s (Martin and Rowthorn, 1986).   It turned out to be the most severe UK 
recession of the post-war period up to that time, and was almost on a par with the Great 
Depression of 1930-34 in terms of the depth of the downturn in GDP and certainly in terms 
of the time taken for output to recover (see Figure 7.1). 99 The recession of 1990-1993, which 
followed the so-called tax-cut driven ‘Lawson Boom’ of the 1980s, is generally considered to 
have been caused by an increase in interest rates to reduce inflation, and the entry in 1990 
of the UK into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which also required an 
increase in interest rates to maintain a high value of the pound.100  Although this recession 
once again hit manufacturing, it had a major depressive impact on the service economy, 
including finance. The origins of the 2008-2010 downturn, widely termed the Great 
Recession, involving a proportionate drop in GDP similar to that in the Great Depression of 
the early-1930s, was the direct result of a major credit squeeze following the banking 
meltdown that originated mainly in the United States, but which quickly spread through the 
global financial system to the UK and beyond (see Tooze, 2018).  In the view of many 
observers, the recovery from the financial crisis was then delayed by the introduction of fiscal 
consolidation (austerity) policies by the UK Government in 2010 (see, for example, Krugman, 
2015; Coppola, 2017).  As Figure 7.1 shows, as far as output is concerned, the recent Great 
Recession turned out to be the longest on record, with GDP not returning to its pre-crisis level 
until six years after the downturn began. 
Recessionary shocks are not just about falls in output, of course, but also impact on the 
labour market, as employers lay off workers, stop hiring, put workers on short time, and even 
delete jobs altogether. In general, recessionary downturns in employment tend to lag the drop 
in output and then take longer to recover. However, the decline in employment in the 2008-
2010 recession was much less than would be expected given the scale and duration of the 
contraction in output.  This has been the subject of some debate, with explanations ranging 
from the idea that many workers were willing to bear real wage cuts in return for keeping their 
jobs; to the argument that because firms were in good financial shape when the crisis broke, 
 
99 Many have argued that the Thatcher Government’s tightening of monetary and fiscal policy in the early-1980s recession 
served to intensify the depth of the downturn.   
100 The UK was forced to leave the ERM in 1992 after the Government was unable to keep the pound sterling above its agreed 
lower limit against the Deutsche Mark. 
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they were able to hoard labour; to the argument that while full-time employee jobs declined 
sharply this was in fact largely offset by actual growth in part-time and self-employed jobs 
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010; Coulter, 2016).  In the empirical part of this paper, however, 
we focus on output. But whether we measure a recessionary shock in terms of its impact on 
an economy’s output or employment, or indeed some other key indicator, there are obviously 
two main phases involved: the downturn, or the economy’s resistance to the shock, and the 
upturn, or the economy’s recoverability from it. Both are central to the idea of resilience (see 
Martin and Sunley, 2015; Martin, 2018).   
Figure 7.1: The Last Four Recessionary Shocks to the UK Economy (With the Great 
Depression for Comparison) 
Source of data: Office for National Statistics 
Note: The dates refer to the interval between the year of the onset of the recession and the 
year in which national output (GDP) returned to its pre-recession level. 
7.3 A Resilience Perspective on Recessionary Shocks 
As the notion of resilience has spread across various social sciences in recent years, so it 
has acquired a variety of interpretations and specifications (Martin and Sunley, 2015; Modica 
and Reggiani, 2015; Martin, 2018).  There are in fact several definitions, and indeed some 
ambiguity of terminology.  In the overview by Walker et al (2004), for example, resilience is 
defined as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing 
change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” 
(p. 4).  Even in this much-quoted definition there is room for ambiguity, between the idea of 
system ‘reorganization and change’ on the one hand, and the ‘retention of the same function, 
























































seems unlikely, in an economic system, for reorganization not to involve some change, 
possibly considerable change, in both structure and identity.    
In one version of resilience – so-called ‘engineering resilience’ – the focus is on how quickly 
a system, once disturbed, returns to its pre-shock state. The latter is often assumed to be an 
equilibrium state. However, strictly speaking, such an equilibrist perspective is not necessary: 
all that is required is that the system returns to its pre-shock state or path, whether that state 
or path was an equilibrium one or not.  This essentially ‘bounce back’ definition or type of 
resilience resonates most closely with the conventional view of shocks (including recessions) 
in the economics literature.  In the Friedman (1968, 1993) ‘plucking model’, for example, 
shocks such as recessions are likened to temporary downward ‘plucks’ of output from an 
upward-sloping trend ‘full employment growth path’, or ‘maximum feasible output path’, and 
in recovery output springs back to this original trend (see also Claeys and Walsh, 2015). 
According to his schema, recessionary shocks thus have a characteristic ‘V-shape’ (b-c-d in 
Figure 7.2), with reversion back to the (upward sloping) full employment growth path (a-b-d-
e): 
The cycles are symmetrical about their troughs: each contraction is of the same amplitude as 
the succeeding expansion [recovery]. But there is no necessary connection between the 
amplitude of an expansion [recovery] and the amplitude of the succeeding contraction ... 
Expansions [recoveries] would be uncorrelated with succeeding contractions, but contractions 
would be correlated with succeeding expansions [recoveries]… (Friedman 1968, p. 3).  
Implicit in this statement is the idea that, to use our terminology, recoverability from a 
recessionary shock should be positively correlated with resistance to it. Friedman also 
assumes that recessions have no permanent impact on the long-run growth path of an 
economy.  
A second definition of resilience, often labelled as ‘ecological resilience’, and the one 
seemingly preferred by Walker et al (op cit; see also Folke et al, 2010), is more concerned 
with the absorptive capacity of a system in the face of a shock. Drawing on panarchy theory 
and ideas from the theory of complex adaptive systems, the assumption is that many systems 
have multiple alternative states (or ‘attractors’), that is different possible combinations of 
components and resources. This implies that a shock or perturbation can bring the system 
over an absorptive threshold that marks the limit of the ‘basin of attraction’ or stability domain 
of the original state, causing the system to be attracted to a contrasting or alternative stable 
state. This is qualitatively different from returning to the original state, and involves adaptation 
of components, structures, functions and resource use. Provided such adaptation is 
successful, in the sense that the system moves to a favourable alternative state, then its 
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resilience can be described as ‘bounce forward’, rather than bounce back.  If, however, the 
system loses key resources and components it could be pushed to a new state that is less 
favourable than its original state, in which case it would be deemed to have negative 
resilience. 





This type of resilience also has its counterpart in economics, specifically those models of 
shocks and perturbations that allow for the possibility that a recession or similar disturbance 
can have permanent (especially) negative effects on an economy’s growth path.   Such a 
possibility is usually referred to as hysteresis (see for example, Romer, 2001), or remanence 
(Cross, 1993; Setterfield, 2010). In such a case, output does not revert to its pre-shock trend, 
and instead the trend itself is shifted, typically downwards. In Hamilton’s (1989) exposition of 
this phenomenon, the economy undergoes a regime shift, in which it resumes its pre-shock 
growth rate coming out of recession, but remains on a path (c-f in Figure 7.2) that is parallel 
to but below the original trend (a-b-d-e): what we might call a ‘Hamilton negative hysteretic 
recession’.  A more pathological instance of negative hysteresis would be where a recession 
is so deep it destroys so much of an economy’s productive base that it shifts the economy 
onto a new growth path that is both lower and less steep (c-g), that is to a lower growth rate, 
than the original. Such an economy may take a very long time for its output to recover to its 
pre-recession level (b). On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that a recession sets off 
various ‘creative destruction’ processes which gives the economy a phase of rapid recovery 
out of recession before settling down at a growth path parallel to and above its pre-recession 
path (c-d-h-i), or what could be termed a ‘Hamilton positive hysteretic recession’. If the 
reorientation of the economy towards new growth sectors, technologies, products, markets 



























































maintained as a new growth path, a trend rate of growth greater than the pre-recession trend 
rate (c-d-h-j).101   
These are of course stylized examples, and in practice actual responses to recessions and 
similar shocks may be much more complex and variable.  However, interestingly, in their 
analysis of national-level shocks among no less than 192 countries over the period 1960 to 
the early-2000s, Cerra and Saxena (2005) find very few countries that exhibit the simple 
Friedman type of response to recessionary and other shocks. Rather, in the vast majority of 
countries, recessions have followed the negative Hamilton type of pattern (b-c-f in Figure 
7.2), and some the more pathological pattern (b-c-g). In other words, recessionary and other 
contractions would seem to have permanent negative effects on a country’s level of output.  
Very few countries were found to experience positive hysteretic responses, where shocks 
are followed by rates of output growth higher than the pre-shock average rate, that is post 
shock growth paths of the sort b-c-h-i, or b-c-j in Figure 7.2.  An important consequence of 
these findings is that depending on the depth of contraction experienced by countries in a 
recession, and the speed of recovery, such downturn events can be a significant cause of 
long-run divergence among national economies.  Indeed, Cerra and Saxena (op cit) find that 
poorer countries (as measured in terms of per capita GDP) tend to be less resistant to major 
recessions than are richer countries, and while the recoverability of poor countries tends to 
be greater than that of rich countries, it is not sufficiently higher to offset the divergence that 
occurs during the recessionary downturns. In other words, there would appear to be a 
relationship between a nation’s resilience to economic shocks and its long-run growth path. 
At the same time, it might be conjectured that an economy with an inferior growth path will 
as a consequence be more vulnerable to shocks. Resilience and long-term growth and 
development may thus be inextricably and recursively interwoven, and perhaps should be 
theorized as such. 
These are findings that have obvious relevance for the analysis of the reaction of cities and 
regions to economic shocks, and for the evolution of spatial disparities in economic prosperity 
and performance over time. Figure 7.3, for example, shows a hypothetical case where three 
cities have differential resistance to and recoverability from shocks, and where the rate of 
recoverability is positively correlated with resistance to downturn.  The effect of these 
differences in resilience in this instance is to cause a progressive widening of economic 
disparities between the three cities over time.  The key point is that economic cycles are not 
merely exogenous transient disturbances to an economy’s growth path, but an integral 
dynamic that shapes how that path evolves over time. In a spatial – inter-city or inter-regional 
 
101 Indeed, some writers have started using the term ‘transformational resilience’ to depict. 
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– context, recessionary shocks are not autonomous to, but part of, the very the process of 
geographically uneven development. 





7.4 The Resilience of British Cities to Four Recessions 
Although there is a growing literature on regional and city resilience, there is as yet no single, 
generally agreed methodology for how it should be measured. Several different approaches 
can be distinguished (see Table 7.1, which also contains examples of the various methods 
that have been used). As even the stylized anatomies in Figure 7.2 highlight, the notion of 
resilience necessarily involves the specification of a counterfactual or expected position, that 
is some reference point against which to measure both resistance and recoverability.  There 
are several possible approaches to this issue.  One would be to project the pre-shock growth 
path forward using, for example, statistical time series models or some appropriate structural 
model, to derive an estimate (counterfactual) of where the economy would have been had a 
shock not occurred.  This does depend, however, on a sufficiently long pre-shock period from 
which to fit a model reliable enough to generate the predicted counterfactual position or path.   
If the pre-shock period is not long enough, an alternative would be to use a number of 
previous pre-shock or recovery periods to estimate such a model.  However, this would 
require the assumption that the dynamics of those successive recovery periods remains 
unchanged over long periods of time, from one economic cycle to the next, an assumption 



























If the focus is on comparing cities or regions directly one with another, a simpler method is to 
use the national resistance to and recovery from a shock as the benchmark. This is the 
approach adopted here.  Given that a major national recession is an economy-wide event, a 
logical counterfactual or expectation is that each city (or region) making up that economy 
should react in the same way as the macro-aggregate. The national reaction is thus the 
benchmark or reference against which all cities (or regions) can be compared.  Differences 
from this benchmark are therefore an indicator of each city’s (or region’s) relative resilience.  
More specifically, our two measures of resilience for a given city, c, are 
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where ∆𝔼  𝑌𝑐) is the ‘expected’ change of output in city c during a recession or recovery 
of length k years, given as   
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and 𝑌𝐺𝐵
   is the national (Great Britain) level of output in year t.   
By definition, both measures are centred on zero, in which case a city would have the same 
resistance and recoverability as the national economy.  One possible criticism of this 
approach is that this type of counterfactual ignores local context and conditions, that is 
geography, in its construction (in contrast to, say, city-specific counterfactuals calculated 
using each city’s own pre-shock performance history as captured by a statistical time series 
model or structural model of some sort). However, a counter-argument in defence of the 
method used here is that the measures defined above are ‘cause free’, and that the task then 
becomes one of seeking to account for the observed differences between each city’s 
resilience and that of the national economy precisely in terms of local factors and conditions.   
The focus here is on the resilience of the 85 British largest cities to the four major recessions 
discussed in Section 7.2 above.  These cities account for 82 percent of national (Great 
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Britain) output.102 The recessionary shocks are defined as the peak to trough contraction in 
national output (Gross Value Added, GVA). The recoveries are taken to be the periods 
between each trough and the next cyclical peak (that is, before the onset of the next 
recessionary shock).  The cities are defined in terms of travel to work areas (using the latest, 
2011, definition).103 These have a reasonably high level of ‘self-containment’ as functioning 
labour market areas. The data consist of annual GVA series from 1971 to 2015, measured 
in constant 2013 prices.104 
Table 7.1: Methods of Measuring City and Regional Resilience  







Mainly narrative based, using simple 
descriptive data, 
interviews with key actors, 
interrogation of policies, etc. May be 
comparative (eg two cities or regions) 
 
 
Simmie and Martin (2010, 
Cambridge and Swansea), Treado 
(2010; Pittsburgh); Wolfe (2010; 
Ottawa and Waterloo), Hill et al 
(2012. Seattle), Cowell (2013, 
Cleveland), Enelow (2013, Detroit), Evans and 
Karecha (2013, Munich), Hu and Hassink 




Singular or composite measures, often 
relative to some ‘reference position. 
May involve ‘dashboards’, using key 
economic indicators. Often 
comparative (several cities, regions), 
to produce ‘resilience rankings’ of 
cities and regions 
 
Martin (2012, UK regions), 
Augustine et al (2013), Han and 
Goetz (2015, US counties), 
Rockefeller Foundation (2015, 
World cities), Martin et al (2016, UK 
regions), Salvati et al (2016, Italian 
cities), Angulo et al (Spanish 
regions), Ibl et al (2018, EU 
regions), Sensier (2018, EU regions), Spencer 




ARIMA type models (with dummy ies 
for shock and recovery periods) used 
to generate counterfactual or expected 
positions of city or region assuming no 
shock, against which actual outcomes 
Fingleton, Garretsen and Martin, 
(2012, UK regions), D’Lima and 
Medda (2015, London) 
 
 
102 Our data do not include Belfast; hence we use the Great Britain output series as the reference benchmark, rather than the 
UK equivalent.  
103 Travel to work areas are defined as those spatial units in which typically at least 75 percent of local workers also live.  
104 The data derive from a larger ESRC-funded project on city economic evolutions in the UK (ESRC (ES/N006135/1). A 
description of the data and their construction can be found for example in Martin et al (2018).  Other annual data series for these 
cities, for example on employment, productivity, occupations, skills, and wages, have also been constructed for the same cities 
over the same period.  
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Used either to estimate 
counterfactual positions or 
which include dummies for 
shocks among regressors. 
Used to generate impulse 
responses or error corrections 
type measures of dissipation 
of shock. Also includes models that 
regress resilience indices on selected 
‘causal’ variables 
 
Doran and Fingleton (2013, US 
cities), Fingleton and Palombi 
(2013, British towns), Fingleton, 
Garretsen and Martin (2015, EU 
regions, Salvati et al (2016; 
Italian regions), Pudelko et al (2018, German 
regions), Kitsos and Bishop (2018, Britain’s 
local authority districts), Sprague (2018, US 
counties) 
 
The resilience results for these 85 cities for the four recessions studied here are shown in 
Figure 7.4, in which the cities have also been divided into ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ groups.105  
Several key features stand out.  First, in the first two  
Figure 7.4: Resilience of British Cities to Four Recessions 
 
 
105 We follow the conventional division of Britain into ‘north’ and ‘south’. Thus, Southern cities are those in the following regions: 
London, the South East, South West, East of England and East Midlands. Northern cities are those in the remaining regions of 














































Source: Calculations using authors’ data 
 
recessions of 1973-1975 and 1979-1981, there was a positive relationship across cities 
between resistance to recessionary shock and recoverability from it: those cities that were 
most resistant to the national downturn also tended to recover faster from it, and vice versa.   
However, in the second two recessions of 1990-91 and 2008-2010, the relationship had 
become negative, the more so in the most recent of these two recessions: those cities least 
resistant to the national downturn tended to recover faster from it than those cities that were 
less impacted by recessionary contraction.  There has likewise been a steady change over 
the course of the last four economic cycles in the relationship across cities between the speed 
of recovery from one recession and the scale of downturn in the next (see Table 7.2): those 
cities that experienced greater recoverability from the recession of 1973-75 also proved on 
average to be the most resistant to the next recession of 1979-81. But the correlation between 
recovery from the 1979-81 recession and resistance to that of 1990-91, though positive, was 
much reduced, and between recovery from the downturn of 1990-91 and resistance to the 
Great Recession of 2008-2010 was negative.    
The evidence thus points to a clear shift or change in the resilience of cities over time. This 

















































growth and productivity performance of these cities over the past 45 years (see Tyler at el, 
2017; Martin et al, 2018). Clearly, economic resilience need not be a fixed attribute of cities 
(or regions), but can evolve and change from one shock to the next. This is not surprising, 
given that the causes of recessions and other shocks varies, one to another, as noted above, 
and that city economies themselves evolve and change over time, thus altering their 
vulnerability and reaction to successive disturbances when these occur.      
Table 7.2:  Relationships across British Cities between Resistance and Recoverability for 
Four Recessions  
 
  Resistance to Recession 






















1975-1979 0.482** 0.682**   
1981-1990  0.387** 0.149  
1991-2007   -0.196 -0.241* 
2009-2015    -0.269* 
Source: Calculations using authors’ data 
Note: *=significant at p=0.05, **significant at p=0.01 
 
A second feature of Figure 7.4 is the comparison between northern cities and southern ones. 
In the recession of the mid-1970s, differences in resilience between the two groups of cities 
were relatively small, with most cities not deviating markedly from the national response to 
downturn and recovery, and with both groups containing a small number of highly resilient 
cities (in the top right hand quadrant of the plot).  In the deep recession of the early-1980s, 
however, a clear distinction is evident between less resilient northern cities and more resilient 
southern ones.  There is also a greater spread in relative resilience across the 85 cities, 
compared to the preceding recession: more specifically, cities varied much more in their 
resistance to the recession than in their recovery from it. This dispersion in resistance 
increased further in the shock of the early-1990s, though the tendency for southern cities to 
be more resilient than their northern counterparts is still partially evident. With respect to the 
recent deep recession of 2008-2010, not only was there less dispersion in resistance across 
cities, but the distinction between more resilient southern cities and less resilient northern 
ones reappears more clearly. This distinction is most evident in terms of recoverability. The 
majority of southern cities that had below average resistance to the downturn nevertheless 
had above average recoverability from it (upper left quadrant of plot), whereas those northern 
cities that were badly impacted also had below average recoverability (lower left quadrant). 
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Testing for the similarity between average growth rates across the cities during the recovery 
period 2010-2015 and their pre-recession growth rates (1991-2008) yields the three patterns 
shown in Figure 7.5, and reveals how most northern cities emerged on a lowered growth path 
of the sort a-b-c-g in Figure 7.2.  In contrast, the majority of southern cities recovered with a 
growth rate equal to or greater than their pre-recession growth rate (a-b-c-f or a-b-c-h in 
Figure 7.2). 
            Figure 7.5:  City Recovery from the Great Recession of 2008-2010 
 
 Source: Calculations using authors’ data 
 
Thirdly, the resilience of London across these four recessions is also noteworthy.  In the 
1973-75 recession both its resistance and its recoverability were below that of the national 
economy as a whole. Then one of the country’s major centres of manufacturing, it behaved 
much like many of the country’s northern industrial cities. Over subsequent recessions, 
London’s resilience has improved, possibly because its economy shifted substantially away 
from manufacturing to services, and especially business and financial services, and, from the 
early-1990s onwards, because of its advantageous position arising from the creation of a 
European Single Market and its attraction of skilled EU migrant workers.  While many 
northern cities likewise deindustrialized over the 1970s and 1980s, they were much less 
successful in developing compensating service activity.  From the mid-1980s onwards, 
London consolidated its role as one of the world’s leading financial centres, so that perhaps 
not surprisingly when the global financial crisis hit in 2008-2009 London was widely expected 
to be particularly badly hit. But such predictions proved mistaken: London turned out to be 
much more resilient than the economy as a whole (Figure 7.4; see also Overman, 2011).  Its 




































in what appears to have been a process of steady improvement in resilience across the last 
four economic cycles. 
Fourthly, taking this north-south pattern of resilience, particularly in recoverability, one stage 
further, Table 7.3 reports the correlation between a city’s resilience and its distance from 
London (in km).  What is striking is that while the relationship between city resistance and 
distance from London varies with the nature of each recession, city recoverability consistently 
declines with distance from London, especially in the last three recessions, even in those 
recessions in which southern cities proved less resistant to the downturn (as in 1979-81 and 
2008-10).   
Table 7.3:  Correlation between City Resilience (Resistance and Recoverability) across 






































RECOV  -0.042  -0.417**  -0.279**  -0.468** 
 
Source: Calculations using authors’ data 
Note: The distance between London and any given city is simple straight line distance, measured in km. 
*=significant at p=0.05, **significant at p=0.01 
 
There is clear evidence that the closer, geographically, is a city to London, the greater its 
recoverability from a recessionary shock tends to be.  This was notably the case with the 
recovery from the last deep recession. It would appear that the dynamism of the London 
economy extends out in a sort of ‘sphere of influence’ that tends to benefit those cities nearest 
to it. 
Finally, it was mentioned in Section 7.3 that the resilience of cities (or regions, or indeed 
nations) to shocks may influence their long-run growth paths, and possibly contribute to 
observed patterns of convergence or divergence among cities (and regions and nations).  
This can be illustrated by comparing the growth paths of London and Liverpool (Figure 7.6).  
In each of the four last recessions, Liverpool’s recovery of output to its pre-recession peak 
has taken longer, and the rate of recovery has been slower, than in the case of London. 
Indeed, in the recessions of 1973-5 and 1979-81 Liverpool’s output actually failed to return 
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to its pre-recession peak before the next recessionary shock occurred. As a consequence, 
following each recession the growth paths of the two cities have diverged, with London pulling 
progressively ahead of Liverpool. London’s greater resilience, both its resistance to 
recessionary downturns and its faster and stronger recovery from them, has contributed to 
its superior long-run growth performance.   
Figure 7.6: Differential Resilience to Recessions and Long-Run Growth: London and Liverpool 
Compared  
  
Source: Based on authors’ data  
 
The relationship between resilience and long-run growth is, of course, highly likely to be 
recursive. A buoyant long-run growth performance embues a city’s firms, workforce and 
institutions with the confidence that if a shock occurs, the city is highly likely to recover quickly, 
and that same confidence is likely to shape behaviour (investment, workforce retention, and 
so on) in a positive way to bring about that very outcome. Conversely, for a city that has a 
sluggish or stagnant growth path. How long-run growth shapes resilience and how resilience 
shapes long-run growth is thus an issue that merits detailed research.   
7.5 Why Might Cities Differ in Economic Resilience?  
The brief reference above to the possible effect of changing economic structure on city 
resilience raises the obvious question of what determines the economic resilience of cities 
and regions. Given that our measure of city resilience uses the reaction of the national 
economy as a city’s expected reaction, variations of each city’s actual reaction from the 




























































































shaping resilience.   Like the measurement of resilience, however, there is no agreed theory 
of economic resilience, of what its determinants might be. Nevertheless, the literature on 
regional and city economic growth and development is suggestive of a number of factors or 
features that might influence, positively or negatively, a city’s resistance to and recoverability 
from a major economic shock (see Table 4; also Martin and Sunley, 2015).  These include, 
for example, various aspects of a city’s economic structure and specialisation, its export 
orientation, the composition, productivity and competitiveness of its firms, its skill base, 
access to business finance, city size and the extent of agglomeration economies, and a city’s 
institutional set-up and economic governance arrangements.  
Perhaps the most discussed factor thought to influence the economic performance of cities 
and regions, and thence possibly their resilience to economic shocks, is their sectoral 
structure.  There are several dimensions to this.  While many analysts argue that sectoral 
specialisation is the key driver of regional and city economic success (for example, Storper, 
et al, 2015), the evidence in support of this claim is far from persuasive. In fact, from a 
resilience point of view, it can be equally argued that a diversified industrial structure is more 
conducive to city resilience: as Davies and Tonts (2010) put it 
The general contention is that those places with diverse economies are more 
resilient in socio-economic terms than those with a narrow economic base (p. 232).  
Given that different sectors of activity have different elasticities of demand, different labour 
and capital intensities, different exposures to overseas markets and competition, for example, 
they can be expected to respond to a given shock, say a recession, to different degrees. 
Thus, a varied or diverse structure should, ceteris paribus, provide better resistance to and 








106 There is a direct parallel here with investment portfolio theory, wherein a diversified investment strategy is often argued to 
provide a better hedge against adverse market movements than a narrowly based portfolio. For an early discussion of the 
relevance of this idea for regional development see Conroy (1975). 
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Table 7.4:  Some Possible Influences on City Economic Resilience  
Type of Influence Possible Effects 
Economic structure 














Scale and nature of export base 
The more diversified (more specialized) the city’s economic 
structure, the more (less) resilient it will be to shocks.  
The greater a city’s dependence of manufacturing, the less 
resilient it will be to shocks, given this sector’s traditionally 
higher elasticity of demand. 
The greater a city’s dependence on services, the more resilient it 
will be to shocks, given this sector’s lower elasticity of demand. 
The more localized (geographically dispersed) are city’s 
industrial supply chains, the less (more) resilient it will be to 
shocks. 
 
Given the traditional stability of public services over the economic 
cycle, the greater a city’s dependence on public sector the more 
resilient it will be shocks.  Conversely, large-scale cuts in local 
public services associated with fiscal consolidation policies may 
reduce the ‘buffering’ role of the public sector. 
 
The impact on a city’s resilience will depend on the nature of its 
export base: it may shield a city from internal (domestic) shocks, 
but may expose it to demand or other shocks originating in its 
overseas export markets. 
  
















The more productive a city’s firms, the more resilient they will 
be to shocks since they should have a competitive advantage 
over less productive cities. 
 
A high innovation rate, which helps drive firm competitiveness, 
should make for enhanced firm adaptability and greater city 
resilience.   
 
The presence of high-skilled, well-qualified workers is widely 
thought to influence a city’s economic dynamism; thus, to the 
extent that such workers are more productive, and their skills 





























Skilled workers are more likely to be able to move into the more 
dynamic parts of a city’s economy and thus assist recovery from 
shocks. 
 
A steady in-migration of skilled workers may thus improve a 
city’s economic resilience, while, conversely, the sustained 
outflow of skilled workers could well erode a city’s resilience  
 
Large cities are claimed to benefit from various agglomeration 
economies that help make local firms more productive and 
innovative, and that attract high-skilled workers. Large cities 
also tend to be more economically diverse. Together these 
features should make larger cities more resilient to shocks.  
 
The availability and commitment of local sources of loan finance 
or capital, including low costs and favourable terms of credit, 
may help small local firms to weather downturns and maintain 
or re-orientate production and employment more easily than 
under conditions where finance is restricted. 
 
A city with a well-organised, consensual and strategic economic 
governance structure committed to short- and long-run policies 
aimed at supporting businesses and jobs may improve a city’s 
resistance to and/or its recoverability from shocks.  
 
 
Likewise, a diversified structure may be more resilient than one characterised by ‘related 
variety’ (Frenken et al, 2007), since by definition, the latter indicates certain 
interdependencies and complementarities among sectors, while diversity is more likely to 
ensure a degree of sectoral modularity (independence or loose coupling) which provides an 
element of ‘buffering’ against shocks spreading from one local sector to another.107 
Nonetheless, certain detailed aspects of structure may be important in shaping a city’s 
economic resilience.  It is a commonly observed fact that manufacturing activities (and 
construction industries) tend to be more sensitive to economic shocks and cyclical 
movements than are most services. This is often attributed to the greater elasticity of 
 
107 The notion of modularity, used in the theory of complex systems theory, refers to the tightness of coupling or interdependence 
between a system’s components. The greater the degree of modularity, the weaker the coupling, and the more flexible the 
system is to reconfiguration and adaptation (for a discussion, and a business application, see Schilling, 2000).    
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manufactured goods to changes in demand and prices, as compared to consumer and 
personal services. Thus, cities that have a greater dependence on manufacturing might be 
expected to be less resistant to recessionary shocks than those more orientated towards 
service activities.  More particularly, knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) are now 
widely associated with economic success, although how resistant they are to recessionary 
shocks may depend on the precise nature and orientation of such activities, and how they 
relate to other sectors of activity, both local and non-local. 
Recent discussions of industrial organization have argued that what matters more for the 
geographies of economic development in today’s globalized world is not sectoral structure 
but functional structure, that is a city’s or region’s position and role in an industry’s supply 
chains, production networks and supply-chain trade (Baldwin, 2018).  The trend towards 
geographically dispersed and distributed supply chains - often on a global scale – has had 
several possible implications for the economic resilience of cities and regions. For one thing, 
it means that those cities and regions that host an industry’s high-order functions and tasks 
– its corporate head offices, research and development functions, advanced manufacturing 
stages of production, and the like -  will tend to be more robust in the face of recessionary 
type shocks than those cities that focus more on routine functions, and lower order positions 
in supply chains and value added networks, to which the brunt of instabilities in production 
will be ‘exported’.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct data on the functional 
economic structure of British cities, especially back to the 1970s and 1980s, and in the 
analysis below city economic structure is defined in sectoral terms.  
In recent years, considerable attention has been directed to the role that innovation plays in 
local economic growth and development, and to the fact that both innovation (and patenting 
and R&D) and the capacity of firms to adopt and absorb new technological advances, appear 
to vary significantly between cities and regions.  The typical argument is that places with high 
rates of product and process innovation not only exhibit faster economic growth, but are also 
more adaptable in the face of shifting markets and competition.  Other things being equal, 
such places might then be expected to be more resilience to shocks, although much may 
depend on the particular sectors, products and technologies in which local firms are 
specialized. The success over time of innovative and high-tech places is not guaranteed of 
course.  High-tech places and clusters may ‘overheat’, with high rates of inflation of housing 
and land, for example, or may even be prone to speculative investment and overvaluation of 
assets, as happened in the bursting of the global high-tech (NASDAQ) bubble in 2000.  
Another aspect of a city’s structure concerns the scale and role of public sector activities. 
Traditionally, public sector services (such as health, police, utilities, social services, and the 
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like), have tended to be relatively immune to recessionary shocks, since they are no less 
essential in (and indeed may become more necessary) in periods of economic downturn than 
they are during expansionary phases. The greater the dependence of a city on public sector 
activities and industries, the more resistant its economy might be expected to be to 
recessionary downturns. Until recently, the public sector had grown steadily in most 
advanced countries over the post-war period, so this might be expected to have acted to 
cushion cities and regions from recessionary downturns.  However, in response to the global 
financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008-2010, some western states - and notably among 
them, the UK - introduced draconian fiscal consolidation (austerity) policies which have led 
to severe cuts in both central and local public services, so that the public sector may no longer 
provide the cushion against economic shocks it once did.  
Much has been made in recent years of the importance of skilled and well educated workers 
for city prosperity and growth (for example, Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Glaeser, et al, 2011; 
Moretti, 2013).  Cities that attract and retain skilled labour in turn are argued to attract 
productive and innovative firms, which then attract yet more skilled workers, and so on. Other 
things being equal, a skilled workforce will tend to be more flexible and adaptable, more 
productive, and potentially more entrepreneurial, which should, again ceteris paribus, make 
firms themselves better able to adjust, adapt and reorient their production and markets if 
subjected to disruptive shocks and economic contractions. In recessions, skilled workers 
themselves are also more likely to be kept on by firms than are unskilled employees.  Cities 
that contain large shares of skilled workers and large shares of jobs in higher level 
occupations might then be expected to display greater resilience to shocks than ‘unskilled’ 
cities. 108 
The role of migration may play a role in this context. To the extent that migration is selective, 
in that it is the more skilled and more enterprising workers who are more geographically 
mobile, then those cities that experience high rates of in-migration of such workers will not 
only be more successful economically, but as a consequence be more resilient to shocks. 
Conversely, less economically successful cities are likely to experience sustained out-
migration of their more skilled workers, which will not only reduce their potential for long-run 
growth but also lower their resilience to shocks.  The key point here is that the movement of 
skilled workers between cities, itself in part a response to the differences in economic 
performance and opportunities between cities, may not only serve to accentuate those very 
differences, but likewise reinforce differences in resilience among those same cities. 
 




Unfortunately, severe data limitation on skilled migration for our city areas prevented the 
analysis of the role of this factor. 
Another argument found in the urban economics literature is that larger cities benefit from a 
host of agglomeration economies which confer productivity advantages to the firms there. 
For example, it has been estimated that a doubling of city size results in an increase in the 
level of productivity of typically between 2-5 percent (OECD, 2015).  Whether the scale of 
this ‘productivity premium’ associated with city size is considered significant might well be 
debated, but one implication is that, other things being equal, larger cities might be better 
positioned to weather recessions.  Larger cities are also likely to have more diversified 
economies than smaller cities, and to contain major concentrations of skilled workers and 
higher order functions and occupations, including knowledge intensive business services.  
Yet further, large cities (especially national and regional capitals) might be expected to 
contain sizeable constellations of financial institutions, so that firms located there may have 
easier access to credit, venture funding and other finance to enable them to survive during 
major economic downturns and propel growth during subsequent recovery phases of the 
economic cycle.   
One further factor that may influence a city’s resilience to shocks has to do with the presence 
and effectiveness of a local economic governance system, including both public sector 
authorities and private sector organizations, that undertake coherent strategic policies to 
support local business development and employment. Typically, the scope for specific short-
term countercyclical interventions is limited at the city scale, unless considerable local 
autonomy in such matters exists and significant resources are available. Rather, local 
economic governance arrangements and strategic policies have most potential impact over 
the longer term, through such interventions as infrastructure provision, urban regeneration 
schemes, training programmes and the like, which improve the local business environment 
and attractiveness of a city to firms and skilled workers; in other words, in helping to build a 
city’s inherent long-run economic resilience. Research also suggests that this effect may be 
lessened if a city’s governance structure is fragmented, with policy powers divided among 
several local authorities (Ahrend et al, 2017).   Measuring the scale, intensity or ‘quality’ of 
local institutions, policies and economic governance structures is far from easy however, let 
alone isolating their specific impacts on city economic performance and resilience. Moreover, 
the UK has one of the most centralized fiscal and political systems of any advanced economy, 
and cities have limited autonomy of action and limited local resources to undertake major 
economic development programmes. In addition, most of the key institutional structures and 
policy programmes that have been imposed by central government to regenerate and 
develop urban areas over the decades have not only been top-down but characterized by 
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considerable churn over time, making long-term goals and impacts difficult to secure.  
Although a new central government initiative of devolving certain powers and finance to 
selected cities has recently been introduced, it is far too soon to judge how far and in what 
ways this policy will influence city resilience, and hence this development is of little relevance 
to the four recessionary shocks that are of interest here.   For these reasons, it was not 
possible to devise a meaningful or consistent measure of city governance, and so this factor 
is omitted in the analysis below.     
Many of the factors outlined above are obviously interrelated, and may themselves be 
influenced by how a city or region reacts to recessions: this is the issue of the potential 
interdependence between resilience to shocks and long-run development referred to above.  
Ascertaining the specific importance of individual ‘causal’ influences on the observed patterns 
of city resilience may not, therefore, be straightforward. City size, for example, is likely to be 
strongly correlated with economic diversity, productivity and high-order occupations and 
skills. Nor is the possible or predicted impact of certain factors necessarily unambiguous. 
Take, for example, a city’s export base. A competitive export base, especially serving 
expanding overseas markets, can drive a city’s output growth and in turn investment and 
productivity, making for a dynamic city economy that will be shielded to some extent from 
recessions originating in the national domestic economy. On the other hand, large-scale 
exposure to overseas markets may also make a city particularly vulnerable to disruptions 
originating in those markets.  The loss of a major overseas market in a key sector in a city 
may seriously undermine that city’s economy as a whole, regardless of the state of the 
national economy.  A high dependence on public sector activities may also work in two ways, 
giving some buffer against the economic cycle (assuming an absence of public expenditure 
austerity programmes), but at the same time possibly ‘crowding out’ a thriving private sector 
economy capable of generating new firm formation, innovation and productivity advance on 
a scale necessary to drive dynamic and adaptive growth, and thence resilience.  
The list of possible factors analysed here is given in Table 7.5. Very severe data limitations 
constrain the range of determinants of the sort discussed above that can be explored in the 
case of British cities, especially extending back to the 1970s and 1980s, and certain 
compromises have to be made.  The analysis that follows must therefore be regarded as 
merely exploratory. All of the variables used in the regressions below, and described in Table 
7.2, were constructed as part of the larger project referred to earlier.  The index of 












  and 𝑠𝐺𝐵,𝑗
   are the shares of sector j of total employment in city c and the national 
(Great Britain) economy respectively, in year t, calculated for an 82-sector level of sectoral 
disaggregation. It is only possible to construct skilled occupational data for our cities back to 
1981. However, perusal of the time series over 1981-2015 reveals that the occupational skill 
mix across cities changes only slowly over time, so that any errors in using the 1981 data in 
regression analyses of the recession of 1973-76 are not likely to be that large.  The patent 
data are based on OECD data for local NUTS3 areas, and have been converted to our city 
travel to work areas.  
Table 7.5: Variables used in City Resilience Regressions 
Variable Abbreviation Period for which data 
constructed 
Share of city employment in Manufacturing industry           MANSH 1971-2015, annually 
Share of city employment in KIBS           KIBSSH 1971-2015, annually 
Krugman city specialisation index           KSI 1971-2015, annually 
Share of city employment in public sector activities           PUBSH 1971-2015, annually 
Share of city employment in export intensive sectors           EXPSH 1971-2015, annually 
City labor productivity (GVA per employed worker)           PROD 1971-2015, annually 
Share of city employment in high-skill (Level 4) 
occupations 
          SKILLSH 1981-2015, annually 
City innovation proxy (patents per million employed)           PAT 1990-2012, annually 
Size of city (population) 
City population density 
          POPSIZE 
          POPDEN 
1971-2015, annually 
1971-2015, annually 
Distance from London (km)           DISLOND Constant  
   
 
Although the OECD data cover the period 1977-2015, the data prior to 1990 are not 
consistent or reliable, as many of the raw figures do not have a location identifier, so that it 
was not possible to allocate them to any particular city. Thus, only the regressions for the last 
two of the four recessions include this variable.  Two variables are used to proxy for 
agglomeration effects, namely population size and population density.  Distance from London 
is measured as straight line distance between city centroids.  
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The trends in a selection of these regressor variables over the study period are shown in 
Appendix C, and are worthy of comment.   The degree of long-run structural and economic 
change that has occurred across British cities over the 1971-2015 period has been 
pronounced. The marked structural shift of employment out of manufacturing and the growth 
of employment in knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) is evident across almost all 
cities (Figures C.1 and C.2), as is the expansion of public sector employment (Figure C.3). 
In fact, overall, cities have become less specialised since the beginning of the 1970s, and 
have steadily converged in sectoral composition (Figure C.4).  Perhaps reflecting this, the 
share of employment in export-intensive sectors has fallen across almost all cities, and 
likewise has become more similar from city to city (Figure C.5). The share of high-skilled 
occupations in total employment has increased across all of the cities, (Figure C.6), as has 
labour productivity, though unevenly (Figure C.7).  Although the data on patenting activity is 
limited, it suggests a highly concentrated geography across cities (Figure C.8). Given these 
(ongoing) developments, it might be expected that the role of different factors will have 
evolved to some degree.  
Table 7.6: Resilience Regressions for Four Recessionary Downturns and Recoveries 
















MANSH -0.0302 -0.0526*      -0.2202** -0.0424 
KIBSSH  0.0775 -0.0532 -0.2701*   -0.0943* 
PUBSH -0.1913**  0.0603 -0.1653*  0.0080 
KSI  0.7980  1.8944 3.2479  1.8047 
EXPSH -0.0728* -0.0337*  0.1009  0.0360 
SKILLSH -0.1260*  0.0955 -0.0162  0.0250 











PAT      ND      ND -0.0025  0.0010 
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 0.2182 
 3.6051 














Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes: * Significant at 0.10 level **Significant at 0.05 level.   Skills data series only begin in 1981, which is 
used as the start year in the regressions for the first two recessions, and have a discontinuity in 1991. ND - No 
reliable or consistent data for Patents (PAT) prior to 1990. N=85 cities. 
 
To explore the influence of these structural and other characteristics on city resilience, the 
following model was estimated: 
𝑅  𝐼 𝑐
 , −𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴  𝐻𝑐
 −𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐾𝐼𝐵  𝐻𝑐
 −𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑈𝐵 𝐻𝑐
 −𝑘  
+𝛽4𝐾 𝐼𝑐
 −𝑘 + 𝛽5  𝑃 𝐻𝑐
 −𝑘 + 𝛽6 𝐾𝐼   𝐻𝑐
 −𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑐
 −𝑘 +
+𝛽8𝑃𝑂𝑃 𝐼𝑍 𝑐
 −𝑘 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐷  𝑐
 −𝑘 + 𝛽10𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑐
 −𝑘 +  𝛽11𝐷𝐼  𝑂 𝐷𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐
 , −𝑘                                                                                              
          
and similarly for 𝑅  𝑂𝑉𝑐
 , −𝑘, using the resistance and recoverability indices calculated in 
Section 7.4.   
As discussed above, factors and characteristics shaping a city’s resilience may themselves 
be influenced and changed over time by successive shocks, so that there is bound to be an 
element of endogeneity in th system. By measuring the regressor variables at the start year 
(t-k) of each recessionary downturn and each successive recovery, this effect should to some 
extent be minimised.  The results are given in Table 7.6. As a city’s export intensity was very 
highly correlated with its manufacturing employment share, the former was dropped from the 
regressions in favour of the latter. 

















MANSH -0.0911** -0.0320** -0.0097  0.0031 
KIBSSH  -0.1369** -0.0334*  0.0141  0.0155* 
PUBSH  -0.1125** -0.0574** -0.0408** -0.0201 
KSI  2.0041  1.1272* -0.3485  0.7110 
EXPSH  0.1408 -0.0060 -0.0099 -0.0316* 
SKILLSH -0.0029  0.0467**  0.0094  0.0038 











PAT      ND      ND  0.0003**  0.0007 
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 0.3367 
 5.3266 
         85 
 0.2449 
 3.7253 




A number of features are noteworthy despite the limitations of the data that can be assembled 
for British cities on a consistent basis back to 1971.  At a broad level, it appears from the 
adjusted R-square values that the model fits the recovery phases better than the downturn 
(resistance) phases. This might be as expected, given that recessionary contractions differ 
in their specific causes and hence impacts, so that there need be no consistency between 
one recession and the next in the role of a city’s economic structures and characteristics.  
Also, recessionary downturns are typically short-lived compared to their subsequent 
recoveries, so that the latter are more likely to depend on a city’s economic make-up. Even 
in the recoveries, however, the level of fit is low.  
What does emerge is the role of structure. The greater the share of a city’s economy (in 
employment terms) is accounted for by manufacturing activity, the less resilient, both in 
resistance and recoverability, is that city to recessionary shocks, although the relation is not 
always significant.  Correspondingly, a city’s reliance on KIBS seems to have become a 
negative factor shaping its resilience to the second two recessions, no doubt reflecting the 
declining importance of manufacturing in city economies from the late-1980s onwards. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly a greater dependence on public sector activities does not 
appear to have acted as a buffer to recession, and has had a negative impact on city 
recoverability.  The fact that British cities have become more similar in their more detailed 
sectoral structures over the study period probably accounts for the lack of impact accorded 
to the Krugman specialization index. Likewise, the role of skills does not appear to be a 
significant factor shaping city resilience to recessionary shocks. Export intensity appears to 
have been a significant factor in influencing resistance, in a negative way, only in the first two 
recessions, possibly reflecting the greater importance of manufacturing in city economies in 
the 1970s and early-1980s than in the period since. However, its influence on recoverability 
seems also to be negative, although this effect was only statistically significant in the last 
recession, in 2008-10. 
The role played by a skilled workforce in shaping city resilience is neither consistent nor 
significant. It seems to have played a negative role in city resistence to the recessionary 
downturns of 1973-75 and 1979-81, but had no influence on the subsequent two recessions; 
it had a positive influence on city recoverability from the recession shock of 1979-81 and the 
most recent one of 2008-2010, but otherwise no significant influence. Base year productivity 
increased city resilience to the downturns of 1979-81 and 1990-91 and city recoverability 
from the latter (1991-2007), but otherwise is not a significant determinant of city resilience. 
The relationship between city resilience and city population size and city population density, 
the two proxies for agglomeration effects, is frequently negative, but only significant, in the 
case of density, in the recession of 1973-75, and only positive, in the case of size, in the 
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recovery of 2009-2015, possibly reflecting the particular performance of London, by far the 
largest city. In general, however, the regressions do not lend any statistical support to the 
notion that bigger cities should be more resilient to economic shocks.  The inclusion of a city 
patent variable, as a proxy for innovativeness, in the regressions for the last two recessions 
only produced any significant effect in the 1991-2007 recovery.  
What is both significant and almost consistent across the four shocks is distance from 
London: the further is a city from London, the more likely it is to have a faster recoverability 
from recessionary shocks. This points to the importance of proximity and connectivity to the 
economy of London and its surrounding ‘Greater South East’ region, which together contain 
a third of national economic activity and output, the bulk of the nation’s major economic, 
financial and political infrastructures, and much of the key policy decision-making that impacts 
on national and local economic life.  It possibly suggests the existence of a broad regional 
agglomeration ‘dynamic’ that declines away from the capital, which acts to confer a measure 
of resilience to cities the closer and more connected to and dependent on it they are.   
While some of these findings are thus suggestive of the possible factors influencing city 
resilience across Britain, the low level of statistical fit of the regressions in Table 6 indicates 
that much more analysis is required to uncover the city-specific and the national processes 
at work. More sophisticated modelling might help in this respect, although, as stressed above, 
the lack of detailed data on many processes of city economic development that potentially 
shape how cities react to shocks hinders such a task.  Further, some of those processes and 
the structures that support and underpin them are likely to be long-standing and slow-
changing, while others are likely to change more rapidly over time, including in response to 
major shocks.  It is this interdependence and recursiveness between resilience and 
development that is the real explanatory challenge.  These issues in relation to understanding 
the resilience of British cities to previous major recessions loom equally large when it comes  
to  assessing the impact of what is the next imminent shock, the UK’s withdrawal from the 
European Union, or Brexit. 
7.6 How Will Brexit Impact British Cities?  
Estimates of the possible impact of Brexit on the national UK economy have varied widely 
and been the target of much heated debate (such as Ebell et al, 2016; HM Treasury, 2016; 
Economists for Brexit, 2016).  At one extreme are studies such as that by HM Treasury and 
the London School of Economics, which predict that a ‘hard’ Brexit – a withdrawal without 
any free trade deal with the EU, and a new relation based on WTO trade rules – will lead to 
a reduction in national GDP of as much as 8 or nearly 10 percent, respectively, by 2030.  At 
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the other extreme, according to Economists for Brexit, such an arrangement would increase 
national GDP by 4 percent by that date.  According to Coutts, Gudgin and Buchanan (2018), 
in their highly critical essay on the subject, not only are all of these studies based on 
contestable assumptions, they differ in what potential effects they incorporate (on trade, 
migration, productivity, regulation, wages, financial markets, and the like), as well as in the 
types of models used (macro-economic, general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, gravity 
models, and so on). Coutts et al conclude that most estimates of the impact of Brexit in the 
UK, both short-term and long-term, have exaggerated the degree of potential damage to the 
national economy.  However, their analysis has in turn been criticized for its selective use of 
data.  In short, even deriving estimates of the impact of a ‘hard’ Brexit shock on the national 
economy has proved difficult and highly contentious.  
The problems escalate when it comes to estimating the possible impacts on Britain’s regions 
and cities. Predictions of the impact on the country’s regions and cities have varied (see, 
among others, for example, Chen et al, 2017; Dhingra et al, 2017; McCombie and Spreafico, 
2017;). Such variation is not in fact surprising.  As in the national case, the predictions of the 
severity of the impact depend on the plausibility of the assumptions and models employed, 
on the type of Brexit deal eventually secured, and on the data used. One key issue is that the 
potential adverse effect of Brexit on Britain’s cities and regions is not just a question of the 
proportion of exports of a city or region that goes to the European Union.  It also involves 
their supply chains and production networks, and the extent to which these are located in 
other cities and regions. There are important industries, such as motor vehicles and 
aerospace, that not only have localised spatial distributions within the UK, but also complex 
supply chains of intermediate inputs that crisscross the EU border (HM Treasury, 2016).  
Then there are the likely spatially differential implications of what will be restrictions on the 
migration of labour from the EU into the UK.  Further, the long-run impact across cities and 
regions will depend on how far and in what ways local firms are able to reconfigure their 
exports away from Europe to other markets, as well as under what trade arrangements. And 
we cannot know whether and to what extent UK-based firms (both manufacturing and 
services) would relocate their activities to other EU member states in the case of a ‘hard’ 
Brexit.109 
 
109 Several companies have in fact threatened to move (or have already begun to move) operations to mainland Europe given 
the uncertainty surrounding Brexit, including Panasonic, Microsoft, Goldman Sachs, UBS, HSBC, Airbus, Deutsche Bank, and 
Sony. Some of these firms have supply chains across the UK, so that the indirect effects of such relocations could well exceed 
the direct effects. 
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To compound these problems and imponderables, analysis at the subnational scale, and 
especially for cities, is rendered particularly difficult because of the lack of the sort of data 
needed to quantify the effect of such factors.  While certain trade data exist for the major 
regions of the UK, mainly for manufactured goods, there are no officially collected trade data 
for cities or other similar spatial units.  Thus, studies have had to resort to other ways of 
estimating the regional and local trade impacts of Brexit.  In their analysis, Dhingra, Machin 
and Overman (2017) use estimates of the impact of Brexit on national economic sectors 
derived from a computable general equilibrium trade model (Dhingra et al, 2016, 2017), to 
generate corresponding estimates at the local level by applying these national sectoral 
impacts to local sectoral employment structures and summing to get an overall local effect.   
Using this approach they find that the most affected local areas would be in the south of the 
UK, with London the most adversely impacted (mainly on account of the concentration of 
financial and related services there).  In their study, Chen et al (2017) use estimated inter-
regional extensions of the World Input-Output Data base (Chen et al, 2017) to predict the 
impact of Brexit across the subregions of the UK (and the EU as a whole). Their results are 
somewhat opposed to those of Dhingra, Machin and Overman (2017), in that they suggest 
that the main impact will be on northern subregions, with London amongst the least affected, 
primarily, the authors argue, because while much of northern Britain has increased its 
dependence on and integration with the European Union over recent years, London has 
become more globally orientated and less integrated with Europe.  
Thus, just as predicting the impact of Brexit on the national economy is fraught with difficulties 
and debate, so estimating its impact across Britain’s cities or regions is equally problematic.  
The analysis of Section 7.4 may possibly give some pointers as to what might be expected. 
As Table 7.6 shows, the more a city’s economy is orientated towards manufacturing activity 
(as measured in terms of employment share), the less resilient it is to shocks, although this 
negative relationship has not always been statistically significant. Thus, to the extent that a 
Brexit deal restricts Britain’s trade in goods with the EU, then this may possibly impact more 
on those cities that still have an above average manufacturing base.  On the other hand, a 
greater dependence on KIBS, though certainly not isolating a city from a negative shock, 
seems to improve its recoverability. So, much will also depend on whether and in what ways 
the eventual Brexit deal will impact on tradable services such as finance. Perhaps the most 
pertinent possible implication of the analysis in Section 4 is that, if past evidence is any guide, 
regardless of the geography of the initial or short run negative impact of the Brexit shock 
across Britain’s cities, those nearer London are likely to recover faster and more successfully 
from it. Indeed, the evidence from the regression analysis in Table 7.6 indicates that for past 
major recessionary shocks the recoverability of cities has tended to decline with distance 
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from London.  This a pattern that exhibits a notable degree of persistence or path 
dependence.  It might be hypothesised, then, that whatever form Brexit takes, most southern 
British cities are likely to weather the shock better than most of their northern counterparts.  
Most northern cities voted strongly for Brexit in the 2016 referendum, yet they could actually 
prove to be less resilient to the shock. Brexit, therefore, could well intensify existing prosperity 
gaps between northern cities southern cities.110 
There is a limit, however, to how far such ‘prognoses’ can be read off from the analysis of 
past recessions, even the most recent and arguably most relevant one. And given the issue 
of lack of detailed trade and related data for our 85 cities, we are hesitant to present yet 
another estimate of the possible local impact of Brexit. Nevertheless, since existing estimates 
of the sort referred to above seem to give somewhat different results, we generated our own 
as follows.  We used the detailed national sector output and employment results produced 
by Cambridge Econometrics (2018) for three Brexit scenarios (Single Market, Customs 
Union, WTO rules) using their E3ME global macro-econometric model, based on 
assumptions about trade prices (tariff and non-tariff barriers), migration, and investment111. 
For each city, an estimated impact was derived by weighting the UK-sector results by each 
city’s output and employment shares in 2015. The results are shown in Figure 7.7. As 
expected, the general finding of ‘the harder the version of Brexit, the worse the impact’ holds 
true across all cities, but there is a spread of effects under each scenario, a spread that 
increases the more comprehensive the nature of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU.  Most 
notably, the disparity in the negative impact on output across cities is far more pronounced 
under the ‘hard’ Brexit scenario (WTO rules), from -2.4 percent to -4.2.  This compares with 
a range of -1.2 to -2.0 under the Customs Union scenario, and only from -0.8 to -1.3 under a 
Single Market outcome. The other key point is that under the ‘hard’ Brexit (WTO rules) case, 
there is no clear distinction in impact as between northern cities or southern ones. There is a 
mixture of northern and southern cities at both ends of the impact spectrum, whether 
estimated for GVA or employment. Nor is there any statistically significant relationship 
between impact and distance from London (see Figure 7.7; R2=0.014). However, what does 
 
110 The fact that most of Britain’s lagging northern cities and regions voted strongly for Brexit possibly had as much to do with 
the growing sense of neglect felt by their populations - of being economically ‘left behind’ and ‘forgotten’ by the London-based 
political, economic and financial establishment (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018) - as it did with anti-EU sentiments. 
111 E3ME is a global macro-sectoral econometric model developed over the past 20 years by Cambridge Econometrics 
through the European Commission’s research framework programmes. It covers 69 sectors and 59 countries of the world. and 
is now widely used in Europe and beyond for policy assessment, for forecasting and for research purposes. Its econometric 
specification addresses concerns about conventional macroeconomic models and provides a strong empirical basis for 
analysis. It can fully assess both short and long-term impacts and is not limited by many of the restrictive assumptions 
common to Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (see www.e3me.com). 
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stand out is that London itself emerges as one of the least affected cities, a finding that is in 
line with London’s resilience to the recession of 2008-2010.  
Figure 7.6: Estimated Impact of Brexit on British Cities: Percent by which Output and 




Source: Based on authors’ data and calculations and the national sectoral impact estimates from 
Cambridge Econometrics’ E3ME global macro-econometric model. 
 
These estimates, like others that have been produced for British regions and localities, should 
be viewed with very considerable caution, and are only as valid as the assumptions and 
techniques they employ. In our case, a key assumption is that the reaction of a given sector 
to a particular Brexit scenario is the same regardless of location, so that differences among 
cities in the impact of Brexit simply reflect differences in the sectoral composition of those 
cities. Reality is likely to prove much more complex than that, and ultimately the true resilience 
of Britain’s cities to Brexit will only be known ex post, once the actual Brexit deal has been 































Figure 7.7: Relationship between the Impact of a Hard Brexit (WTO rules) on City Output and City 
Distance from London  
                  Source: As in Figure 7.6 
7.7 Some Conclusions  
In recent years, the concept of resilience has attracted increasing attention in urban and 
regional studies. At the same time, interest in the impact of major shocks on cities and regions 
has also increased, not least because of the uneven geographical impact of the Great 
Recession of 2008-2010. In this paper, a unique data set on British cities, constructed as part 
of a larger research project, and extending back some 45 years to the beginning of the 1970s, 
has been used to examine the resilience of some 85 such cities to the four major recessionary 
shocks that have disrupted the UK economy over this period.  The same data was also used 
to explore the possible impacts across these cities of the Brexit shock, the UK’s withdrawal 
from the European Union.   
A number of key findings have emerged from this analysis.  First, there has been significant 
variation across British cities in both their resistance to and recoverability from the four 
recessions. Second, the resilience of cities has itself varied over time, and especially as 
between the first two recessions (the downturns of 1973-75 and 1979-81), and the last two 
(1990-91 and 2008-10). More specifically, whereas in the first two recessions there was a 
positive relationship across cities between resistance and recoverability (the more resistant 
a city the faster its recovery), in the second two this relationship had disappeared, and if 
anything was replaced by a weak negative relationship (the less resistant a city the faster its 
recovery). Third, there has also been a notable geographical dimension to city resilience, in 


















































three recessions, even though relative resistance of the two broad groups of cities has varied 
from one recession to the next. A further aspect is that London’s relative recoverability has 
steadily improved over time. It would appear that, therefore, that there are both continuities 
and shifts in the dynamics of resilience to recessionary shocks across the urban system.  
In an attempt to account for these continuities and changes in city resilience a range of 
possible factors was explored by means of a regression model of resistance and recovery for 
each of the four recessions studied.  Considerable data restrictions limit the range of such 
factors that can be analysed on a consistent basis for all four recessions, so that the analysis 
can only be exploratory.  In fact, levels of statistical fit are generally low, although better for 
the recovery (expansion) phases than for the downturn (resistance) phases.   There is some 
evidence that economic structure has played a role in shaping differences in resilience across 
cities, with greater dependence on manufacturing reducing resilience and recovery, 
especially in the first two recessions, when manufacturing was more prominent across the 
economy, and greater dependence on KIBS becoming more of a negative factor in the last 
two recessions, when several cities had shifted substantially to a service based economy.  
Other variables, including skills, productivity, patents and city size and density, do not emerge 
as key determinants of city resilience.  What is notable, however, is that city recoverability 
has tended to decline with distance from London. 
These findings are clearly at best only suggestive and the estimates produced in Section 6 
should, therefore, be interpreted with considerable caution, since like other such estimates 
in the literature, they are highly model- and assumption- dependent. Notwithstanding these 
caveats and limitations, the issue of city resilience to shocks does seem to be an issue worthy 
of investigation.  Cities differ in their resistance to and recovery from major economic shocks. 
Those differences can influence the long-run growth paths of cities. This in many ways is the 
key issue, since the dynamics of recessionary shocks seems not to be that of fluctuations 
around some long-term growth path; rather, for many cities recessionary contractions lead to 
permanent reductions in the level of output.  Shocks can thus lead to divergent growth paths 
among cities. This not only has implications for how we theorise city (and indeed regional) 
long-run growth, but also for discussions of policies aimed at reducing growth inequalities 





The concluding chapter to the thesis covers three main items: 
(i) Summarising the main findings of each of the papers  
(ii) Linking these with the stated thesis objectives. 
(iii) Identifying further lines for research, and unanswered questions. 
(iv) Drawing out the implications for policy. 
8.2 Main Findings from the Papers  
Database 
Using a mix of official local data sources, I have shown how it is possible to construct a 
database to create functional areas which can approximate for city-regions. Together, these 
cities account for some 83 percent of British employment and 86 percent of British output 
(gross value added).  They thus make up the bulk of the national economy. The preliminary 
analysis undertaken with this database demonstrated London’s turnaround and increased 
domination of national productivity performance. The database was also used to show how 
structural change (particularly KIBS growth versus manufacturing and mining sector decline) 
was partly responsible for employment performance across the 85 cities identified in the 
database. 
The database acts as the springboard from which all the further empirical studies were 
launched, and without which it would have been impossible to undertaken the same depth 
and breadth of analysis. It thus represents a major achievement in its own right and should 
help to improve understanding about spatial development and imbalance in Great Britain in 
future work as well – the construction techniques can also be applied to update and extend 
the database when more official local data releases become available112. The three 
dimensions across which the database help to push the boundary of knowledge are: 
(i) Time 
 
112 Currently local employment data are released annually in September, while GVA is released in December. 
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Long-run datasets do exist for the UK, but they tend to be at higher levels of aggregation 
and are often for administrative areas (e.g. NUTS1 regions). Meanwhile those based on 
functional definitions (such as the EC-OECD Functional Urban Areas) are good for cross-
section analysis but extremely limited for investigating how they are evolving over time. 
A database covering almost 50 years is thus a very useful addition as it allows multiple 
cycles and shocks to be analysed, and also covers interesting periods of British economic 
development, from periods of de-industrialisation, privatisation and growth of services, 
globalisation, and the most recent impacts of the great recession. 
(ii) Space 
The use of travel-to-work areas as the boundary definition for cities is something that 
makes the database useful for some areas of analysis and less for others. Travel-to-work-
areas are one example of a wider set of Functional Economic Market Areas (FEMAs), 
where the boundary is dictated by the economic aspect being investigated – this can 
included labour markets and employment (as with TTWAs), housing markets, consumer 
markets, governance and policy space, or wider transport and infrastructure networks. 
This also links to the work of Parr (2007, op cit) who noted there is no single definition of 
a city – it depends on the purpose. Thus, a detailed TTWA based definition of cities is 
useful for analysing the evolution skills, jobs and employment-related activities. 
Functional space is important for any country, but for a Great Britain which has become 
heavily imbalanced over the past decades due to the rise of London and the greater South 
East, it is especially so. 
(iii) Activity 
Many of the changes that have occurred in Great Britain over the past 50 years have a 
sectoral or activity-based aspect, such as the effects on manufacturing from de-
industrialisation, and the rise of services and in particular the role played by Knowledge-
Intensive Business Services (KIBS) in taking over the role of supporting productivity 
growth in an increasingly urbanised country. Having a dataset which distinguishes 45 
sectors of activity over 50 years, and over 200 sectors since 1991 can therefore allow for 
interesting questions to be asked about the role being played by sector mix and 
transformation in city prospects and performance. Sectoral definitions do not provide the 
only way of defining activity, however, and as has been shown in the analysis functional 




The findings here are focussed around the role that structural change has had on the he 
economic growth paths of the 85 British cities over the past 5 decades. The results show a 
highly divergent mix, with some cities showing fast rates of growth and structural 
transformation towards KIBS and services in general, others remaining largely in long-term 
industrial decline, while a few have managed to turn around their performance. Dividing the 
cities into growth typologies was a way of making sense of the disparate mix of development 
paths. In Club I both for employment and output (gross value added), the mostly southern 
cities have grown faster than most. Interestingly, the fastest rates of growth have been among 
smaller and medium sized cities: the major cities (regional capitals and most of the Core 
cities') have been among the slowest growing. The exception is London, with a club of its 
own, and which after growing slowly up to the late-1980s, has since been one of the fastest 
growing cities in the UK. The northern (and generally more peripheral cities in Club III) have 
fared less well, with any nascent growth in new service sectors mostly outweighed by the 
decline of the legacy of their industrial past. In-between are the cities in Club II growing at 
more or less the national average, where these two forces largely offset each other. 
The results also shed light on the importance of between versus within sector changes, which 
is measuring the importance structural change going on across sectors (e.g. the shift from 
manufacturing to services) against what is going on inside them (e.g. the shift to higher value-
added activities within a given sector). The latter effect has been demonstrated to be the 
more important one, and understanding the locational reasons behind the division of 
functions within a sector, as noted by Baldwin (2016), is clearly key in this respect. 
North-south divide 
There is a north-south division of cities in terms of productivity, with almost all northern cities 
having labour productivity levels, both in 1971 and in 2014, below the Great Britain average. 
While northern showed some tendency to 'catch up' with the southern counterparts over 
1971-1991, the process stopped thereafter, and southern cities have since pulled ahead. 
This has largely been led by London, which has benefitted from being the focus of a largely 
mono-centric system which has led to the city simultaneously being the financial, cultural-
creative, and political centre within the UK – a situation which rarely exists in other countries. 
Clearly there are winds of change blowing in the form of devolution and a (belated) perception 
of the degree of spatial imbalance within the country, and the re-discovery of macro regions 
through the creation of concepts such as the Northern Powerhouse, the Midlands Engine, 
and also city-deals and mayoral powers at smaller spatial scales is a reflection of this. What 
is unknown is how far devolution will manage to unwind the decades of centralisation of 
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power, which has manifested itself in the general discontent with the status quo and demand 
for change. 
Contrary to much of the academic literature, our research finds that a city's economic 
structure - its sectoral make-up - explains very little of its growth rate relative to other cities. 
In fact, cities have become increasingly similar over time in their sectoral structures: there 
has been sectoral convergence at the same time there has been divergent growth. What 
seems to be more important in determining a city's growth are local' city-specific' factors other 
than structure. It is not so much what cities do that matters, but how well they do what they 
do. 
Productivity puzzle 
Analysis of productivity growth for the 85 cities over 1971-2015 shows that over 1971-1991 
northern cities enjoyed a faster rate of productivity growth than southern cities, but that since 
1991 it has been southern cities that have led productivity growth. However, productivity 
growth has slowed down almost everywhere since the 1980s, if not before, as performance 
in service sectors has been unable to offset the higher rates of capital intensity in more 
industrial-related activities. This fining is consistent with the general move towards structural 
similarity that has occurred in the UK over the period of analysis, as places become broadly 
the same their previous locational advantages for specialisation (and resulting productivity 
gains) have lessened.  
However, the work does show that while structural change - the shift from manufacturing, 
where manufacturing growth tends to be high, to services, where in many such activities, 
productivity growth is lower - only explains a small part of this general slowdown. As with the 
analyses in previous chapters, most of the latter appears to be due to 'within-sector' 
slowdown, and this dimension also differs across cities. 
The skilled city 
A key finding in the occupations-related analysis is that, somewhat contrary to the experience 
for US cities, in the British case, there is little evidence that skills have increased faster in 
already-skilled cities, i.e. 'smart cities' have not necessarily become yet more 'smarter'. 
Neither, again in contrast to the US, have skilled occupations increased faster in larger cities. 
Rather, there has been a widespread hollowing out of the middle of the skills hierarchy, and 
polarization between high and low skilled occupations.  
Nevertheless, skilled cities (those with higher accumulations of skilled labour) have grown 
faster than those dominated by lower-skilled occupations, and this supports the general 
argument of mutually-reinforcing combination of skills, innovation, productivity, and 
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agglomeration benefits that are expected to accrue from this. But these effects (as measured 
by their cumulative growth paths and how far they deviate from the national average) do tend 
to stabilise over time, suggesting that the benefits from such accumulation to not offer a 
perpetual mechanism to continually improve performance. 
The spatial dimension of city skills gaps is also observed, and is to some extent a reflection 
of the structural and productivity differences highlighted in previous chapters. But the growth 
of skilled labour in the UK is not solely about London – other smaller cities have managed to 
successfully grow a high skills base, although many of these are still based around London 
in the wider South East. 
City-level resilience 
The final aspect the city-based research has examined is the resilience of British cities to 
economic shocks. Analysis of four major recessions over the last 45 years - the downturns 
of the mid-1970s, the early-1980s, the early-1990s and the financial crisis of 2008-10 – has 
revealed that southern cities tend to recover more strongly and sooner that northern cities: 
that is, they are more resilient. The relationship between resistance and recovery was also 
been examined, and a change noted over time with the link between a city’s ability to resist 
a shock, and its subsequent strength of recovery, gradually becoming weaker and less 
associated. Despite the database constructed for the study, there are limitations on being 
able to investigate a panel-type relationship across all the combinations of downturn and 
recovery, with the result that empirical conclusions are largely associative. Economic 
structure does seem to play a role in the ability of a city to resist a shock, but as cities become 
similar in structure and more diverse, the ability to observe how structure plays a role in 
resilience will diminish as the role of functions undertaken within section takes on greater 
prominence. 
Using these results as background, further work has been conducted on the likely impact of 
Brexit on the 85 cities examined in this project. Estimates of the possible sectoral impact of 
Brexit - both soft and hard exit scenarios - suggest that the impacts are likely to be fairly 
evenly spread across the country, although with some indication that southern cities would 
be more likely to recover more quickly from the negative shock associated with Brexit than 




8.3 Linking Main Findings and Objectives 
Re-cap on thesis objectives 
Here, the objectives listed in the introduction are re-visited so that I can demonstrate how 
they were met, or adapted, during the course of the resarch. They objectives were: 
(i) How have structural transformations observed at national level been distributed 
across British cities? 
Historical context 
In the period since the oil crisis of the early 1970s, very considerable changes have taken 
place in the structure of the British economy. Britain has lost much of its industrial base 
and experienced rapid growth in the service sector. While structural change has affected 
virtually every aspect of the British economy, perhaps one of the most significant impacts 
has been on the economic growth of its cities, particularly its large conurbations that owed 
much of their rapid expansion throughout the 18th and 19th centuries to Britain’s 
industrialisation. Many of Britain’s largest cities have struggled to adjust to a post-
industrial economy. As cities have lost manufacturing jobs, they have experienced 
periods of high, often long-term unemployment, and in more recent years, while there 
have been more job opportunities, these have often been relatively poorly paid, and thus 
contributed to increased levels of income inequality across British society. 
City groupings 
To examine the patterns of change across British cities, the focused was on cumulative 
differential growth, whereby, starting in the base year of 1971, each city’s growth rate in 
each year had the corresponding national (Great Britain) rate subtracted from it and 
cumulateed over time. The overall performance of the 85 cities, measured in terms of 
their differential growth in output and employment over 1971–2015, was shown in Figure 
3.1. 
The cities were characterized into three distinctive groups; those cities that had grown 
faster than the nation, which were termed cities ‘pulling away’ (Group I); those cities that 
had grown slower than the national benchmark, which were termed ‘falling behind’ (Group 
III); and those cities that had ‘kept pace’ with the growth of the nation (Group II). Table 
3.1 shows which cities are in which group, while Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the 
growth of GVA relative to the nation for the groups from 1971 until 2015. The relatively 
fast-growing Group I cities had an average growth rate of 2.76%, but some cities within 




A dynamic shift-share decomposition procedure was adopted which was able to 
decompose city changes in output and employment on a year-by-year basis, in order to 
reveal the contribution that changes in economic structure have made to each city group’s 
output growth differential over time. The contribution of the structure effect and local effect 
to the positive or negative gap in performance compared to national growth was shown 
in Figure 3.11.  
Structural transformations in the national economy have played out quite differently 
across British cities, shaping, to a considerable extent, their divergent growth trajectories 
over the past five decades. The cities in Group I (mainly cities in the South of England) 
and London—which have been pulling ahead—have benefitted substantially from 
structural transformation and have seen strong growth on the back of high-growth 
sectors, especially KIBS. 
A second set of processes concerns within-sector changes and includes the way in which 
different parts of the same industry change and evolve over time. They highlight the way 
in which different firms within the same industry may have different productivity and 
innovation capabilities and track records. Cities host firms that are classified as belonging 
to the same industry but are actually quite different in their capabilities, employment, 
business models and strategies; and these ‘within-sector’ effects will also contribute to 
divergent economic performances. The findings on the importance of ‘local effects’ in 
some types of cities may well indicate in part that these ‘within-sector’ effects also have 
a significant and growing spatial dimension. There are certainly many theoretical 
arguments that support and envisage this, as they suggest that globalisation and new 
supply chains and divisions of labour are widening differences between firms within 
industries and creating new types of specialisations in terms of functions, tasks and 
capabilities rather than entire sectors. Different rates of entrepreneurship and firm 
demographics, as well as investment and foreign ownership, may also be reinforcing 
these spatial variations. 
However, a third set of processes centring on the development of cities’ local supply 
factors is also interacting through time with both of these two types of industrial change. 
We know that there are important differences in the capabilities of cities to offer firms an 
attractive business environment through the supply of both appropriate ‘hard and soft’ 
infrastructure and the development of a local labour force sought by knowledge-intensive 
and tradeable industries. 
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As has been argued elsewhere, local areas start with an inherited pattern of land use, a 
resource base and institutions that were tailored to another era, and the legacy of the 
past weighs heavily on their ability to adjust to new economic futures. Thus, the Group III 
cities tend to be among the oldest industrial cities with infrastructure, labour forces and a 
constrained land use pattern to match. 
(ii) How have the economic structures of British cities changed over time? 
Growth of employment also tend to be those that have recorded the fastest rate of growth 
of employment and vice versa. Some cities, such as Milton Keynes, Northampton, 
Telford, Crawley and Swindon, have experienced average growth rates in their GVA and 
employment far exceeding the national average (and totalling to a cumulative differential 
of over 30–40% over the period). Other cities, such as Liverpool, Glasgow, Newcastle, 
Birmingham and Sheffield, have grown well below the national rate in both output and 
employment. Still other cities have tracked national growth. Notwithstanding the high 
correlation between output and employment growth, however, some cities show a much 
slower performance in employment than in output, such as Sunderland, Middlesbrough, 
Manchester and Huddersfield. Still other cities seem to experience much stronger 
employment growth compared to GVA growth, such as Colchester, Chelmsford, 
Plymouth and Southend.  
Another feature is that many of the fastest growing cities have been in the southern half 
of Britain (roughly south of a line between the Severn and Humber) and most of the 
slowest growing cites have been in the north. Notable exceptions to the latter group are 
Aberdeen (which has benefited from the North Sea oil industry), Telford (a New Town in 
Shropshire), Leamington Spa and Crewe. 
However, structural factors cannot in themselves account for the strong growth of cities 
in Group I, and many cities in Group II (and the non-urban TTWAs) also managed to deal 
with structural transformation better than Group III. Moreover, these factors are also 
insufficient to explain the very lacklustre performance of London until the turn of the 
century, with a sudden turn-around in its fortunes thereafter, as well as the full extent of 
the lagging growth in Group III cities. 
These results imply that the economic trajectories of cities are the complex and uneven 
outcomes of three fundamental sets of processes, all of which are interactive and 
potentially shaped by their policy and institutional contexts. The first are those structural 
changes in output and employment shares, which we have analysed here in depth. They 
centre on what we might term between-sector changes and refer to the rise of some 
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industries and the decline of others. Our analysis has demonstrated the importance of 
these processes in some cities and has allowed us to understand the extent to which 
post-industrial transition produces growth-reducing structural change in some categories 
of city. 
(iii) How and why have cities varied in economic adaptability and to what degree has 
this been shaped by their industrial structure? 
The growth path of a given city is the outcome of a complex and evolving interaction of 
‘external’ (national and indeed global) factors and city-specific factors and conditions. 
One can think of a city’s economy as being an ‘ensemble’ of activities—a structural 
ensemble—that is constantly changing as a result of this interaction. Such a structural 
ensemble can be examined and decomposed in different ways. The analysis has taken 
industrial sectors as the primary units of a city’s structural ensemble – Figure 3.4 shows 
the pattern of sectoral growth in the British economy over the period 1971-2014. 
The sources of this uneven geography of productivity performance lie in a combination of 
changes to industry structure and spatial differences in within-sector effects. In terms of 
industry composition, many northern and core cities have suffered a steep decline in 
export-intensive manufacturing and their tradable industries since the early 1970s. In 
most cases, they have failed to compensate by developing new higher productivity 
sectors such as Knowledge Intensive Business Services or creative industries. Instead, 
the main sectors of employment expansion have been in lower productivity growth 
services. But changes to industry structure are not the primary cause of urban and 
regional variations in productivity growth. Instead, the analyses finds that productivity 
growth differences across cities are primarily due to differences in within-sector 
productivity growth (Martin et al, 2018).  The importance of within-sector effects suggests 
that firm entry and exit processes have variable dynamics, and that some cities and 
regions have a greater share of high productivity firms, irrespective of their industry 
structure.  Specialisation by function and task and associated differences in skill and 
occupational structure appear to be increasing in importance and require investigation. 
(iv) What sort of economic structure - diversified or specialized - is most conducive to 
regional and city growth? 
Productive performance 
The research has shown that, while productivity growth has slowed in most sectors in 
recent decades, the decline has been most pronounced in manufacturing, while at the 
same time the share of manufacturing in total employment has fallen consistently since 
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the beginning of the 1970s.These shifts in employment have had the effect of reducing 
the degree of specialisation in almost all cities (see, for example, Figure C4). Or put 
another way, British cities have become increasingly similar in their employment 
structures over the past 40 or so years. 
To assess the impact of these structural changes on city productivity paths, methods 
followed by previous authors such as Rodrik and Kruger have been used to decompose 
total productivity change into a component due to employment shifts between sectors 
(structural change), and a component due to productivity changes within sectors. Two 
key features stand out. First, the between-sector (structural change) component is 
frequently negative, which is consistent with the shift of employment from higher 
productivity growth sectors into slower productivity growth sectors. 
However, second, in most cities the within sector component of productivity change, 
which is positive across cities, outweighs the structural change component. That is, 
productivity growth differences across cities are primarily due to differences in within-
sector productivity growth. This finding mirrors that found in analyses of differences in 
productivity growth among countries (for example in the work of Rodrik). It is also perhaps 
not surprising, given that cities have become less sectorally specialised, that is, more 
sectorally similar, over time. 
Within-sector productivity change appears to be more important than between-sector 
shifts (structural change) in shaping the pattern of productivity growth across cities. This 
may reflect the fact that functional or task specialisation (within sectors) is more important 
than sectoral specialisation per se. However, it is difficult to assemble city data on this 
aspect of city economic structure. 
Resilience 
In addition, city resilience seems no longer to be shaped by sectoral structure. This, as in 
the case of productivity growth differences, quite probably reflects the decline in sectoral 
specialisation across British cities, and the convergence in their sectoral structures. What 
may be important, however, though it could not explored because of data limitations, is a 
city’s functional specialisations, including its position and role in supply chains and 
networks.  
It is more difficult to explain city differences in resistance to recessionary shocks than 
their recoverability from them. Second, the factors that appear to be important have varied 
from recession to recession. For example, while structural factors seem to have 
influenced recoverability from the first two recessions, they seem to have played much 
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less of a role in the two recent recessions – possibly reflecting the convergence in 
structure across cities noted in Chapter 3 and 4 above. 
(v) How have urban and related policies impacted on the structures and growth paths 
of British cities? 
National policy context 
The national policy context for city economic development comprises several policies 
directly related to territorial development across the UK including sub-national economic 
development and spatial policy. But there are also a number of ‘spatially-blind’ policies 
which are of great importance for the growth prospects of places across the country: 
industrial policy, labour market and welfare policy, and macro-economic policies. Taken 
together this set of policies have undergone several shifts in the past five decades. Table 
8.1 below provides an overview of the main initiatives of different governments in these 
policy domains since the 1970s. 
Table 8.1: Major Shifts in National Policies Across Different Governments since the 1970s 
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Source: Table 7.1 in Think-piece submitted for the UK2070 Commission113. 
These shifts are evident in the evolution of governance arrangements and economic 
development policy initiatives leading to considerable churn and fragmentation. This is 
true for arrangements at the national level, such as central government departments and 
their regional offices, as well as various non-departmental executive agencies, for 
example, those responsible for labour market and skills policy, business support, and the 
management of public assets especially land and property. 
This continual reorganisation is evident at the sub-national level too as governance 
arrangements and policies have been subject to frequent restructuring. Moreover, the 
territorial focus of subnational economic development policy has changed frequently from 
regionalism to localism, back to regionalism, then localism and most recently to city-
regionalism. Layered on top of this, there have also been several large-scale reforms of 
local government in England and Wales, and Scotland, since the 1970s: first around 1974 
and then again around 1996 with the Greater London Council and six metropolitan 
counties (including the West Midlands) abolished in 1986. In all cases, churn and 
 
113 See http://uk2070.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/76-MARTIN-British-Cities-Economic-Performance.pdf.  
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fragmentation have been key issues, generating costs and absorbing time for economic 
development policymakers in a constantly shifting institutional and policy landscape. 
New towns as policy success examples 
When re-assessing growth performance, the cities in Group I (methioned earlier) have 
been characterised by very strong overall growth in output throughout the period of study, 
though this seems to have levelled off somewhat in the last 15 years of the period under 
investigation. This group includes Milton Keynes, Northampton, Telford, Peterborough, 
Reading, Cambridge and Southampton. Several of these cities were promoted as New 
Towns and assisted by British spatial policy to become centres of growth. The New Town 
approach was to facilitate a planned approach to economic development, whereby a 
Development Corporation was established with extensive powers relating to land 
assembly and the provision of infrastructure in order to promote economic development. 
The evidence suggests that they may have been quite successful in this respect. 
The process of structural change may have had more indirect effects, and may have 
interacted with the within-sector changes and development of local supply factors in 
complicated ways. Our fast-growing Group I cities contain post-Second World War New 
Towns characterised by plentiful and planned land assembly, up-to-date infrastructure 
and labour with skills more appropriate to the new age. In contrast, the Group III cities 
tend to be among the oldest industrial cities with infrastructure, labour forces and a 
constrained land use pattern to match. The legacies of these cities have frequently 
constrained and filtered the development of growth of service sector firms, as well as the 
provision of a skilled and educated labour force that is well suited to knowledge-intensive 
firm growth. Hence there may well be a type of spatial differentiation and sorting in which 
the emergence and growth of knowledge-intensive and high-productivity firms is shaped 
by the degree to which their past legacies allow some cities to be more valued by these 
firms and their employees.  
Policies need to understand and take account of structural change 
How cities deal with structural transformation over time, and the concomitant changes in 
conditions and opportunities for their economic growth, are clearly major issues for 
society and the formulation of policy. Indeed, in Britain, as government devolves 
economic powers from central to local government, it is important that those tasked with 
managing city economies understand the basic mechanisms that lie behind change, and 
what may be the scope for intervention to assist the process in a way that enhances local 
economic growth. Policymakers need to know more about the sectors that are declining, 
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those that may be experiencing successful upgrading or ‘turning around’ and those that 
are new and growing. This knowledge can help them to understand more about how to 
assist their economies to adapt and adjust their structures in response to both the 
challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing globalised marketplace. 
8.4 Further Areas of Research  
Database 
A first and obvious natural extension of the database is to use it for applied research, but this 
has already been done as evidenced by the subsequent chapters in this thesis.  
As far as extending the database goes, there are a number of areas where the existing 
indicator list or coverage could be improved: 
• Estimating a measure of investment (gross fixed capital formation) which can then be 
used to calculate capital stock and then a measure of total factor productivity. Currently 
the ONS produces estimates of investment at NUTS2 level, so an approximation would 
be required to take this down to LAD level and then back up to the TTWA scale. But it is 
possible. 
• The definition of cities as represented by TTWAs could be further refined. Using recent 
improvements in GIS software, a more accurate approximation from LAD data, and 
possibly using lower spatial levels of data such as employment from the Business 
Register Employment Survey (BRES) would give rise to more robust estimates. This 
would also allow the full set of TTWAs to be identified and included in the analysis, 
although this would take the work beyond the cities remit. 
• Related to this is the changing definition of TTWA boundaries. Every 10 years, when the 
full census is undertaken, the TTWA boundaries are reviewed, recalculated and 
redrawn. The next TTWA revision will be 2021, and as well as applying these new 
boundary definitions to create an updated dataset, more analysis on the changing nature 
of these boundaries and how they affect the observed data would be a useful exercise, 
because the TTWA has been necessarily fixed (at 2011) for the purposes of the current 
database and studies that rely upon it. 
• Finally, linking the developed database into the European taskforce on establishing the 
harmonised definition of labour market areas114 is a further development that can take 
place to aid the process of improving the information base on a wider geographic scale, 
 
114 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/content/2018-task-force-european-set-lmas_en. 
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although the focus on the taskforce is mostly on harmonizing area definitions rather than 
developing time series data. 
Structural transformation 
From the structural perspective, further work could be done to look at the contribution which 
related and unrelated variety might make to the picture. Currently the sectoral structures are 
viewed in an unrelated sense, while much work (e.g. by Frenken et al, 2007; Boschma, 2016, 
and others) in this area has been done to link to explore whether and how far interrelated 
sets of industries (in terms of input-output linkages, overlapping technologies, related skill 
requirements, and the like) correspond to regional growth. This could help to reveal alterative 
typologies that are not defined purely on growth trajectories, but on the factors that underlie 
them. 
A more detailed sectoral investigation could also take place to see whether or not the degree 
of sectoral disaggregation influenced results. Alongside the main 45-sector database used 
for the majority of the research, a more detailed 249 (i.e. largely 3-digit level) sector database 
was also constructed over a shorter time period (1991-2015). As proposed by Richardson 
(1978) and subsequently defended by Forthergill and Gudgin (1979), the work could be 
extended to see whether the results were invariant to the number and granularity of sectors 
being analysed. 
North-south divide 
In some ways the debate about imbalance has now moved from the traditional stereotype of 
the north-south divide. The narrative of more recent years is that of left-behind or forgotten 
places, as typified by Rodriguiez-Pose (2018) and which has also been linked to the 
referendum result to leave the European Union. The typology of left-behind places is more 
nuanced. Left behind places occur in both north and south (e.g. Blackpool and Jaywick 
Sands) and so analysis would require a deeper and possibly more fine-grain analysis to get 
below the surface and understand the evolutionary dynamics that causes some places to 
benefit from a virtuous cycle of growth, agglomeration and competitiveness, while others fall 
into a vicious circle of firm closures, unemployment, and deprivation. This type of analysis 
could then potentially link in with other interesting work on the psychology of place, as has 
already been initiated by the likes of Garretsen et al (2019a, b). This may well go beyond city-
level analysis, although there is research to be undertaken as to why, in the UK at least, it is 
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the wealthiest cities (e.g. Cambridge) which also see the highest degree of inequality within 
their boundaries115. 
Productivity puzzle 
The spatial aspect of the UK’s (and possibly other countries’) productivity puzzle still requires 
much research, and is indeed one of the themes of the Productivity Insights Network116 of 
which I am a co-investigator. Firm-level analysis has already started, such as the analysis of 
the Bank of England117 but the focus has been mostly on alternative micro-based firm 
aggregations (e.g. exporting firms versus non-exporting) and not so much on the spatial angle 
– indeed, Haldane notes that ‘Looking at the problem by sector, by region or by city all have 
merit’. The Centre for Cities118 has done excellent preliminary work pushing the spatial 
dimensions of this research, but much more research is needed, directed at changing 
structures and dynamics over quite long periods of time, rather than static cross section 
analyses at a particular point in time as currently exists.   
The skilled city 
Having established that the findings for the UK economy differ from those of the more 
established US-dominated literature on the topic, the first natural extension to the skills work 
is to push this further across other countries to see if the same findings hold true. For 
example, given that the European urban system is known to differ from that in the US 
(Dijkstra, et al, 2013), it would be interesting to examine whether the rapid growth of skilled 
occupations in some smaller, lower density cities, and stronger occupational polarisation in 
former manufacturing cities, have been seen across other states, or whether they are peculiar 
to the UK.  Second, a better understanding is needed of the conditions that favour growth in 
skilled employment. In particular, why are smaller and medium-sized cities showing such a 
wide range of results in terms of their occupational change? The ‘skilled city’ view risks over-
emphasising city size, agglomeration and KIBs in misleading ways and relying too heavily on 
education as a measure of skill. Our findings suggest policy needs to acknowledge the 
potential and limitations of ‘big city resurgence’ while paying more attention to what has 
facilitated the rapid growth of high-skill sectors and firms in small and medium-sized cities 
and what else in addition to specialisation in KIBS supports urban employment growth.  While 
our results support the common policy focus on upskilling and increasing skill levels, the 
 
115 See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/04/cambridge-most-unequal-city-population-divide-income-disparity. 
116 See https://productivityinsightsnetwork.co.uk/. 
117 See https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2018/the-uks-productivity-problem-hub-no-spokes-speech-
by-andy-haldane. 
118 See https://www.centreforcities.org/publication/the-wrong-tail/. 
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relative decline in some middle-skilled occupations in northern cities raises profound 
challenges for this approach. As demand for some of these skills appears to have fallen 
substantially, the rationale for responses seeking to raise the supply of people with medium-
level qualifications and skills is being undermined. Indeed, policies seeking to speed-up the 
diffusion of new technologies in attempts to raise productivity in such cities may well intensify 
these patterns. City skills policy faces the challenge of better connecting with other local 
economic development strategies, devising complementary and co-ordinated interventions 
to raise the supply and demand for skills and supporting appropriate living wage floors 
(Sissons and Jones, 2016). Our analysis reveals that in many northern cities, the professional 
group is the only major high-skilled occupational category that has shown strong growth, 
typically related with public sector growth. Opportunities for city policy to build upon rising 
demand for skilled labour in other occupational categories are fewer and any skill shortages 
may be limited to tightly defined, specific groups within occupations. Further research on 
those cities where medium level skills have continued to increase would be valuable here. 
Future work should provide more disaggregated analyses of change in specific occupations 
and cities to strengthen the evidence for policy. The place dimension of skills change needs 
to be taken more seriously, as it may well be missed by approaches that rely on generalized 
propositions about the ‘skilled city’.  
City-level resilience 
To understand more fully why cities differ in resilience, and why their resilience changes over 
time, would require more detailed analysis, either using more sophisticated dynamic panel 
models with spatial effects, which would still be hampered by the sort of data restrictions 
encountered above, or by means of in-depth investigation on a city-by city case study basis, 
which would be a very considerable task for all 85 locations included in our study. The latter 
would require, among other things, detailed micro-data on the firm populations of each city, 
their dynamics and responses to recession, including their investment, market orientation, 
exports, supply chains, workforce, migration and financial strategies and options.   It would 
also require investigation of both locally-specific policy and institutional responses to 
recessionary shocks, and the impact of national policy reactions and interventions (which are 
also bound to vary in impact from city to city). While much is made in the literature about the 
importance of local economic governance arrangements, determining their independent 
impact on local economic growth and development, let alone resilience, is extremely difficult, 
the more so in the case of the UK because of the substantial churn in policies and policy 
institutions that has occurred at the city and regional levels over the past four decades. 
Reliable estimates of the resilience of British cities to Brexit would also require detailed 
bottom-up, city-by-city, analysis to be compared against the more generic top-down research. 
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8.5 Implications for Policy  
Rather than adopt a chapter by chapter approach in this final section, it is instead structured 
around the way in which city-level research can and should affect policy, particularly in the 
UK where initiatives do not seem to be particularly joined up and consistent, and in a country 
which is becoming ever-more imbalanced. 
Cities as driving forces for rebalance 
As noted in the introduction, the UK government has started to take notice of the extent of 
the imbalance in the economy and take action to address the concentration of economic, 
cultural, and governance structures in London and the Greater South East. Cities outside 
London have a key role to play in the rebalancing of the country in a post-Brexit world, 
whatever that may look like. There is strong evidence (see, for example, Rodríguez-Pose, 
2018) that one of the primary causes for the Brexit vote was the degree of spatial imbalance 
and the feeling of being left behind, with the majority of benefits from globalisation and 
integration seemingly going mostly to London and the Greater South East. Whatever the final 
outcome of the Brexit process, there is a strong need to address these imbalances in a 
thorough way, looking at the manner in which economic, financial, political, and cultural forces 
have become centralised over the past few decades and exploring ways of redressing the 
balance.  
One size will not fit all 
The heterogeneity of performance across cities and the factors underpinning them mean that 
the specific policies needed will vary across each city, or at least type of cities. Some ‘generic’ 
issues can be identified.  In his discussion of how lagging and old industrial regions can be 
given ‘second or third wind’, Krugman (2006) makes a simple but useful distinction between 
a region’s or city’s fundamentals which are largely place-specific immobile resources and 
assets, and its growth and development dynamics, that is the particular form of a city’s or 
region’s economic growth, and the external economies that are themselves a consequence 
of that pattern of economic development.  
While useful, this simple distinction fails to capture the complexity of the policy challenge of 
reviving or boosting a city’s economic performance. For example, a city’s economy can be 
viewed as comprising key assets that in turn shape the drivers of city growth, prosperity and 
productivity, which in turn offer various potential levers for policy intervention and support: 
see Figure 8.1 (the list of potential policy levers shown there is meant to be illustrative rather 
than exhaustive).  
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Figure 8.1: The City Economy as a Complex Policy Field 
 
Based on OECD (2018) 
 
The nature and success of policy interventions will depend, among other things, on the 
degree of local fiscal and policy autonomy, the resources at the city’s disposal, local 
leadership, the nature of strategic planning, and the success to which a city is able to attract 
and harness national level initiatives and programmes. Note that there are two-way or 
recursive causal influences at work in Figure 8.1, in that policies can influence the drivers of 
a city’s development, which drivers then reshape the city’s key assets. In effect a process of 
two-way cumulative causation is involved. The policy aim is obviously to make that process 
a virtuous one, leading to a continual positive adaptation of the city’s economy. Note also that 
the local accumulation and upgrading of a city’s assets can generate positive external 
economies of agglomeration. 
Identifying policy aims 
If Figure 8.1 identifies some of the potential policy levers for a city’s economy, what should 
be the aims of policy? Figure 8.2 show four such broad aims119: 
 
119 It should be noted that the policy aims suggested here go beyond the remit of the thesis and contain ideas and suggestions 
which do not (in some cases) build on the previous work contained in the preceding chapters. More integrated (and 
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(i) promoting a city’s dynamic comparative advantage;  
(ii) promoting inclusive growth; 
(iii) building the resilience of its economy; and  
(iv) raising the quality of life of its population.  
 









Other major aims could no doubt be added, such as moving towards a low carbon economy. 
The key point is that major policy goals need first to be specified, since these then determine 
what city assets, policy drivers and policy interventions are relevant and need to be 
prioritised. At the same time, major policy objectives, and the measures needed to achieve 
them, will inevitably be inter-related.  Dynamic (and adaptive) comparative advantage is a 
key building block of a city’s economic resilience to shocks. At the same time, a skilled 
workforce is key not only to dynamic advantage but also to ensuring that a city’s economic 
growth is inclusive, founded on good quality, high wage jobs across its population. Yet again, 
policies that seek to improve the quality of life for a city’s population will enable the city to 
attract and retain high quality jobs and workers.  
 
notion of spatial equilibrium (see Brakman, Garretsen, van Marrewijk, 2020) as locational choice across cities of different 
types (large vs small, dense vs spread out), etc. Here, firms and workers/consumers make location choices (in a particular 
spatial setting, e.g. a travel-to-work-area) based on the interplay between (the inter-regional variation in) local productivity, 
local amenities and local housing rents, and the constraints under which they operate. Thus, there is the notion that these 
variables are not independent, and do not necessarily need to be part of a new policy agenda as they are already 
incorporated in agents’ decision-making processes. It should also be noted that the majority of empirical findings on these 
processes are based on studies of US cities, so the area is perhaps ripe for research using a UK city database. 
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Promoting dynamic comparative advantage 
Dynamic comparative advantage refers to the capacity of a city economy to constantly adapt 
its economic structure (its firms, industries, technologies and skill base) so as to maintain its 
productivity and competitiveness, especially in export markets. The findings from the 
research suggest that many of the cities in this study have lost dynamic comparative 
advantage over recent decades, losing key export activity and lagging in economic growth 
as a consequence.  
Conventionally economists have viewed comparative (or competitive advantage) in static 
terms, What matters, however, is dynamic comparative (or competitive) advantage, since 
over time advances in technology, shifts in competition (and competitors), trade patterns, and 
market conditions generally, mean that firms and industries need to adapt. It may also mean 
that some of a city’s firms and industries will decline, so policy will need to promote the 
conditions that maximise the potential for new firms, new technologies, new industries and 
new skills to develop to replace those in decline or no longer at the forefront of productivity 
or technological advance.   
Building a resilient economy 
Building a resilient economy refers to promoting an economy that is able both to better resist 
shocks and disruptions and to successfully recover from them when they do occur. Economic 
growth is not some smooth incremental process, but one periodically subject to shocks of 
various kinds, such as major recessions or financial crises. A key finding is that the average 
performance of many of the UK’s larger cities is typically one of lower resistance and 
recoverability than the national average in most of the recession-recovery cycles of the past 
forty years. In contrast, while London has not improved its resistance to shocks over this time, 
its ability to recover has improved with each shock it has faced. Since recoverability is key to 
long-run growth performance, this is one reason why London has pulled progressively ahead 
of the other large over recent decades.  
Many of the determinants of economic resilience are precisely those that make for a buoyant 
city economy, and key among these is the ability of a city to adapt over time. Adaptive 
resilience is central to successful recoverability. Dynamic comparative advantage is 
quintessentially about the capacity of a city’s firms, industries and workers to adapt to 
changing market and technological conditions. A city’s resilience is an ongoing process of 
upgrading and re-orientating its economic structures and comparative strengths. Economic 
policies – whether at national level or local (regional and city) level - have not hitherto been 
concerned with building resilience, yet the latter is central to long-run prosperity. How to 
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incorporate resilience building into policy-making on a number of fronts is now being actively 
considered int e EU for example.  
Promoting inclusive growth 
There is widespread concern that over the boom years that preceded the global financial 
crisis, and indeed in the hesitant recovery since, economic growth has tended to favour 
certain groups while leaving others behind. Real wages have stagnated for many groups in 
the labour market, but have been more robust for high-skilled workers. The result has been 
that wage inequalities have widened everywhere. Although UK employment has expanded, 
and has been much celebrated by Government, many new jobs have been low-wage and 
part-time, with inferior conditions and entitlements (the so-called ‘gig economy’)120. There are 
long-run trends and processes in motion, such as AI and robotics, associated with the 
changing nature of work, that are militating against the low-skilled and those without skills. A 
key policy objective must be to ensure a more inclusive mode of economic growth in our 
cities, involving the creation of an employment base not only sufficient to provide jobs for all 
those seeking work, but also consisting of good quality jobs paying decent wages. This will 
require policy action on several fronts. Measures that improve the minimum wage to a 
liveable standard will help in the short-run. But over the longer term, policy needs to help 
raise the skill levels across a city’s workforce while at the same time promoting and supporting 
the economic activities that will enable those skilled workers to find local jobs, rather than 
being forced to move to those cities and regions where attractive jobs can be found. Over the 
post-war period in the UK, the net movement of the more educated and enterprising workers 
has been from northern cities and regions to London and the south-eastern region of the 
country.  This has benefitted the latter, but hindered the growth and prosperity of the former. 
Promoting a more inclusive mode of growth require both supply-side and demand-side 
policies. 
Ensuring quality of life 
Quality of life has to do with the general well-being of individuals and societies, and spans 
everything from cost of living, physical health, family, education, employment, wealth, 
safety, transport, security to freedom, religious beliefs, and the environment. Various 
composite ‘quality of life indices’ have been compiled for UK cities and for major cities 
across the world, and no two lists are the same because of different methodologies and 
factors included. But the evidence suggests that UK cities do not compare favourably with 
similar sized cities in the EU, or even in the USA.  Edinburgh ranks the highest both in 
 
120 See https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/1309457/6_Insecurity_Minireport_Final.pdf. 
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international tables and UK rankings.  In UK rankings, Nottingham, Belfast and Liverpool 
have much lower quality of life indices than Birmingham, Bristol and Leeds. Quality of life 
and well-being are not only desirable in their own right, but also for the positive impacts 
they have on attracting both business and workers. 
A final thought… 
While this thesis deals mostly on the economic and financial forces, one recent idea put 
forward by the Economist (2017)121 focussed on political centralisation and the idea that 
Parliament should move north to Manchester, particularly in the context of the vast repairs 
needed on the Houses of Parliament. Perhaps a bolder plan could be considered whereby 
Parliament rotates between the main cities of the UK, in the same way that the Royal Court 
moved around the country in Tudor times. Such a move would truly signal a real political 
desire for rebalancing, and make politicians more acutely aware of the issues in different 
areas of what is increasingly a Disunited Kingdom.  
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Appendix A: Data Definitions 
Table A1: 45-sector and 82-sector disaggregation 
45 Sectors 82 Sectors SIC 2007 
codes (82 
Sector) 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
Crop and animal production, hunting and 
related service activities 1 
 Forestry and logging 2 
 Fishing and aquaculture 3 
Mining & quarrying Mining of coal and lignite 5 
 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 6 
 Mining of metal ores 7 
 Other mining and quarrying 8 
 Mining support service activities 9 
Food, drink & tobacco Manufacture of food products 10 
 Manufacture of beverages 11 
 Manufacture of tobacco products 12 
Textiles etc Manufacture of textiles 13 
 Manufacture of wearing apparel 14 
 Manufacture of leather and related products 15 
Wood & paper 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood 
and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 16 
 Manufacture of paper and paper products 17 
Printing & recording Printing and reproduction of recorded media 18 
Coke & petroleum 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products 19 
Chemicals 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products 20 
Pharmaceuticals 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical preparations 21 
Non-metallic mineral 
products Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 22 
 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 23 
Metals & metal products Manufacture of basic metals 24 
 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment 25 
Electronics 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and 
optical products 26 
Electrical equipment Manufacture of electrical equipment 27 
Machinery 








Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 29 
Other transport equipment Manufacture of other transport equipment 30 
Other manufacturing & repair Manufacture of furniture 31 
 
Other manufacturing; Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 32, 33 
Electricity & gas 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 35 
Water, sewerage & waste Water collection, treatment and supply 36 
 Sewerage 37 
 
Waste collection, treatment and disposal 
activities; materials recovery 38 
 
Remediation activities and other waste 
management services. This division includes 
the provision of remediation services, i.e. the 
cleanup of contaminated buildings and sites, 
soil, surface or ground water. 39 
Construction 
Construction of buildings, Civil engineering, 
Specialised construction activities 41,42,43 
Motor vehicles trade 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 45 
Wholesale trade 
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 46 
Retail trade 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 47 
Land transport Land transport and transport via pipelines 49 
Water transport Water transport 50 
Air transport Air transport 51 
Warehousing & postal 
Warehousing and support activities for 
transportation 52 
 Postal and courier activities 53 
Accommodation Accommodation 55 
Food & beverage services Food and beverage service activities 56 
Media Publishing activities 58 
 
Motion picture, video and television 
programme production, sound recording and 
music publishing activities 59 
 Programming and broadcasting activities 60 
 Telecommunications 61 
IT services 
Computer programming, consultancy and 
related activities 62 
 Information service activities 63 
Financial & insurance 
Financial service activities, except insurance 
and pension funding 64 
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Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, 
except compulsory social security 65 
 
Activities auxiliary to financial services and 
insurance activities 66 
Real estate Real estate activities 68 
Legal & accounting Legal and accounting activities 69 
Head offices & management 
consultancies 
Activities of head offices; management 
consultancy activities 70 
Architectural & engineering 
services 
Architectural and engineering activities; 
technical testing and analysis 71 
 Scientific research and development 72 
Other professional services Advertising and market research 73 
 
Other professional, scientific and technical 
activities 74 
 Veterinary activities 75 
Business support services Rental and leasing activities 77 
 Employment activities 78 
 
Travel agency, tour operator and other 
reservation service and related activities 79 
 Security and investigation activities 80 
 Services to buildings and landscape activities 81 
 
Office administrative, office support and other 
business support activities 82 
Public Administration & 
Defence 
Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 84 
Education Education 85 
Health Human health activities 86 
Residential & social Residential care activities 87 
 Social work activities without accommodation 88 
Arts Creative, arts and entertainment activities 90 
Recreational services 
Libraries, archives, museums and other 
cultural activities 91 
 Gambling and betting activities 92 
 
Sports activities and amusement and 
recreation activities 93 
 Activities of membership organisations 94 
Other services 
Repair of computers and personal and 
household goods 95 













Appendix B: Chapter 6 Technical Results 
Table B1: Initial regression with insignificant results 
 
Dependent Variable: EMPLGR8115  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/14/17   Time: 13:42   
Sample: 1 85    
Included observations: 85   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.011066 1.176328 2.559717 0.0128 
HSKILLSSH81 0.020137 0.010644 1.891862 0.0630 
EMPL81 -0.148121 0.090383 -1.638818 0.1061 
AGGLOM81 -0.177150 0.071066 -2.492768 0.0152 
MANSH81 -0.001876 0.008777 -0.213719 0.8314 
KIBSSH81 -0.012991 0.016302 -0.796904 0.4284 
KSI81 -0.971807 0.563138 -1.725699 0.0892 
PROD81 0.029229 0.020680 1.413375 0.1623 
NEDUM -0.540688 0.211290 -2.558980 0.0128 
NWDUM -0.294684 0.160419 -1.836963 0.0708 
SCDUM -0.721202 0.167742 -4.299472 0.0001 
WADUM -0.573671 0.221511 -2.589812 0.0118 
LODUM 0.146824 0.463247 0.316946 0.7523 
EMDUM -0.102202 0.165313 -0.618236 0.5386 
EEDUM -0.062162 0.128728 -0.482895 0.6308 
WMDUM -0.023202 0.164221 -0.141284 0.8881 
YHDUM -0.244487 0.156473 -1.562487 0.1230 
SWDUM -0.015012 0.159301 -0.094237 0.9252 
CAPCIT 0.417022 0.267693 1.557837 0.1241 
NEWTOWN 0.543435 0.126430 4.298289 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.721973    Mean dependent var 0.756988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.640703    S.D. dependent var 0.508699 
S.E. of regression 0.304921    Akaike info criterion 0.664797 
Sum squared resid 6.043496    Schwarz criterion 1.239538 
Log likelihood -8.253860    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.895974 
F-statistic 8.883680    Durbin-Watson stat 2.096874 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix C: Chapter 7 Additional Figures 
Figure C.1 The Falling Share of Manufacturing Employment by City, 1971-2015  
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.3 The Uneven Growth of Public Sector Employment by City, 1971-2015 
 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.5 The Falling Export Share of City Employment, 1971-2015 
 
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.7 The Growth in Labour Productivity by City, 1971-2015 
 
 
Figure A.8  The Localisation of Patenting Across Cities, 1990 and 2012 
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